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PRACTITIONERS’ PERSPECTIVES ON ALTERNATIVES TO THE
PAPER-BASED SYSTEM FOR PREVENTING WELFARE FRAUD
Timothy Jerome Cole, D.P.A.
Western Michigan University, 2000
Federal agencies have begun to devote greater attention to detecting welfare
fraud. This dissertation reviews three proposed alternatives to the current PaperBased system for preventing welfare fraud, namely, the Paper-Based system with
Fingerprint Imaging, Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT), and EBT with Fingerprint
Imaging. It also examines the policy implications likely to result from implementation
of these various systems.
Practitioners were randomly selected from agency directories and mailed a
survey. Information was sought on their socioeconomic background, professional
affiliations, and opinions on several welfare fraud detection systems.
Statistically significant differences in their responses resulted from differences
in their socioeconomic backgrounds, agency affiliations, and professions. Law
enforcement, city and county employees, and noncollege graduates more often
preferred the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system for preventing the most common
forms of welfare fraud. EBT administrators, state and federal practitioners, college
graduates, and city and county respondents placed their confidence in the
technologies of fingerprinting as the most accurate means to identify an individual
and opted for combining EBT with Fingerprinting system.
State, federal, and EBT administrators over 40 years o f age feared it would
be difficult to prevent unauthorized access to welfare recipient fingerprints and to
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provide real time data with such a system. There was also concern that use of
Personal Identification Numbers would not positively prove who was accessing
benefits.
Three major policy concerns were expressed by the respondents about the
generally preferred EBT with Fingerprint Imaging System: (1) its excessive cost,
(2) the feasibility o f limiting access to authorized representatives, and (3) the threat
posed by fingerprinting to the constitutional rights of welfare recipients.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem
For many years the Paper-Based system o f distributing welfare benefits has
been accused o f being manipulated by criminals who steal from the poor and defraud
the government. The four most common forms of fraud are: (1) duplicate assistance
fraud, when individuals use an assumed name and false identification to apply for
benefits for which they are already receiving; (2) coupons and checks that are stolen
directly from the recipients or from their mailboxes; (3) welfare benefits that are
counterfeited; and (4) food stamp trafficking, which is the illegal sale and purchase of
food stamps. Oftentimes recipients are attacked for their benefits or just after cashing
their welfare check. This many times goes unreported, and thus may not be
considered a major crime. It has been suggested that fingerprinting applicants for
welfare benefits will deter fraud. The latest technology involves a process called
Fingerprint Imaging. Computers are used to scan and digitize fingerprints by
automatically creating a spatial geometiy or map o f the unique ridge patterns of the
prints and translating the spatial relationship into a binary code for the computersearching algorithm.
The Los Angeles Department of Social Services and the New York City
Department o f Social Services have used the process of identifying individuals who

1
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have applied for welfare benefits. Both systems have been successful in preventing
fraud in the enrollment phase of receiving benefits.
Fingerprint Imaging identifies recipients who are applying for benefits under
an assumed name after a database search has been completed. If a national
Fingerprint Imaging system is established, it will detect those individuals applying for
benefits in two different states. Fingerprint Imaging has proven to have an impact on
duplicate assistance fraud (fraud that occurs at the time an individual applies for
benefits). However, this system has not been proven to have any impact on the other
forms o f fraud that occur in the welfare system (stolen benefits, counterfeiting, and
food stamp trafficking).
A planned alternative to the Paper-Based system being used by many states is
the Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) system. The EBT system provides welfare
benefits through an Automated Teller Machine (ATM) and a Point of Sale (POS)
terminal located in grocery stores. The EBT system can replace the multiple PaperBased system with a single integrated electronic system that delivers benefits for a
full range of federal and state programs. The EBT system has been heavily promoted
as an alternative to the more traditional Paper-Based system. “An important planned
benefit o f converting from paper to electronic delivery is the EBT system’s value in
reducing fraud abuse and inefficiency” (EBT Task Force, 1993, p. 16).
Currently, 38 states have implemented EBT pilot projects or are considering
implementing a pilot project soon. Unfortunately, not all EBT pilot projects have
been successful in preventing fraud. “In Reading, Pennsylvania, a sandwich shop
trafficked $200,000 in food stamps before investigators, by using a sting operation,
were able to track and identify the illegal activity” (EBT Task Force, 1993, p. 17).
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States are investing millions o f dollars in EBT systems with the assumption
the system will prevent the types o f fraud that have occurred repeatedly in the PaperBased system. However, it appears there is a chance the same forms of fraud that
occurred in the Paper-Based system will still take place in the EBT system. It has not
been determined that distributing welfare benefits electronically will prevent
individuals from applying for benefits they are already receiving. EBT cards can be
stolen and, with knowledge of a Personal Identification Number (PIN), an
unauthorized individual can have access to benefits for which they are not entitled.
EBT cards are similar to credit/debit cards in that they can be counterfeited. Financial
institutions have been struggling to combat counterfeiting o f credit/debit cards for
many years.
Some EBT pilot projects have been vulnerable to food stamp trafficking.
Very similar to the Paper-Based system, food benefits are bought and sold illegally
between welfare recipients and food store owners and/or employees.
Investigations have resulted in store owners/employees processing the EBT
card through a card reader to indicate a purchase was made. The store
owner/employee will then pay the welfare recipient S.50 to $.75 on the dollar and
then receive full reimbursement from the United States Treasury.
Millions of dollars are lost to fraud and abuse in the welfare system. Federal
and state agencies are investing taxpayer dollars in hopes of preventing these welfare
crimes that have traditionally occurred. The question facing public agencies is which
system will most effectively prevent fraud, if any, and what are the policy implications
associated with implementing such a system? A review o f all three systems is
necessary in order to answer these questions.
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Purpose o f the Study
The purpose of this research study is to objectively evaluate three alternatives
to the welfare Paper-Based system in terms of preventing fraud and to look into what
policy implications are involved with implementing an alternative. The three
alternatives to the Paper-Based system for this study are: Paper-Based with
Fingerprint Imaging, Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT), and EBT with Fingerprint
Imaging. The research concentrates on identifying each system’s capacity to prevent
the four most common forms o f fraud, determine if one alternative can prevent all
fraud, determine if one alterative can provide fraud prevention benefits, identify
technologies that will and will not prevent fraud, and examine potential policy
implications for the alternatives. The four most common forms o f fraud are duplicate
assistance fraud, counterfeiting, stolen benefits, and food stamp trafficking. These
crimes have traditionally occurred in the welfare system. The alternative systems are
judged in terms of preventing each common form o f fraud. For example, the PaperBased system used in association with Fingerprint Imaging will be evaluated on its
ability to prevent duplicate assistance fraud. A survey seeking nominal, ordinal data
and policy implications was sent to individuals across the country who are directly
involved in welfare fraud to identify their perceptions o f the effectiveness of the
alternative delivery and identification systems. Comparisons are made based social
and demographic characteristics that are found to be significantly different when
compared. These respondents either investigate welfare fraud, administer welfare
programs in which fraud is committed, or are responsible for delivering benefits to
the rightful recipient. The social and demographic characteristics that utilized in this
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study are profession, employer, employer’s involvement with EBT or Fingerprint
Imaging, age, educational levels, gender, race, and years of experience.
Recommendations are made based on the data collected as to which particular
system best prevents fraud (if any), changes to the welfare system that are necessary
to prevent all fraud, benefits produced as a result of preventing fraud, and
technologies that will and will not prevent fraud.
It is the intent o f this research project to offer direction and guidance, mainly
to the state of Michigan, but also to other state and federal agencies in choosing a
welfare distribution system that best prevents fraud.
Significance of the Study
“To paraphrase the late economist Ernst Shumacker, the smart person solves
problems, the genius avoids them. Preventing crime is easier and cheaper than
treating it” (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992, p. 223).
This study will provide information from individuals involved in law
enforcement, welfare benefit administration, and EBT administration that will assist
state and federal governments in choosing an effective system to prevent fraud from
occurring in welfare programs or in determining that none of the alternatives will
prevent fraud. According to Killerane (1996), 10% of all welfare benefits ($2.2
billion) is lost to fraud in the Paper-Based system (p. 1327). To combat such crimes,
state and federal governments are investing millions and millions of dollars in
Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) and Fingerprint Imaging systems. As a result o f
these new methods to identify individuals and distribute benefits electronically, high
expectations are being placed on government officials to do a better job of preventing
welfare fraud. This study will examine the perspectives of individuals regarding
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whether EBT or Fingerprint Imaging alone will prevent fraud in the welfare system,
whether it is necessary to combine the two systems, or whether no current alternative
is available that will prevent fraud. This study will also review potential policy
implications for the three alternatives. This study is significant since no state has
combined both EBT with a Fingerprint Imaging system. Thus, no data exist that
would demonstrate the potential of EBT with Fingerprint Imaging as an alternative to
the Paper-Based system. Perspectives were gathered from professionals in law
enforcement, EBT administration, and welfare benefit administration on the three
alternatives to the Paper-Based system: Paper-Based with Fingerprint Imaging, EBT,
and EBT with Fingerprint Imaging. All o f these respondents are directly involved
with the prevention of welfare fraud. Each one o f these respondents offers a unique
perspective on fraud prevention. For example, law enforcement professionals provide
a crime prevention view; welfare benefits administrators, a welfare system’s position;
and EBT administration, an electronic delivery perspective. City and county
respondents provide a perspective o f being directly involved with a distribution
system. State and federal respondents offer an administrative delivery distribution
perspective.
There have been very few EBT pilot projects reviewed whose primary focus
was fraud prevention. The evaluations that have been completed have left many
questions unanswered. As Robert Robinson (1994), Secretary of the United States
Department o f Agriculture, points out:
We believe that EBT could reduce fraud and abuse in the Food Stamp
program, particularly fraud from mail theft. However, it does not appear that
EBT would have a major impact on reducing fraud and abuse at the time
recipients apply for food stamps. Furthermore, while EBT has the potential to
reduce the sale or trading of food stamps, the amount of reduction that would
result from using EBT is unclear at this time. (p. 1)
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Unfortunately, not being able to prevent fraud can cost the taxpayers in terms of
dollars lost to fraud and moneys spent to investigate. “States spent $83 million in
conducting recipient anti-fraud investigations in 1992” (Robinson, 1994, p. S).
It is important for research to examine if the three alternatives (Paper-Based with
Fingerprint Imaging, EBT, and EBT with Fingerprint Imaging) are a means to
prevent fraud.
Fingerprint Imaging has been successful in identifying those individuals who
are applying for state assistance under an assumed name. However, Fingerprint
Imaging’s impact on the other forms o f fraud has not been clearly identified. For
example, what impact will Fingerprint Imaging have on counterfeiting, on stolen
benefits being used by unauthorized individuals, or food stamp trafficking? Data need
to be gathered to chose a system that will decrease crimes committed against the
poor and the government units trying to provide for them. Federal and state agencies
are pursuing different directions in their fraud prevention measures. There needs to
be one alternative offered to states that will prevent fraud from occurring and that
will positively identify those truly in need.
Summary o f Chapter I
Estimates are that 10% of all welfare benefits are lost to fraud and abuse.
Clearly, issues exist that must be resolved before states invest additional moneys in
welfare benefit systems with the assumption that all forms o f fraud will be prevented.
Many o f these issues involve problems implementing a new system and what program
outcomes will result. Research needs to be completed on alternatives to the PaperBased system. Each alternative must be examined in order to critique preventive
measures and pinpoint vulnerabilities within the systems. At this time, the only
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method that mists to compare the Paper-Based system with Fingerprint Imaging, to
Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT), to EBT with Fingerprint Imaging is to gather
perspectives o f those who have been professionally responsible for combating the
fraud problem in the welfare system.
Overview of the Chapters
This research is organized into seven chapters. Included in Chapter I are an
introduction, a statement of the problem, and the purpose of the study.
The next chapter, Chapter n, will provide background information about the
three systems that are being reviewed: the Paper-Based system with Fingerprint
Imaging, Electronic Benefits Transfer, and Electronic Benefits Transfer with
Fingerprint Imaging. Information will be provided about the application distribution
and the use o f benefits for each system. Chapter III provides a review o f current
literature that is relevant to the research question, methodology, instrumentation, and
statistical analysis. Chapter IV presents the conceptual framework, which explores
the three models o f the study.
Chapter V consists of the methodology, with descriptions o f the research
design, sample population, instrumentation, data collection procedures, and
procedures for the statistical analysis. Data analysis and research findings are
presented in Chapter VI, and the summary, conclusions, and recommendations are in
Chapter VII.
The next chapter o f the study will provide background information of the
application, processing, and distribution of welfare benefits.
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CHAPTER n
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Introduction
The following information provides a description o f the application,
distribution, and use of welfare benefits for the Paper-Based, Paper-Based with
Fingerprint Imaging, Electronic Benefits Transfer, and Electronic Benefits Transfer
with Fingerprint Imaging systems. These forms of state assistance will be reviewed:
Aid to Families o f Dependent Children (AFDC), or also known as Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families; Medicaid (MA); and Food Stamps (FS). The process
to apply for welfare benefits differs slightly from state to state. However, ADC, MA,
and FS are all federally funded programs; thus, states must meet the same criteria
during the application process. The State of Michigan’s application process will be
reviewed for the Paper-Based system. The source of this information will be the
Michigan Family Independence Agency’s Program Administrative M anual (1994).
Paper-Based System
Application Process
An individual may up pick up an application for AFDC benefits at the local
county social services office. On the same day a person comes to the local office, he
or she has the right to fill an application and receive local office help to provide the
minimum information for filing. For individuals who cannot come to the local county
9
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office, they may request an application via telephone or letter to receive AFDC
benefits. A social service worker must reply by phone call or letter within 5 days.
Once the application is completed, an interview is scheduled for the applicant.
The interview’s purpose is to explain the social service’s program
requirements to the applicant and determine eligibility. The interview is an official and
confidential discussion. Its scope must be limited to circumstances directly related to
determining the group’s (mother, father, and children) eligibility and benefits.
Another purpose of the interview is to offer information on programs and services
available through social services and other programs. In Michigan, the social service
worker is responsible for the following during the interview: state the client’s rights
and responsibilities, review and update the application, resolve any unclear or
inconsistent information, request any needed information not brought to the
interview, advise the client on agency standard operating procedures, and provide
information on other social service programs and make referrals if needed.
A member of the group must be designated as a grantee for the purpose o f
case identification and benefit issuance. Normally, the group picks the grantee. The
social services worker may designate a member if policy prohibits the group’s choice
from acting as the grantee, or if the group fails to designate a grantee or disagrees
about who it should be.
The grantee must be considered a resident. A person is a resident if he or she
is not receiving assistance from another state, is living in the state where the benefits
are issued, except for a temporary absence, at the time of application, and intends to
remain in the state permanently or indefinitely.
To be eligible for AFDC benefits, a group must be in financial need. In
Michigan, financial need exists when the group’s monthly income is less than its
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monthly need requirements based on assistance standards. Also, the group’s assets
cannot exceed the asset limit to qualify for AFDC. In Michigan, the following are
considered assets: cash and deposits in banks and warrants; lump sum payments such
as lottery winnings and inheritance; trusts, promissory notes, and accounts receivable;
uncashed checks, draft deposits in savings and loans and credit unions; stocks, bonds,
and securities; money in pension plans; income tax returns; real property, mortgages
and loan contracts; vehicles, boats, tools, and machinery.
Another factor in determining the grant amount is countable income. In
Michigan the amount of the grant is determined by subtracting countable income
from the appropriate assistance standard to determine benefits. The following is
considered countable income: adoption subsidies, disability benefits, child support,
spousal support, rental income, Supplemental Social Security Income, veterans’
payments, unemployment payments, earnings from income, strike pay, and military
allotments.
Under the Paper-Based system, grantees are mailed AFDC checks usually
twice monthly. The checks are mailed to the grantee’s last known address. Grantees
are responsible for cashing AFDC checks at a local financial institution or check
cashing center.
Regarding application for food stamps in Michigan, food stamps can be issued
to an individual or to a group (mother, father, and children). An application may be
made in person, by letter, or by phone call. For food stamp eligibility, the social
service worker must determine the following: who lives together; of those living
together, who purchases and prepares food; and the relationship o f the people living
together.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

12
In Michigan, generally persons who live together and purchase and prepare
food together are members o f the same food stamp group. An example is a family of
four: husband, wife, and two children are members of the same food stamp group. A
recipient o f food stamps is a grantee o f public assistance. A grantee can have
residence while living in Michigan for any purposes other than a vacation, even if the
grantee has no intent to remain in the state permanently or indefinitely. Lack of a
permanent dwelling or a fixed mailing address does not affect a person’s state
residence status. If the grantee has no permanent address, food stamps can be picked
up at the local county social services office or mailed to an address agreed upon
between the grantee and the social services worker.
In Michigan, an applicant for food stamps (FS) will be asked to provide some
form o f verification such as a voter registration card, a wage stub, or a birth
certificate. Food stamp applicants who do not have a Social Security number must
apply for one. To be eligible for food stamps, the group must meet the same financial
eligibility factors (income and asset requirements) as for AFDC.
All FS groups are evaluated for expedited Food Stamp Service. Food stamp
groups can receive food stamps the same day if they have less than SI 50 in monthly
gross income and $100 or less in liquid assets, or they are destitute migrant or
seasonal farm workers with less than $100 in liquid assets, or the group’s combined
gross liquid assets are less than its monthly rent and/or mortgage payments plus heat
and other utilities.
As a condition of Food Stamp and AFDC eligibility, certain groups must
complete and return a monthly report concerning income and changes in
circumstances. In Michigan, failure to report will result in case closure. Each program
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has its own categories of mandatory monthly reporting. Therefore, a combination of
programs must be evaluated separately for reporting requirements.
For Medicaid (MA) eligibility in Michigan, an application for MA may be
made in person, by letter, or by phone call. An MA applicant’s income and assets are
reviewed for eligibility. Only a person’s own income and assets and those o f Iris or
her spouse and those of his or her parents can be used to determine the applicant’s
eligibility. For example, a child’s income and assets cannot be used to determine
eligibility for his parents or siblings.
In Michigan, AFDC recipients are automatically eligible for MA benefits.
Thus, most of the application requirements for AFDC apply to MA. In Michigan, if
an applicant is applying for MA, he or she would still have to provide verification of
assets and income. The MA applicant would have to be considered a resident o f the
state, which means he or she is not receiving welfare benefits from another state,
living in the state where the benefits were issued except for a temporary absence. The
applicant must plan on remaining in the state permanently or indefinitely. The social
services worker will verify that the applicant is not covered by any private health care
before processing the application for MA. As with Food Stamp and AFDC, MA
eligibility groups must complete and return a monthly report concerning income and
changes in circumstances.
Distribution of Benefits
In the distribution of welfare benefits under the Paper-Based system,
according to the Food and Nutritional Services, $6.1 billion of the S20 billion in food
stamps benefits issued in fiscal year 1992 were distributed through the mail
(Robinson, 1994, p. 3).
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AFDC checks are usually mailed to recipients twice monthly, food stamps are
mailed once monthly, and Medicaid cards are mailed once yearly in the State of
Michigan. The Michigan Family Independence Agency replaces lost, stolen,
destroyed, or not received checks. Replacement must be requested by the last
workday of the fourth calendar month after the date the check was issued. Recipients
of welfare benefits are to inform the local county social services agency o f their most
current address. Grantees who lack a permanent address may pick up their benefits at
the local county social services agency. Food stamp recipients may be issued
replacement o f food stamps, which have been reported lost, destroyed, mutilated,
stolen, or not received. Food stamps can be replaced only twice within 6 months if
one of the following occurs: food stamps are not received, stolen, reported lost, or
misplaced after receipt. Grantees must complete a replacement affidavit to have food
stamps replaced. The signed replacement affidavit must be received by the local
county social services agency within 10 days o f the original report of loss by the
grantee.
Use of Welfare Benefits
Food stamps can be used to buy eligible food items at any Food and
Nutritional Services authorized retail store or approved meal provider. Eligible food
includes: any food or food product intended for human consumption except alcoholic
beverages, tobacco, and foods prepared for immediate consumption. The following
types of food stamp recipients may purchase prepared food in certain Food and
Nutritional Service approved restaurants: grantees 60 years of age and over and their
spouses, blind and disabled grantees and their spouses, and homeless individuals.
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AFDC benefits can be used to provide shelter, clothing, and other basic needs
of maintenance for recipients and their children. Grantees may cash their AFDC
checks and use the money at their discretion.
In the area o f Medicaid usage, grantees and those covered by Medicaid may
use their cards at hospitals, at doctors’ offices, for prescriptions, and for health care
services when no private insurance is available. Grantees must present their MA card
and sign for the services provided.
Paper-Based System With Fingerprint Imaging
Application Process
Typically, the social service agency will first provide the individual seeking
welfare assistance with information regarding the Fingerprint Imaging process. The
applicant will then be required to provide personal identification such as a Social
Security number, a birth certificate, or a driver’s license. After a short wait, the
applicant’s fingerprint image will be obtained, and the system will begin to search for
a match. If no match is found, the operator will complete the enrollment o f the client
into the system by taking the photo image and keying the applicant’s personal
information. However, if a match is found, the operator will typically consult with the
applicant regarding the accuracy of the personal information initially supplied. What
occurs next in the chain of authority is likely to differ among various counties and
states that implement such procedures. However, for purposes of this model, Suffolk
County, New York, procedures require the operator to advise the eligibility examiner
of the discrepancy. If the eligibility examiner cannot resolve the conflict, he or she
must bring the matter to the attention o f the eligibility supervisor. If a conflict
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remains, the supervisor notifies the Special Identification Unit, which performs
manual review of the prints. If at this point, the review confirms the match, the case
may be denied or closed.
Distribution o f Benefits
Disbursement of benefits is the same under the Paper-Based with Fingerprint
Imaging as it is under the Paper-Based system.
Use of Welfare Benefits
Use o f welfare benefits is the same under the Paper-Based system with
Fingerprint Imaging as it is under the Paper-Based system.
Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) System
Application Process

The application for Aid to Families of Dependent Children, Food Stamps, and
Medicaid under the EBT system is virtually the same as it was for the Paper-Based
system. The social services worker will review the applicant’s income and assets and
residency requirements. The applicant will be asked to provide personal
identification. However, there are some differences between the Paper-Based system
and the EBT system.
Applicants who are approved for AFDC, Food Stamps, or Medicaid receive
plastic cards with a magnetic stripe, photograph, and signature panel. If applicants
cannot demonstrate at the end o f training sessions that they can use an ATM
machine, they are then restricted to using only Point o f Sale (POS) machines at
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grocery stores (Wood & Smith, 1991). After the training sessions have been
completed, grantees are assigned a Personal Identification Number (PIN). Grantees
are instructed to keep their PIN confidential. Participation in EBT training is
mandatory for recipients except for those who have experience using ATMs and
Point of Sale (POS) machines.
Distribution o f Benefits
To access benefits, a grantee goes to a terminal that may be dedicated to the
system or may be part of an existing Automated Teller Machine (ATM) or Point of
Sale (POS) network. When the grantee inserts the card, a device reads the magnetic
stripe. In the case o f an attended terminal, the grantee presents the card to a cleric
who sweeps the card through the stripe reader. The grantee’s identity is usually
verified by the PIN, and the terminal communicates with an authorization center to
ascertain that the recipient is eligible for benefits, the card has not been reported lost
or stolen, and benefits are available (Wood & Smith, 1991, p. 1). The central
processor stores and consolidates the retailer redemption information.
Once each day, the central processor prepares a magnetic tape in ACH format
for delivery to a contractor financial institution and off-setting debit to the contractor
financial institution. The Federal Reserve processes the tape in the night cycle to
apply credits to the appropriate retailer’s financial institution and an off-setting debit
to the contractor financial institution. The contractor financial institution then initiates
a wire transfer to request reimbursement from Food and Nutritional Service’s letter
of credit account at the U.S. Treasury.
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Use o f Welfare Benefits
The EBT card and system should link and operate like commercial credit and
debit card systems widely used across this country. Grantees should be able to
purchase food items at any grocery store that is authorized by the United States
Department o f Agriculture. AFDC grantees will be able to access benefits from an
ATM.
Electronic Benefits Transfer System With Fingerprint Imaging
Application Process

The application for welfare benefits (AFDC, MA, and Food Stamps) under
the Electronic Benefits Transfer with Fingerprint Imaging is very similar to the
process under the Paper-Based system and the Electronic Benefits Transfer system.
There are, however, a few differences. During the enrollment period, the agency will
provide the individual seeking welfare assistance with information regarding the
Fingerprint Imaging process. The applicant will then be required to provide personal
information such as a date o f birth. A live scan device attached to the enrollment
workstation captures fingerprint images from applicant for future comparison and
verification. The information collected to create a new applicant record then enters
the search/match process where it is compared against all existing database records.
The computer does not actually compare one fingerprint to another, but rather
conducts a mathematical search. The computer’s search algorithm converts the data
extracted by the scanner into a binary code, which is then used to search the
computer’s file. The computer, using a component called a matcher, can search an
applicant’s print against the database prints at a rate o f 500 to 600 prints per second.
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If a fingerprint match is found, the record can be forwarded to a dedicated fraud
investigation workstation for further review.
Distribution of Benefits
The disbursement o f benefits under the EBT system with Fingerprint Imaging
would be the same as when the EBT system funds are electronically deposited into
the recipient's account. The exception is in accessing benefits. A grantee goes to a
terminal that may be dedicated to the system or may be part of an existing Automated
Teller Machine (ATM) or Point of Sale (POS) network. The grantee must place his
or her index finger on a Fingerprint Image Reader. During disbursement at an ATM
or POS, there will be self-verification by the fingerprint reader to compare a fivescanned fingerprint with the same print encoded on the EBT card. Benefits cannot be
accessed unless there is a match between the live scanned print and the encoded print
on the EBT card. A fingerprint secured card cannot be used by anyone other than the
authorized recipient o f the entitled benefits. Every time the EBT card is used at an
ATM or POS, there must be an exact match between the fingerprint o f the individual
using the card and the fingerprint that is encoded on the card. Without an exact
match, benefits cannot be accessed.
Use o f Welfare Benefits
Grantees should be able to purchase food items at any grocery store that is
authorized by the United States Department of Agriculture and equipped with an
EBT/Fingerprint Imaging Card Reader. AFDC grantees will be able to access benefits
from an ATM with an EBT/Fingerprint Imaging Reader.
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Summary of Chapter II
In summary, this research project examines the failures of the current PaperBased system of preventing fraud and possible alternatives that would avert such
activity. The alternatives being considered are Fingerprint Imaging with the PaperBased system, Electronic Benefits Transfer, and Electronic Benefits Transfer with
Fingerprint Imaging. The process of applying for benefits under all three systems is
very similar. The greatest distinctions among the three systems are in the distribution
and use o f benefits. The Paper-Based system relies on checks and coupons being
mailed to recipients, while the EBT and EBT with Fingerprint Imaging benefits are
electronically deposited. Once recipients have received their benefits, they are not
required to provide any means o f personal identification to use their benefits with the
Paper-Based system. The EBT system requires recipients to use their Personal
Identification Number (PIN). The EBT system with Fingerprint Imaging requires the
use of both the PIN and an exact fingerprint match to access and use benefits.
The next chapter will review the current literature that is pertinent to this
study. The literature review relied on articles, reviews o f projects, and published
interviews written about Fingerprint Imaging Electronic Benefits Transfer and
welfare fraud. The literature is structured around the three welfare distribution
systems and how each system would combat the four main types o f fraud, namely,
duplicate assistance fraud, counterfeiting, stolen benefits, and food stamp trafficking.
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CHAPTER HI
LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
For many years there has been growing discontent with this country’s welfare
system. Part of the problem is the belief that welfare benefits are not being used for
their intended purpose, which is feeding and clothing the poor. It is thought that one
way to gain back the public’s confidence in our welfare system is to improve its
integrity. Welfare administrators face the challenge o f convincing taxpayers that those
receiving benefits are truly in need and will use them for their rightful purpose.
Because of this, states understand the importance o f preventing welfare fraud.
According to the American Public Welfare Association (1996), “States cited most
often the ability to detect and reduce fraud through Electronic Benefits Transfer.
Thirty-four states or 71% ranked this benefit among their top three choices for
switching from a Paper-Based system to a EBT system” (p. 13). The way in which
welfare benefits are distributed and the positive identification o f recipients can have a
great impact on the prevention of fraud. Currently, there are two systems o f
distributing welfare benefits: The Paper-Based system, which is the distribution of
welfare benefits by coupon or check, and the Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT)
system, which electronically deposits benefits into a welfare recipient’s account.
Some cities and states have implemented Fingerprint Imaging with the PaperBased system as a means to prevent fraud, but no state has implemented Fingerprint
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Imaging with an EBT system. There is limited literature and, as yet, apparently no
formal research published on the Paper-Based system, Benefits Transfer (EBT)
system, and the EBT system with Fingerprint Imaging system and fraud prevention.
Therefore, this literature review relied on articles, reviews o f projects, and published
interviews.
This literature review will describe the types of fraud that have occurred in
the Paper Based system and outline each system’s approach to preventing fraud, as
well as other issues
Welfare Fraud in the Paper-Based System
The current Paper-Based system o f distributing welfare benefits has been
accused o f being beset with fraudulent abuse. Food stamp coupons have been used
illegally to pay for everything from illegal drugs to a house. Coupons are often
redeemed or sold at discount for cash, often with the help o f unscrupulous retailers.
In some large cities in the United States, 25% of the welfare recipients are involved in
the food stamp trafficking, according to the EBT Task Force (1993, p. 1). Other
sources have indicated similar findings. Some news reports have estimated that one in
five food stamp transactions is fraudulent in some way, which is a major problem
when it relates to a S2S billion program.
For the recipients who sell their stamps, it is a profitable enterprise. They
convert something they never paid for into cash they can spend any way they choose.
For the buyer who typically pays between S.50 and S.7S on the dollar, it is also an
easy profit. As Mike Cooper of the United States Department o f Agriculture, Office
of Inspector General, points out, “Because food stamps were transferable and nearly
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impossible to trace, it was difficult to detect abuse in the system” (Hardy, 1995,
p. A25).
The Office of Inspector General (OIG), United States Department of
Agriculture, determined the following to be the most common forms o f welfare fraud.
The first form is duplicate assistance fraud, in which a person supplies false
identification claiming to be someone else. Second, individuals can counterfeit
benefits. Third, coupons are stolen from mail boxes. Fourth, recipients may misuse
coupons by selling or trading them for other items, which is referred to as trafficking.
Also included in the trafficking category is retailers’ misuse of coupons, for example,
selling them for cash (Robinson, 1994).
The check and coupon-based system can pose other fraudulent possibilities.
Because checks are lost or stolen, some recipients may never receive their checks and
may need to have them replaced. Also, recipients who must take the entire benefit
payment at once run risks in carrying several hundred dollars or more (Wood &
Smith, 1991, p. 1).
Reducing fraud is a high priority for state welfare agencies. In a survey
conducted by Glickman and associates in 1994, retailers in the pre-implementation
and post-implementation of EBT were asked about perceptions of fraud in the food
stamps system. In the pre-implementation, almost 49% reported that it was easy for
recipients to trade food stamps for cash, while only 14% of retailers thought it was
very hard for recipients to trade for cash (Glickman et al., 1994, p. 125). Those
surveyed by Glickman et al. were asked to compare only the Paper-Based system to
the EBT system. No other alternative, that is, the Paper-Based system with
Fingerprint Imaging or EBT with Fingerprint Imaging, was addressed.
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In summary, the first food stamp office in a major city opened in Detroit,
Michigan, in July of 1961 (Cole, 199S, p. 9). Soon afterwards, welfare benefit
administrators were faced with the dilemma of food stamp trafficking. The
distribution o f welfare benefits by a Paper-Based system has provided an opportunity
for criminals to steal from the poor and defraud the government of millions of dollars.
Paper-Based System With Fingerprint Imaging
The Paper-Based system distributes benefits by issuing checks or coupons.
Usually, a check or a book of food stamps is mailed monthly o r bi-weekly to the
recipient. Fingerprint Imaging is a part of the field of science called Biometric.
Biometric involves the scanning or recording o f some unique characteristic, such as
fingerprints; a comparison is then made to a digitized image on a database for
positive identification. Interest concerning welfare applications and Fingerprint
Imaging began in 1990 when Los Angeles County awarded a $9.2 million contract
for the Automated Fingerprint Imaging Reference Manual (AFERM) system.
According to Sack (1994), “The fingerprinting technique has been tried and found
cost effective in Los Angeles. It is designed to prevent welfare applicants from using
assumed names to collect benefits in more than one place” (p. 1).
The literature reveals that for many years there has been a problem with
individuals applying for assistance under an assumed name. A. number o f reasons
explain why this form of duplicate assistance fraud has increased in the welfare
system. According to Tanka (1996),
Over the past several years, the potential for duplicate assistance fraud has
increased dramatically due to three primary factors: easier access to false
identification; rapidly expanding caseload without a parallel increase in
caseworkers; increasing complex regulations and limited time to respond to
serious family situations, (p. 2)
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In New York, those trying to defraud the social services system use forged
documents and attempted to register for aid under more than one name or apply for
aid in more than one county. To prevent these types of fraud, New York Department
of Social Services installed an Automated Fingerprint Imaging system. In the first 4
months o f operation, more than 200 people were caught applying for benefits they
were already receiving. Additionally, 15,000 did not show up for their fingerprinting
appointments (Morpho, 1996, p. 1). Further, the State ofNew York completed
fingerprint matches o f their welfare registers with those o f five neighboring states and
found 4,200 individuals receiving state assistance from more than one state (Morpho,
1996, p. 1). The results available so far show AFIRM to be highly effective in
combating multiple-case fraud. Preliminary data show AFIRM will lead to significant
benefits savings, potentially as high as SI 16 million, before recidivism over the
remaining 26 months of the pilot (Tanka, 1996, p. 4). In the City o f Los Angeles, a
Fingerprint Imaging system was also implemented in 1996. In the first 6 months of
operation, 3,021 cases were terminated and 242 new applications were denied.
According to Warfel and Miller (1994), savings attributed to the Los Angeles system
was $5.4 million (p. 8).
The U.S. Secret Service has commented favorably on Los Angeles County’s
efforts because of the benefits that a fingerprint enrollment verification system offers.
These same officials maintain “that failure to use the available fingerprinting
technology to deter fraud in the initial enrollment phase of the program may open the
entire system to fraud and abuse” (United States General Accounting Office, 1995,
p. 7). It appears that Fingerprint Imaging may have an impact on duplicate assistance
fraud; however, it may not be the complete answer to the welfare fraud problem.
According to Killerane (1996),
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Fingerprinting is not a panacea for all forms of welfare fraud. In addition to
the use o f multiple aliases to obtain additional benefits, criminals may also
underreport income on public assistance. They may also trade their benefits,
such as food stamps, for cash or goods on the street, (p. 1332)
Killerane points out that Fingerprint Imaging may deter duplicate assistance fraud but
would have little impact on other types o f fraud such as counterfeiting o f benefits or
benefits being stolen and used by an authorized individual for food stamp trafficking.
Other Legal Issues Related to Fingerprinting
Not everyone believes Fingerprint Imaging is the solution to the welfare fraud
problem. One o f the major arguments against Fingerprint Imaging is the belief that it
criminalizes welfare recipients. A president of a local NAACP chapter stated, “The
fact that people have to rely on welfare is already dehumanizing enough and for them
to have to now be fingerprinted makes it even more dehumanizing” (Killerane, 1996,
p. 1343). Several U.S. Supreme Court decisions deal directly with welfare and
outline an individual’s right to receive public assistance. Although once considered a
privilege, courts currently consider welfare benefits an entitlement.
In several U.S. Supreme Court cases, the rulings have been that as long as
states met the needs o f the poor, the method in which those needs are met does not
matter (Killerane, 1996, p. 1328). Fingerprint Imaging, or any other requirement for
public assistance, cannot interfere with the right of legitimately needy people to
obtain welfare benefits. Killerane points out, “Fingerprint Imaging does not deny
benefits to recipients; it merely prevents individuals from receiving more than their
fair share of welfare benefits” (p. 1339).
There is considerable literature written concerning the constitutional rights of
welfare recipients in begin fingerprinted. To satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment o f
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due process and right to privacy, a Fingerprint Imaging requirement for obtaining
public assistance must not deprive an individual o f life, liberty, or property without
due process o f law or abridge his privileges or immunities as a United States citizen.
In many situations, courts have regularly upheld fingerprinting against charges
that it violates the right to privacy. The Michigan Court of Appeals ruled in the case
o f Nuriel v. Young Women’s Christian Association o f Metropolitan Detroit, “Taking
and furnishing o f fingerprints is not violative o f constitutional prohibition against
compulsory self-incrimination, as prohibition protects only testimonial evidence”
(Michigan Court o f Appeals, 1990). Another example, in Davis v. M ississippi
(1969), the U.S. Supreme Court observed that fingerprinting involves none of the
probing into an individual’s private life and thoughts that resembles an interrogation
or search. Constance (1996) endorses the decisions made by the Supreme Court:
“Among the primary concerns o f those opposed to the prospect of Fingerprint
Imaging is the potential for an intrusion upon an individual’s right to privacy.
Fingerprint Imaging does not present a constitutional invasion of a privacy issue”
(p. 403).
The current legal literature points out that states can constitutionally
fingerprint individuals as a requirement for receiving public assistance. Wilson (1994)
supports this concept: “Fingerprint Imaging provides an unbiased approach to
positive identification of welfare recipients. There is never a group that is
discriminated against as a result of the use of Fingerprint Imaging” (p. 19). A
fingerprint does not indicate race, gender, height, or weight. Thus, a fingerprint is
less biased than a photograph. As Constance (1996) asserts, “Fingerprinting is not
punitive in nature, but rather a means of identification which is useful in many
circumstances, including the enforcement of laws” (p. 40S).
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To summarize, according to the current literature, Fingerprint Imaging is not
intended to scare away potential recipients o f public assistance. It is merely another
identification tool that officials will use to deliver the correct amount of aid as fairly
and quickly as possible. The U.S. Supreme Court has determined that fingerprinting
as a requirement for welfare benefits does not violate an individual’s constitutional
rights. The Paper-Based with Fingerprint Imaging and the EBT with Fingerprint
Imaging both use the fingerprinting process to identify those individuals who are
eligible to receive some form o f state assistance. Fingerprints are taken during the
application for welfare benefits. The purpose of the fingerprint process is to identify
those citizens who are eligible to receive public assistance. However, some have
viewed the process as criminalizing the welfare process. According to the literature,
this was not the intent. It is a means o f determining that the individual applying for
benefits is who they say they are. Therefore, Fingerprint Imaging programs are
subject only to a rational basis for review, which they can easily satisfy. The literature
indicates that preventing welfare fraud is a legitimate goal, and fingerprinting is a
rational means for achieving it. However, the literature also maintains that
fingerprinting welfare recipients will not totally prevent fraud from occurring. The
next section of the study will review the literature regarding EBT.
Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) System
States are required to implement the Electronic Benefits Transfer system by
the year 2002 unless waived. The EBT system had been promoted as a powerful
weapon in the prevention of fraud in the welfare system. Glickman and associates
(1994) interviewed retailers in states where EBT had been implemented. Retailers in
the pre-implementation and post-implementation stages were asked about their
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perceptions of fraud in the food stamp system. Glickman et al. interviewed recipients
who had used both the paper coupons and the EBT system. Recipients perceived it
harder to sell benefits for cash with EBT than with coupons. About 75% agreed or
strongly agreed with the statement, with only 20% disagreeing or strongly
disagreeing (p. 125).
The appeal of EBT to prevent fraud, in part, is based on the use of the
Personal Identification Number (PIN) to access benefits. This concept has been
endorsed by the executive administration. Vice President Al Gore stated that “the use
o f PINs would limit the transferability o f benefits and create an audit trail to track
where and when a particular card is being used” (Minaham, 1994, p. 1). The
American Public Welfare Association (APWA 1996) surveyed 48 states concerning
the status of EBT projects. O f those surveyed, 45 states (94%) plan to use PINs for
benefit security. In fact, all of the states surveyed plan to use PINs as a security
measure. Only those states not involved in the development o f EBT projects
indicated they were not sure about the use o f PINs (APWA 1996, p. 12). Recipients
are warned against sharing their PIN with any other individual. According to Wood
and Smith (1991), “State agencies currently apply rules for negligent behaviors that
impose the risk of loss on the client” (p. 12).
The current literature describes the use of a Personal Identification Number as
an advantage the EBT system has over any Paper-Based system. Whether the PIN
will deter fraud has not been fully explored. According to Craig Beauchamp, Deputy
Director of the United States Department o f Agriculture, Office of Inspector General,
“EBT and use of PIN will probably reduce street trafficking, and it certainly gives us
a great tool to identify the stores and recipients who are trafficking. It will not,
however, put an end to it” (Wood & Smith, 1991, p. 12). The APWA (1994)
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supports Beauchamp’s position of EBT as a fraud prevention tool: “While EBT must
not be seen as a cure-all for food stamp fraud, it does represent a major advance over
paper coupons” (p. 2). Texas Comptroller John Sharp also endorses the advantages
o f an EBT system over the Paper-Based system:
The paper coupons are often stolen and used to buy drugs. If one o f the new
cards is stolen, however, a single telephone call cancels the account. Also,
transmitting benefits electronically, rather than by mail, will clamp down on
thefts, (p. 9)
Gore, APWA, and Sharp’s comments did not address the EBT system’s ability to
prevent duplicate assistance fraud, counterfeiting, or food stamp trafficking.
There have been incidents where the EBT system has failed to prevent fraud.
Lutterbeck (199S) discovered “a store owner in Baltimore was arrested for
trafficking in $1.2 million dollars of EBT benefits in the course o f a year” (p. 11).
This account is consistent with the findings of Glickman et al. (1994): “It appears that
the selling of benefits for cash under EBT is much more difficult than under the
Paper-Based system, although it is still possible” (p. 139). Glickman et al. examined
three counties to review incidents of fraud after EBT had been implemented. The
problem with Glickman et al.’s results is that fraud under the EBT system may have
gone undetected, thus never accounted for, which would explain the large reduction.
For example, Glickman et al.’s study states that each county experienced a reduction
in fraud after EBT was implemented. However, if the recipient would allow his or her
EBT card to be processed in exchange for cash, this process would go virtually
undetected. Another example would be if a store employee has access to a recipient’s
PIN, he or she may be able to manually process a transaction without the EBT card.
Glickman et al. point this out: “There is no sound quantitative estimates of the
percentage of benefits sold for cash under EBT’ (p. 139). Glickman et al. also state:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

31
“EBT benefits are protected by the recipient’s PIN if the card is lost or stolen and the
remaining benefits on the card cannot be used without the PIN” (p. 121). Glickman
et al.’s study does not consider the crimes that can be committed once the PIN is
known by an unauthorized individual. As Bob Rasor, head of the Financial Crimes
Division of the U.S. Secret Service, which has jurisdiction over funds transferred
electronically, points out, “that number (PIN) is as good as cash” (Mannix, 1993,
p. 2).
In summary, the literature concerning EBT indicates that it will be more
difficult for individuals to commit welfare fraud; however, crimes will still occur
under this system. The four most common forms o f fraud that occurred in the PaperBased system (duplicate assistance fraud, stolen benefits, counterfeiting, and food
stamp trafficking) can still occur in the EBT system. Many EBT pilot projects across
the country have experienced fraud. The literature indicates that EBT has been shown
to have no impact on duplicate assistance fraud. EBT cards can still be counterfeited.
Cards can be stolen, and food stamp trafficking can still take place. The literature also
shows that welfare systems may experience new forms of fraud that did not occur
under the Paper-Based system (wire fraud, double swiping of cards, and the selling of
PINs). Much of the attention given to EBT as an alternative to the Paper-Based
system is based on its success in the private sector. Differences between government
units and the private sector exist. “Industry experts say there’s no central tracking
system among the ATM networks, mainly because each reported theft is relatively
small, usually totally under $1,000.00” (“Automated Teller Machine Fraud Grows,”
1993, p. 3).
Several other issues are raised in the literature concerning EBT and fraud.
The literature points out one of the advantages EBT has over the Paper-Based
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system in detecting fraud: EBT can provide data files that point out unusual
transactions or patterns that can be investigated. When the EBT system was
introduced, this was one of the most appealing aspects o f the system. This can be
seen in a statement made by Health and Human Services Secretary Donna Shalala:
“With EBT there’s considerably less paper. The flip side is that we’Uhave an
electronic audit for every transaction, making fraud easier to detect and prosecute”
(Gore, 1994, p. 1). The questions raised in such literature are that detecting fraud and
preventing fraud are not the same. When statistics indicate a reduction in fraud, it is
fraud that has been detected, while fraud that goes undetected is not reported. The
literature also raises questions that the EBT system does not directly link the
authorized recipient with the use of the card. The literature describing the EBT
system indicates that it would be possible for an unauthorized individual to use an
EBT card with knowledge of the proper PIN with or without knowledge of the
authorized recipient.
Electronic Benefit Transfer System With Fingerprint Imaging
This literature review has examined two welfare distribution systems: (1) the
Paper-Based system with Fingerprint Imaging, and (2) the Electronic Benefits
Transfer. The third system that will be examined will be Electronic Benefits Transfer
with Fingerprint Imaging. The United States General Accounting Office (GAO,
1995) determined that “EBT alone does not effectively deter fraud in the delivery of
food benefits. Thus, an EBT program without the enhanced security o f biometric
verification raises a genuine concern about the potential for increased program costs
and losses” (p. 7). The concern increases with the proposal to expand EBT into other
federal, state, or local government programs involving billions of dollars.
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Many states are investing millions o f dollars in EBT systems with the hope
that it will prevent fraud that has traditionally occurred in the Paper-Based system. In
December o f 1995, the GAO reported that the state EBT systems and pilot projects
that were reviewed had not eliminated fraud (U.S. GAO, 1995, pp. 2-3). The
literature reports that there are advantages to combining the Fingerprint Imaging
system with the EBT system:
With the fingerprint-secured EBT card, a program administer could link the
responsibility for use of the card to the recipient and if fraud was alleged,
have the information needed to determine a future course of action. A
fingerprint secured card could not be used by anyone other than the
authorized recipient of the entitled benefits. (U.S. GAO, 1995, p. 5)
Fingerprint Imaging was been selected as a means to increase security in the EBT
system for a number of reasons. Fingerprinting has been historically accepted as a
means o f providing positive identification in law enforcement. Fingerprint Imaging
has also been successful in preventing duplicate assistance fraud in different cities
across this country. However, these cities have incorporated only Fingerprint
Imaging with the Paper-Based system and not the EBT system.
Without Fingerprint Imaging, EBT systems could face the same types o f
crimes challenged by private industry. According to Arend (1994), credit card fraud
cost issuers worldwide more than $711 million (p. 46). Some examples of crimes
faced by the credit card industry are counterfeiting of cards and the videotaping o f
ATM users as they punch their secret access codes. As Hintze (1995) discovered,
credit card fraud has increased by 15% since 1960 (p. 21). These same types o f
crimes could be encountered by states, which implement EBT to distribute welfare
benefits.
The literature indicates EBT with Fingerprint Imaging may be the most
effective system available to prevent fraud from occurring in the welfare system. As
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the U.S. General Accounting Office (1994) points out, “A fingerprint-secured card
could not be used by anyone other than the authorized recipient o f the entitled
benefits” (p. 6). Unfortunately, the literature does not indicate the costs involved in
implementing an EBT system with Fingerprint Imaging. Each social service agency,
Point of Sale machine, and ATM will have to be equipped with a Fingerprint Reader.
The literature finds that counterfeiting, stealing benefits, and food stamp trafficking
are much more difficult with the combination o f EBT and Fingerprint Imaging.
This study has reviewed literature relating to fraud in the welfare system and
potential alternatives to the Paper-Based system for the delivery of benefits. The next
section of the study will examine fraud in other government programs and
alternatives to the Paper-Based system for the delivery of those benefits.
Fraud in Other Government Programs
Fraud has occurred in a number of other government programs besides
welfare. The same threats o f fraud that exist in the Paper-Based welfare system are
present in Social Security and Supplemental Security Income, unemployment
insurance, and child support. Some examples of such fraudulent acts are eligibility
fraud, mail theft, counterfeiting, physical attacks of recipients, and forgery. Fraud
exists because agencies rely on paper documents for identification. These government
programs also provide documents that can easily duplicated. “In May, police raided
an immigrant neighborhood in Los Angeles, seizing 24,000 phony Social Security
cards counterfeiters were preparing to sell on the streets, along with 50,000 dummy
drivers licenses, green cards, and other official looking documents” (Paige, 1998,
p. 1). This is not the only example of criminal acts that have cost taxpayers millions
of dollars. “The Social Security Administration has uncovered tens o f thousands of
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prisoners illegally drawing Social Security and disability benefits, and an intensified
crackdown on inmate fraud may save taxpayers S3.46 billion over the next seven
years” (Havemann, 1998, p. 1).
As with the welfare system, other government benefit programs require
limited identification (driver’s license, Social Security card, or green card). These
documents can be purchased easily on the street, allowing an individual to acquire a
new identity at limited expense. These new identities can then be used to obtain
benefits. Social Security benefits are many times claimed by relatives long after the
beneficiary is dead. A search for a new identity usually begins where the record o f a
life ends—in a newspaper’s obituaries. The goal is to find the name of a infant who
died around the same time that the person seeking the new identity was bom. Many
times the new identities allow an individual to apply for benefits twice or to avoid
being located in order to pay child support. There are other problems with
distribution systems that cannot prove positive identification. “The licenses helped
John Santer and five accomplices scam at least $4 million from businesses and mess
up the lives of many innocent people with forged checks and fraudulent credit cards”
(Zamora, 1998).
The Social Security Administration, Office of Inspector General (OIG) is
attacking fraud on a variety of fronts. Social Security is one of the largest benefit
programs in the country. “That’s a big beat to patrol, with a lot of money at stake,
given that the two SSA programs receiving the most attention paid out a total o f
more than $541 billion in benefits in 1995” (Paige, 1998, p. 1). The OIG focuses on
residency issues, if beneficiaries live in the United States; eligibility, whether they
really are entitled to benefits; and disability fraud and internal corruption at SSA
itself.
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In order to counter the increasingly sophisticated cons o f the future, the OIG
has also established an Electronic Crimes Team to collect electronic forensic evidence
and monitor computer network intrusions, to develop computer profiling and data
mining techniques to detect patterns o f fraud, and to develop data-based matching
arrangements with other government agencies and some private banks. In all, Social
Security OIG investigations have led to at least 1,194 convictions for fraud since
October 1997, resulting in fines and judgments in the amount o f $40 million. These
statistics indicate that fraud is present in the Social Security Administration programs.
Fraud also exists in the child support payment system. “An investigation into
thefts at the Harris County Texas Child Support Office is being hampered by the
same poor security and record keeping that made the thefts possible” (Stinebaker,
1996). In most states, child support checks are mailed out to the custodial parent’s
last known address. However, most child support agencies do little to verify whether
the parent actually received the support check.
The next section of the study will discuss alternatives to the Paper-Based
system.
Alternatives to the Paper-Based System for the
Delivery of Nonwelfare Benefits
Federal and state agencies are looking for ways to prevent fraud from
occurring, not just in the welfare system but in all government programs. With this in
mind, states are looking for alternatives simply to the Paper-Based system. The
United States government is using a fingerprint recognition system for intake and
manifest processing of Cuban, Haitian, and other refugee populations. Refugees
provide fingerprints upon arrival at United States bases and are checked by the
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fingerprint system to see if they have been previously repatriated to their home
country. This system processes 125 people per hour (Warfel & Miller, 1994, p. 5).
Child support enforcement agencies are also using new methods to prevent
fraud and abuse. According to Justin (1997), “Child support agencies are paying
more attention to the timely recognition and identification o f fraudulent cases through
interviews and contacts made during the location process” (p. 24). The use o f
fingerprints can be a valuable investigative tool for locating delinquent child support
payers. These prints can be stored on databases that can be shared with other child
support agencies to locate and prosecute parents who have failed to contribute to the
support o f their children. Searches can also be processed to locate where these
parents are living, especially if they are using an assumed name.
Other government programs are utilizing other means to prevent fraud and
lower administrative costs. The states of Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, Alabama,
Tennessee, Missouri, and Arkansas distribute Social Security and Supplemental
Security Income Benefits electronically.
In addition to state initiatives, the federal government also is fueling EBT
expansion. The Department o f the Treasury’s Financial Management Service
is adding recipients to the 8,500 persons in the EFT system who are receiving
Social Security, Supplemental Security, Veterans Pension and Compensation,
Railroad Retirement Board, and Civil Service retirement payments in
programs it operates in Houston and Dallas/Fort Worth. (Mitchell, 1995,
p. 16)
Since 1975, Social Security beneficiaries have had the option o f having their benefits
directly deposited (Bondar, 1984, p. 17). Other government programs are also
moving towards electronic deposit o f benefits. Recently the Michigan State Supreme
Court issued an administrative order 1998-3: “Therefore, it is ordered that circuit
courts, in receiving and disbursing support payments, shall use electronic funds
transfer to the fullest extent possible” (Michigan State Supreme Court, 1998, p. 1).
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The transition to Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) was a gradual result o f various
policy decisions as well as legislation. The following is an example of legislation
passed that would help prevent fraud: “The House approved a bill late Wednesday to
outlaw identity theft, a measure that would make it a federal crime for fraud artists to
misuse anyone’s personal information to commit crimes” (O’Harrow, 1998, p. 1). In
1977, 2 years after implementation of EFT program, the Social Security
Administration and the Department of the Treasury contracted Temple University to
conduct a study of direct deposits of Social Security benefits (Bondar, 1984). This
study had two objectives: to find out why beneficiaries had enrolled or not enrolled,
and to see if any modifications were necessary. Convenience was the primary reason
for requesting direct deposits, followed by safety/security and physical problems in
going to the bank. The results o f the Temple study are consistent with studies
conducted of EBT welfare systems.
State agencies and recipients appreciate the convenience o f EFT and EBT
systems but also recognize the need for the increased security these systems offer
over the Paper-Based systems. As with welfare benefits, no state has implemented a
system to distribute Social Security or child support benefits that combines both EBT
and Fingerprint Imaging.
In summary, many other government programs besides welfare are affected
by fraud. Public agencies are looking for alternatives to the Paper-Based system for
the delivery of Social Security, child support, unemployment insurance, and veterans
benefits to save on administrative costs and prevent fraud. States plan on combining
welfare assistance with other benefits on one card to make benefit delivery more cost
effective. Potentially, a citizen could use one EBT card to receive welfare benefits,
Social Security, unemployment, Medicaid, retirement benefits, and disability

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

39
payments. Terry Williams, Project Manager for Wyoming’s Department of Health
points this out:
We hope to eventually use the cards as so-called “health passports,” with a
person’s entire health record stored on the card. The health data could be
shared with dissimilar regional computer systems, laying the groundwork for
statewide or regional health service system. (EBT Task Force, 1993, p. 1)
“The Western Governor’s Association has begun planning to expand the use o f smart
cards into the health services area” (Newcomb, 1993, p. 28). The State of Ohio is
exploring ways to reduce administrative costs and improve service in areas ranging
from income taxes and Social Security benefits to driver’s licenses and voter
registration as a result of using one electronic benefits transfer card (Hintze, 1995,
p. 23).
Welfare benefits appear to be the front runner in electronic delivery o f
benefits. However, it also appears that eventually the plan would be to provide all
government benefits by way of an EBT system that would replace many Paper-Based
systems. Robert Robinson (1994), Secretary o f the United States Department o f
Agriculture, points this out in testimony before the United States Congress:
According to studies we have reviewed to date, using EBT to deliver food
stamp benefits alone will be more costly than delivering benefits through the
current coupon-based system. The Office o f Technology Assessment (OTA),
in its September 1993 report, Making Government Work: Electronic Delivery
of Federal Services, also raises the issue o f the cost effectiveness of EBT for a
singly benefit program. OTA says “that using EBT for multiple programs
would be more cost effective.” In this regard, states that are moving toward
EBT are using it as a means to combine the issuance of multiple benefits—not
just for Food Stamp Program Benefits. For example, Maryland, which
operates an EBT system, has combined food stamps, Aid to Families With
Dependent Children, General Assistance, and child support onto one card.
This allows the state to take advantage on the economic of scale to reduce the
cost o f EBT to individual assistance programs. Other states are considering
including refugee assistance; supplemental benefits for women infants and
children; and Medicaid benefits on their EBT systems, (p. 6)
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The EBT Task Force also believes the multiple Paper-Based benefit delivery
systems will be replaced with a single electronic system that delivers benefits for a full
range o f federal and state programs (EBT Task Force, 1993, Appendix E).
Potentially, any government program that delivers benefits could be subjected
to fraud if the proper precautions are not established. Alternatives to the welfare
Paper-Based system will most likely serve as a model for other government
programs. If fraud is not prevented in the Paper-Based system, EBT, or other
alternatives, it may very well be present in other government programs, which could
result in millions o f dollars being obtained fraudulently.
Summary o f the Literature
The literature indicates that soon after welfare benefits were issued, fraud
became a problem that federal and state agencies had to address. According to
Killerane (1996), 10% of the $22 billion spent annually on food stamps nationwide is
lost to fraud (p. 1327). Fingerprint Imaging was introduced as a method of positively
identifying individuals applying for and receiving public assistance. Articles and
government reports were published, documenting the success o f the AFIRM system
in Los Angeles, California, and in New York City.
Often the literature written about Fingerprint Imaging preventing fraud
focused on the constitutional rights of welfare recipients to be fingerprinted. The
literature did address multiple case fraud (someone applying for benefits which they
are already receiving). However, there is little attention given to Fingerprint Image’s
impact on the other forms of fraud that occurred in the Paper-Based system (stolen
benefits, counterfeiting, and food stamp trafficking).
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The literature consistently represents the Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT)
system as a more efficient method o f distributing welfare benefits over the PaperBased system. Nonetheless, the literature is often conflicting when portraying EBT as
more effective in preventing welfare fraud than the Paper-Based system. When EBT
was first introduced, much of the literature focused on the prevention of fraud. After
a number of pilot projects were reviewed, the literature turned to EBT’s ability to
detect fraud instead of preventing it. Again and again, the literature described law
enforcement’s arrests of individuals involved in food stamp trafficking. These arrests
occurred after thousands and sometimes millions of dollars of illegal transactions
were processed with EBT cards. As more data were gathered, EBT was seen as an
improvement over the Paper-Based system for finding who had committed a crime,
but not as a measure of preventing fraud from occurring.
There is very little literature and no data published on EBT being used in
conjunction with a Fingerprint Imaging system, in part because no state has
implemented both EBT and Fingerprint Imaging together, thus no pilot projects have
been reviewed and no data have been produced. One o f the sources for developing
the theory of combining these two systems is the United States General Accounting
Office (GAO). The GAO published a study in 1995 entitled “Electronic Benefits
Transfer Use of Biometric to Deter Fraud in the Nationwide EBT Program.” In this
report, the GAO strongly recommends that states consider using Fingerprint Imaging
with their EBT systems as a means of preventing fraud:
EBT, alone, does not effectively deter fraud in the delivery o f food stamp
benefits. Thus, an EBT program without the enhanced security of biometric
verification (Fingerprint Imaging) raises a genuine concern about the potential
for increased program costs and losses, (p. 9)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

42
This government report conflicts with previous reports about the overall effectiveness
of an EBT program in terms of preventing fraud. Other literature about EBT
indicates the system will be effective in the prevention o f fraud.
Once a state implements a pilot project using both EBT and Fingerprint
Imaging, a comparison of the three systems (Paper-Based with Fingerprint Imaging,
EBT, and EBT with Fingerprint Imaging) can be made. Until then, only perspectives
can be gathered comparing the three systems in terms o f fraud prevention. This study
will provide perspectives on Fingerprint Imaging, EBT, and Fingerprint Imaging with
EBT to prevent fraud that has traditionally occurred in the welfare system. Table 1
provides the current status of the EBT projects across the country. This study is
important for a number of reasons. Beyond preventing fraud in the welfare system, an
alternative to the Paper-Based system may be utilized in other government programs
for increased security during the application and distribution of benefits.
The conceptual model for this study, presented in Chapter IV, includes
characteristics of individuals involved in law enforcement, welfare benefit
administration, and EBT administration, and perceptions o f preventing fraud in the
welfare system. Following the conceptual model will be a description of the three
systems—Fingerprint Imaging used with Paper-Based system, EBT, and EBT with
Fingerprint Imaging, as well as the research questions, hypotheses, and rationale for
the study. Chapter V focuses on methodology, including data collection procedures.
Data analysis is presented in Chapter VI, followed by implications, conclusions, and
recommendations in Chapter VII.
The following chapter will review the conceptual framework for the study.
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Table 1
Current Status of the EBT Projects Across the United States
State

EBT Status

Plans

Alabama

Member o f the Southern
Alliance o f States,
negotiations underway

Pilot first, statewide by
1997

Arkansas

No implementation plans at
this time

Pilot in 1996, statewide
by 1997

Arizona

Planning implementation in
January o f 1997

Undecided

California

Pilot and demonstration
project release

Statewide implementation

Colorado

Requests for bids (RFB)
issued proposals were due
April of 1996 in 1998

Pilot in 1997, statewide
expansion

Connecticut

Member o f New England
Coalition o f States

Statewide expansion July
o f 1997

Florida

Request for Bids was released
May of 1996

Pilot and statewide
expansion

Hawaii

Conducting feasibility study

Undecided

Idaho

In the planning stages

Statewide expansion 1999

Illinois

State in negotiations with
vendors for EBT services

Statewide expansion by
1999

Indiana

Preparing Request for Bids

Hoping for statewide
expansion

Kansas

Implemented pilot project in
1996

Statewide expansion after
pilot project

Kentucky

Planning stages of
implementing
Also member o f the Southern
Alliance o f States

EBT planning
implementation

Louisiana

Considering proposals

Will start with statewide
expansion
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Table 1—Continued
State

EBT Status

Plans

Maryland

Implemented statewide in
1983

Expansion to include
other benefits

Michigan

Releasing Request for Bids in
1997

Pilot in 1999

Minnesota

Pilot in Herein and Ramsey
Counties

Statewide expansion is
planned

Mississippi

Have released the Request for
Bids

Pilot then statewide
expansion

Missouri

Part o f Southern Alliance of
States

Pilot then signed contract

Montana

Planning to implement EBT
system

Pilot started with
Medicaid, statewide
expansion with food
stamps and Women,
Infants and Children

Nebraska

Holding hearings then report
on EBT

No current plans to
implement

Nevada

No plans to implement EBT

No plans for
implementation

New Hampshire

Considering proposals
Member of New England
Coalition o f States

Statewide by 1999

New Jersey

Pilot project and
demonstration in progress
preparing for statewide

Eventually statewide
expansion

New Mexico

Implemented statewide EBT
system

None established

New York

Contract negotiations
Also member of New England
Coalition of States

Statewide by 1999

North Carolina

Will roll out EBT system in
1999

Statewide expansion by
the end of 1999

North Dakota

Implemented EBT pilot
project in February of 1996

Statewide in 1999
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Table 1—Continued
State

EBT Status

Plans

Ohio

Pilot project in progress;
hoping to begin statewide
expansion

Expansion timing
uncertain due to litigation

Pennsylvania

Negotiating contracts

Statewide expansion

South Carolina

Have implemented statewide
expansion of EBT system

No plans at this time

South Dakota

EBT pilot project in process

Hoping for statewide
expansion

Texas

Implemented statewide EBT
system in November o f 1995

No plans at this time

Utah

Trying to implement statewide

No plans presently

Vermont

Contract negotiations
underway
Part o f the New England
Coalition of States

Pilot then statewide

Virginia

Released Request for Bids

No plans at this time

Wisconsin

Request for Bids issued;
working with Minnesota

Phase in statewide

Wyoming

Pilot project in progress
exploring use o f commercial
networks

Statewide expansion
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CHAPTER IV
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Introduction
This study theorizes that respondents’ characteristics, perceptions o f the
welfare problem, and perceptions of changes in welfare policy to prevent fraud will
influence their selection o f an alternative or no alternative to the more traditional
Paper-Based system welfare policy (see Figure 1). The study also theorizes there will
be potential policy implications as a result of selecting one of the alternatives The one
trait that all of the respondents have in common is their direct involvement with
welfare fraud. Law enforcement respondents are responsible for investigating fraud,
welfare benefit administrators are responsible for administrating programs with
integrity, and EBT administrators are responsible for assuring rightful recipients
receive their benefits. Each of these respondents may share similarities but are also
different in their characteristics and perceptions. These differences may explain why
total agreement on a single welfare policy alternative may not be achieved. Their
similarities, though, may explain why they have selected the same policy alternative.
The differences may also explain why no alterative was selected. The study seeks to
determine whether all will select the same alternative or different alternatives among
the three possibilities, or whether they will select none of the alternatives based on
their characteristics and perceptions. I am hypothesizing that the characteristics and
perceptions of the respondents will determine what selection is made. In this study,
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respondents will be asked to do the following: (a) identify an alternative system that
would prevent the common forms of welfare fraud that have occurred in the PaperBased system, namely, duplicate assistance fraud, counterfeiting, stolen benefits, and
food stamp trafficking; (b) identify changes that are needed in the welfare system that
would prevent all fraud; (c) choose an alternative that would provide benefits as a
result of preventing fraud; and (d) identify specific technologies o f each alternative
that prevent fraud and ones that would not prevent fraud; and (e) identify potential
policy implications.
The respondents may select the best policy alternative among the three that
are currently available, namely, the Paper-Based system with Fingerprint Imaging,
Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT), and EBT with Fingerprint Imaging; or they may
indicate “undecided,” “do not know,” or “none.” For the purpose of understanding
the alternatives, a brief description of each system is provided in this chapter.
The following sections will discuss the characteristics, perceptions of the
problems, and perceptions of changes in welfare policy to prevent welfare fraud o f
respondents who are directly involved with welfare fraud. This study anticipates that
such characteristics and perceptions will influence a respondent’s choice of a welfare
policy alternative or selection of no alternative to the Paper-Based system and
implications involved with implementation.
Characteristics
All o f the respondents are employed in law enforcement, welfare benefit
administration, or EBT administration. Respondents may range in age from 22 years
to 65 years. They are most likely employed by municipal, county, state, or federal
public agencies. Their experience may extend from months to many years. Their
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educational levels may range from a high school diploma to an associate, bachelor’s,
master’s, doctoral, or law degree. The majority o f respondents in law enforcement
and EBT administration are expected to be male. In welfare benefit administration,
both genders are expected to be more equally represented.
The next section of the study will look at perceptions of the welfare fraud
problems by respondents who are directly involved with welfare fraud.
Perceptions of the Problem
One of the biggest challenges facing government in preventing fraud is the
relative size of the welfare program. There are simply not enough personnel available
to impact the deterrence and detection of welfare fraud. Agencies are not adequately
staffed to impact the fraud problem. There are too few investigators, social service
workers, and system technicians to detect and deter fraud. It is not possible to place a
practitioner at every location where a potential fraudulent act can occur, or to
adequately administer caseloads to detect fraud. Often, many demands and lack of
personnel leads to opportunities for fraud. As a result of this understaffing, duplicate
assistance fraud (an individual receiving public assistance twice—once under the
person’s own name and once under an assumed name) has a greater chance of
occurring. As Lipsky (1980) points out, “Bureaucrats characteristically have large
caseloads relative to their responsibilities. The actual numbers are less important than
the concern they typically cannot fulfill their mandated responsibilities with such
caseloads” (p. 29). This point is made clear by the American Public Welfare
Association (1996): “Caseworkers who are too busy with unnecessary paperwork
cannot pay adequate attention to staff the program’s ballooning caseloads” (p. 3).
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In addition to an overwhelming amount o f paperwork, the welfare system is
responsible for the administration of a large caseload. As a result o f this situation,
social service agencies are not very familiar with recipients and may meet with them
only once or sometimes twice per year. Because of this unfamiliarity, caseworkers are
unable to detect a person applying for benefits that they are already receiving.
Because of this situation, there is little chance o f an individual being apprehended;
thus, the unlawful activity continues.
The more traditional Paper-Based system has been described as being very
susceptible to welfare fraud. The ease with which fraud can be committed makes
agencies’ tasks that much more difficult. For example, estimates have suggested that
food stamp trafficking may account for as much as 10% of benefits issued. Every
day, opportunities occur for food stamps and other benefits to be purchased, sold,
and traded illegally. At this time, respondents have no way of knowing who used the
coupons and other benefits. Currently, it is extremely difficult to prevent food stamp
trafficking when paper coupons or EBT cards are utilized. The end result o f this
unlawful activity is a large volume of fraud investigations. As Craig Beauchamp
points out, “The ranks of investigators are thin for the magnitude o f the problem”
(Raab, 1993, p. 32).
An additional problem with trying to prevent duplicate assistance fraud is
counterfeiting o f identification documents, thereby enabling an individual to produce
multiple identities. Robinson (1994) has observed:
Unless better ways of verifying applicant supplied information prior to
eligibility determination are established, individuals choosing to provide
erroneous incomplete information to the state agency can receive benefits to
which they are not eligible regardless o f whether those benefits are disbursed
as coupons or through an EBT card. (p. 5)
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False identification documents, such as Social Security cards or birth certificates, can
be easily purchased illegally.
Once it has been determined that the applicant for benefits is rightfully
eligible, benefits must be delivered to only the recipient.
Welfare systems are responsible for disbursing benefits in an efficient manner
while at the same time assuring that the rightful recipient receives those benefits. The
organization imposes tight control over resource dispersal if it can (Lipsky, 1980,
p. 73). Unfortunately, even with tight control, benefits dispersed are not always
received by the rightful recipient. Benefits are often stolen from mail boxes (postal
theft) and the recipients themselves. Benefits most often stolen are those that can be
used by anyone who has them in their possession. With the paper-coupon system,
once the benefits are taken from the rightful recipient, they cannot be traced. This
problem is present in both the Paper-Based and EBT systems. With the EBT system,
anyone with the access card and knowledge of the PIN can have access to benefits.
Unless some form of positive identification is required, benefits can be utilized by the
recipient under his or her own name, then a separate set o f benefits can be utilized
under an assumed name. Social service agencies are in need of verification during the
application process, other than merely paper documents’ verification that would
confirm the person’s identity. It is hoped the task can be completed in an efficient
manner so there is no delay in the application and processing o f benefits. The
challenge for a welfare benefit administrator is to prevent fraud while at the same
time processing large numbers of recipients efficiently.
For many agencies, pinpointing welfare fraud is extremely difficult and
challenging. The agencies, many times, rely on eyewitness testimony and/or evidence
that is usually costly in terms o f man-hours and financial investment made. Expenses

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

52
are incurred as a result of many man-hours which are involved with surveillance,
gathering evidence, and securing witnesses. These elements o f the investigation are
especially critical for food stamp trafficking and counterfeiting rings, where
surveillance cameras and undercover operations are implemented.
Respondents are concerned with a number of issues regarding the
vulnerability of the EBT system against welfare fraud. If the EBT system is
determined to be suspect, it could be very costly to states. Cohen (1993) argues,
“Scam artists will create enough losses in the EBT system that it would take years to
retool” (p. 17). Some of these losses could be the same that occurred in the PaperBased welfare system.
Without proof that a person actually has received benefits (for example, in the
case of canceled checks) to which he or she was not entitled, the social service
agency will be severely handicapped in its ability to assure accountability. Under
EBT, it would be difficult to prove actual receipt of benefits. Because of this, it is
expected the EBT system will be highly susceptible to fraud activity.
Respondents involved with the welfare system are concerned with preventing
the same types of crimes that occurred in the credit card industry, namely,
counterfeiting credit cards, stolen cards, and theft of PINs. Within the EBT system,
stolen cards can be used to access benefits by someone other than the authorized
recipient. This can be accomplished if an individual has knowledge o f the Personal
Identification Number (PIN). Most equipment needed to counterfeit cards is easily
purchased on the open street at minimum cost. These same threats could possibly
exist in the EBT environment.
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Changes in Welfare Policy to Prevent Fraud
Respondents are in need of a welfare system that establishes crime prevention
measures in reference to violations of state and federal laws. To accomplish this,
changes in the welfare system would have to be made that would place greater
accountability with the client and retailer for the use of welfare benefits. A more
accountable system would be more likely to prevent fraud. A more preventable
system would provide a greater probability of reducing large volume of fraud that has
traditionally occurred in the Paper-Based welfare system.
Many professionals believe there is a need for a picture, eye witness, or a
biometric measurement such as a fingerprint, so it can be proven benefits have been
transacted. Surveillance cameras do not prove positive identification of an individual
accessing or utilizing welfare benefits. An alternative welfare system that provides
positive identification may prevent the types of fraud that have traditionally occurred.
Because the EBT system will utilize the commercial network, this alternative would
have to attach added security that is not provided in the credit/debit card process. It
is anticipated the added security would prevent any EBT card from being
counterfeited or used by anyone except the individual to whom the card was issued.
The belief is, by adding these securities, it would deny benefits to anyone who would
attempt to gain access to an authorized recipient’s account. Benefits could be
processed only to the authorized recipient as a result of the grant the person had
received from the social service agency. The GAO recommended fingerprint
verification over other security options such as the use of Personnel Identification
Number (PIN). One such alternative is Fingerprint Imaging. According to the GAO,
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“fingerprint verification is the biometric option that offers the greater potential for
reducing fraud in EBT systems” (U.S. GAO, 1995, p. 32).
The most desirable alternative welfare policy would ensure the recipient
benefits authorized and paid are directed only to the individual entitled to receive
them. No unauthorized individual should have access to a welfare recipient’s benefits
under any circumstances. The alternative would prevent the theft o f benefits from the
time they are forwarded from the state agency to the time they are utilized by the
authorized recipient.
Differences in Perceptions
A number of differences in perceptions exists among the groups o f
professionals. They simply cannot thoroughly and professionally investigate all the
fraud that is occurring in the welfare system. It appears there is too much fraud to
investigate in relation to the professionals assigned this task. There is also the
problem o f costly investigations requiring hours o f investment made by professionals.
Their perspective reflects a need for preventive measures up-front, so there is less
fraud to investigate later on.
Welfare agencies want to prevent fraud at the beginning when the applicant
applies for benefits, midway when benefits are dispersed, and at the end when
benefits are used. When an applicant applies for welfare benefits, these administrators
want assurances that an individual is not already receiving some form o f assistance. In
most states, welfare recipients are required to report to the social service agency only
once and sometimes twice per year to review their welfare eligibility. Because of
large caseload assignments, workers in many social service agencies are not that
familiar with the recipients, which allows an individual to go undetected when
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applying for benefits under an assumed name. There is little chance o f detecting
duplicate assistance fraud once an individual is declared eligible. Professionals would
not be able to detect an individual receiving benefits under an assumed name based
on observation. The best chance to prevent duplicate assistance fraud is during the
application process. Welfare agencies want to establish rightful eligibility and have
assurances the recipient will receive the entitled benefits. Professionals involved
directly with welfare fraud are in search of a secure system that would forward
benefits only to those for whom they are intended.
Professionals’ need to prevent fraud is directly related to the justification of
the switch from paper to a electronic system. However, respondents directly involved
with welfare fraud are concerned with individuals manipulating the EBT system,
which would result in the same crimes that have been experienced in the Paper-Based
system and credit card industry: counterfeiting of EBT cards and stolen EBT cards
being used by unauthorized persons.
Similarities in Perceptions
Though these professionals differ in characteristics, they do share similar
perceptions concerning the problems in preventing welfare fraud and possible
prevention. Lack of human resources to address the welfare fraud problem is one of
the most significant issues facing these respondents. There are simply not enough
personnel to adequately staff positions that would result in sufficient fraud
prevention. Many professionals believe that there needs to be some form of positive
identification during critical points of the welfare process. Those points are
application, distribution, and accessing of benefits. Many o f the professionals also
believe that no one alternative will totally prevent fraud. The position taken by these
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respondents is that there needs to be improvement in the welfare system, but no
system will prevent all forms of fraud.
Potential Policy Implications
Several potential policy implications are associated with the alternatives to the
Paper-Based system. It is possible that the EBT system would only be transferring
the fraud from paper to plastic. Thus, the same crimes could occur in an EBT system
that occurred in the Paper-Based system. The EBT system is seen by many as an
improvement over the Paper-Based in terms o f detecting fraud. This system would
enable public agencies to identify large numbers o f potential felons. “Gore feels that
the use of the PINs would limit the transferability o f benefits and create an audit trail
to track, where and when a particular card is being used” (Minaham, 1994, p. 1). But
little attention has been given to EBT’s capability to prevent fraud. Thus, this system
would be identifying only those who are involved with fraudulent activity. The same
resources would be needed to investigate fraud with the EBT system that were
required under the Paper-Based system.
An EBT program without the enhanced security raises a genuine concern
about the potential for higher program costs and losses from theft. By adding the
Fingerprint Imaging component to either a Paper-Based system or EBT system,
accountability would be added to the application of welfare benefits. Any alternative
to the Paper-Based system must meet its expectations in order to secure the public
confidence. For law enforcement respondents, this would be a system that prevents
fraud and not simply detects it.
Although development of an EBT system with biometric safeguards would be
more expensive, largely because of the need to purchase hardware and
software, and would take longer to implement nationwide, such system
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enhancement is needed to ensure that the future system is practical and not
beset by fraud. (U.S. GAO, 1995, p. 32)
In theory, each ATM and POS terminal would use a fingerprint reader to compare a
live scanned fingerprint with the same print encoded on the EBT card. Benefits could
not be accessed unless there were a positive match between the print on the EBT
card and the live print.
Another possible implication is the constitutional right to fingerprint
applicants for welfare benefits. Many perceive the fingerprinting o f recipients as
criminalizing the welfare process. Other professionals view fingerprinting of welfare
applicants as a means o f identification, similar to a driver’s license or photo
identification. A second consideration in fingerprinting recipients is how efficient the
fingerprint imaging system is in verifying an individual’s identification. Hours or days,
for someone who is in desperate need of food and shelter, is a very long time.
Welfare agencies are already finding it difficult to administer the backlog of
applicants for public assistance. Any delay in the application process would only
create an even longer backlog. The issue o f administrative costs is also a critical
issue. If states decide to select the Paper-Based system with Fingerprint Imaging,
there is the cost o f purchasing fingerprint readers and computer databases that must
be installed in every social service agency, in addition to the cost o f training staff to
process the fingerprinting of welfare applicants. If states choose the EBT system,
there is the cost of installing a Point of Sale (POS) machine in every retailer who is
authorized to accept food stamps. There also would be costs for training clients how
to access benefits from ATMs and POS machines. If a state selects the EBT with
Fingerprint Imaging system, there would be the cost of installing a fingerprint reader
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at every authorized ATM and POS machines, and training costs for both staff and
recipients.
Costs to implement and maintain an EBT system must not outweigh the
savings attributed to fraud prevention. Installation o f POS machines and fingerprint
readers cannot be more than the savings derived from preventing the improper use o f
welfare benefits. McKinnon (1995) points out that “the EBT system might not
survive if it does not reduce fraud. Tax-payers might lose confidence in the country’s
already much maligned welfare programs if this system fails to live up to its
expectations” (p. 14). This becomes even more of a critical issue if the EBT system
cannot be intra-graded with existing financial infrastructure. Current ATMs and POS
machines must be utilized in order for welfare benefits to be distributed. The
administrative costs could be greatly increased if states have to purchase, install, and
maintain their own electronic network without employing current commercial
networks that are in existence.
The following section of the study will provide a brief description o f the three
alternatives.
Paper-Based System With Fingerprint Imaging
When an applicant applies for welfare benefits, the agency will provide the
individual seeking welfare assistance information regarding the Fingerprint Imaging
process. During the application process, the applicant will be asked to schedule an
appointment to have his or her fingerprint taken. The fingerprint will be compared
against all accessible database records. If there is a positive match with the
applicant’s fingerprint during the database search, either an eligibility worker’s
supervisor reviews the matter or the matter is referred to the welfare fraud
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investigation unit. The distribution and use of benefits is the same under this system
as it would be under the Paper-Based system. The checks or coupons are mailed to
the grantee’s last known address or, in some situations, the benefits may be picked up
at the local social service agency. Benefits may be used to purchase food items,
shelter, clothing, and other basic needs o f recipients and their children (see Figure 2).
Electronic Benefits Transfer System
The application for benefits under the EBT system is virtually the same as
under the Paper-Based system with Fingerprint Imaging. There are a few exceptions.
Under the EBT, applicants are not fingerprinted; applicants are provided an EBT
card with a magnetic stripe code and assigned a Personal Identification Number
(PIN). In some states, grantees are required to attend training on how to use the EBT
card before becoming eligible for benefits.
The biggest difference between the Paper-Based system with Fingerprint
Imaging and EBT is in the distribution and use of benefits. In the Paper-Based
system, benefits are usually mailed to the grantee’s last known address. In some
situations, grantees may pick up the benefits at the social services agency.
In the EBT system, benefits are electronically deposited into the recipient’s
account at a local financial institution. Usually the accounts are maintained as a result
of a contract between the state and the financial institution.
The use o f welfare benefits is significantly different with the EBT system
compared to the Paper-Based system. To receive benefits from the EBT system, a
recipient must use the EBT card at either an ATM or Point of Sale (POS) terminal. If
the recipient is purchasing food items, he or she would present the card to a clerk
who would process the card through a card reader. The recipient must provide the
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Figure 2. Model of Paper-Based System With Fingerprint Imaging.
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cleric with the proper Personal Identification Number (PIN) before the transaction
can be completed. The recipient must also key punch the correct PIN when accessing
benefits from an ATM. Most states using the EBT system require recipients to report
lost or stolen cards within 48 hours (see Figure 3).
EBT Used in Conjunction With Fingerprint Imaging
When EBT and Fingerprint Imaging are used in conjunction, applicants would
be fingerprinted and those prints would be compared to prints on the agency’s
database. Only those applicants whose prints fail to match any print on the database
would be considered eligible for state assistance. Each applicant would receive
training in using the EBT card. Applicants deemed eligible would receive an EBT
card with their engraved fingerprint and would be asked to select a PIN.
Benefits would be distributed in the same way under this system as in the
EBT system. Electronic deposit would be made into the recipient’s account each
month. The most significant difference between the two other systems and EBT with
Fingerprint Imaging is that each EBT card issued would now have the recipient’s
encoded fingerprint on the card (see Figure 4).
Summary
The conceptual framework used for this study theorizes that professionals’
characteristics and perceptions may influence their choice of public policy. In terms
o f this study, respondents who are directly involved with welfare fraud are being
asked to select an alternative to the Paper-Based system in order to prevent fraud.
The three alternatives are the Paper-Based system with Fingerprint Imaging,
Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT), and EBT with Fingerprint Imaging. I anticipate
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Figure 3. Model of Electronic Benefits Transfer System.
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there are differences and similarities between the respondents in their perceptions
pertaining to fraud prevention and changes in the welfare system that would need to
be made. Each practitioner has a different set of social and demographic
characteristics and perceptions, and this may explain why each selects its alternative.
However, given that each may differ, respondents may nevertheless select the same
alternative to the Paper-Based system. Another possibility is that each may select the
same alternative but may differ on the policy implications.
The following are the two research questions addressed within this study. The
questions are based on a review o f the current literature.
Research Questions
The research questions for this study are:
1. Do respondents who are directly involved with welfare fraud, who have
similar or different social and demographic characteristics, endorse the same program
mechanisms regarding welfare fraud issues?
2. Do respondents directly involved with welfare fraud, who have similar and
different social and demographic characteristics, foresee the same policy implications
when implementing the proposed welfare alternatives to the Paper-Based system?
The goal of this research study is to explore perceptions of respondents who
are directly involved with welfare fraud based on different social and demographic
characteristics, as well as the following: (a) selecting of an alternative system
regarding measures that can be taken to prevent common fraud from occurring in the
welfare system, (b) capturing the necessary changes needed to prevent fraud, (c)
identifying the specific technologies of each alternative system that will prevent fraud
and those that will not prevent fraud, and (d) examining potential policy implications.
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Three systems will be compared: Paper-Based system with Fingerprint
Imaging, Electronic Benefits Transfer, and Electronic Benefits with Fingerprint
Imaging. In addition to the fraud prevention measures, policy implications will also be
addressed.
Hypotheses
The Paper-Based system used with Fingerprint Imaging, EBT, and EBT with
Fingerprint Imaging are three alternatives to the Paper-Based system for preventing
crimes in the welfare system. There are pilot Paper-Based systems used with
Fingerprint Imaging and there are pilot EBT systems. There are, however, no pilot or
statewide Fingerprint Imaging system used in conjunction with EBT in the United
States. It is also possible that none of the alternatives will prevent all forms of fraud.
City, county, state, and federal government units are looking for effective
methods to prevent welfare fraud. At the present time, a number o f pilot and
statewide projects are being tested to prevent welfare benefits from being misused.
The cities of Los Angeles and New York are testing fingerprinting recipients. The
states o f Maryland and Texas are distributing welfare benefits electronically (EBT) in
an attempt to prevent welfare fraud. The United States General Accounting Office
recommends combining EBT with Fingerprinting. There are a number of differing
opinions regarding which system would be the most comprehensive and effective
approach to fraud prevention in the welfare system. This research project will attempt
to gather perspectives from various respondents who are directly involved with the
welfare system as to which alternative to the Paper-Based system (Paper-Based with
Fingerprint Imaging, EBT, or EBT with Fingerprint Imaging) would be the most
effective. Another possibility is that no alternative will be selected.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

66
In summary, the major hypotheses o f this research may be stated as follows:
Hypothesis I: There is a relationship based on social and demographic
characteristics between professionals and selection of an alternative to the PaperBased system welfare policy for the purposes of preventing the most common forms
o f fraud, namely, duplicate assistance fraud, counterfeiting, stolen benefits, and food
stamp trafficking.
Hypothesis II: There is a relationship based on social and demographic
characteristics between professionals and selection of an alternative to the PaperBased welfare policy that would provide the necessary changes to prevent all fraud.
Hypothesis IH: There is a relationship based on social and demographic
characteristics between professionals and selection of an alternative to the PaperBased welfare system that would provide benefits as a result of preventing fraud.
Hypothesis IV: There is a relationship based on social and demographic
characteristics between professionals and selection of an alternative to the PaperBased welfare system and agreement on the specific technologies of each system.
Hypothesis V: There is a relationship based on social and demographic
characteristics between professionals and selection of specific technologies that will
not prevent fraud.
Hypothesis VI: There is a relationship based on social and demographic
characteristics between professionals’ perceptions of potential policy implications and
their selection o f an alternative to the Paper-Based welfare system for the purposes of
preventing fraud.
The next section of this research study will describe the reason for choosing
the survey method for data collection and the justification for it.
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Rationale for the Study
Because welfare fraud is such a problem, all states have established welfare
fraud units. Various attempts were made to contact these agencies to obtain data
relevant to fraud committed against the Paper-Based, Fingerprint Imaging, and EBT
systems. However, during the process it became evident that interval and ratio data
information from state and federal agencies was virtually impossible to obtain. One
reason was the lack o f comprehensive and accessible records. The other reason, as
stated previously, is that no state has an EBT system used in conjunction with
Fingerprint Imaging system.
The survey is a far less expensive approach to collecting data than telephone
or in-person interviews. As United States Department of Agriculture Secretary
Robert Robinson (1994) points out:
Determining precisely just how much trafficking is occurring and how often
food stamps are being sold for non-food purchases would be an
extraordinarily difficult and expensive effort. Doing so would require literally
an army of investigators tracking a nationwide sample of program recipients
for several months to determine how much they used their food stamps, (p. 5)
Also, most states are in the developmental stages of the EBT process, thus have little
data available.
Even if the data were accessible, they wouid not provide a comparison o f the
three systems. Gathering the perspectives of qualified respondents, all three systems
(Paper-Based with Fingerprint Imaging, EBT, and EBT with Fingerprint Imaging)
can be compared to each other in terms of fraud prevention. Currently, states can
provide statistical data that will compare only the EBT system and Paper-Based
system or the Fingerprint Imaging system and the Paper-Based system. The data
would not indicate if the Fingerprint Imaging system is more effective at preventing
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fraud than the EBT system, because no state has had both systems operational. Data
from states that have implemented either EBT or Fingerprint Imaging will only
indicate fraud committed against the respective systems. A panel o f respondents will
offer a broader perspective in regard to the vast amount of fraudulent acts that have
been perpetrated.
One of the advantages to the survey method over collecting data from
individual states is that it allows an opportunity to examine whether some forms o f
fraud and abuse are not affected at all, while others are affected greatly. For example,
EBT may have little potential for reducing duplicate assistance fraud, whereas
Fingerprint Imaging may have a large impact on duplicate assistance fraud, but little,
if any, impact on food stamp trafficking. Other problems with statistical data
provided by states can also exist. As Constance (1996) points out, “The actual
statistics concerning welfare fraud and the success of efforts to prevent it are often
conflicting” (p. 413). A state may show a reduction in fraud but at the same time
have an increase in the number of arrests.
As the size and complexity o f fraud cases increase, they also become harder
to detect. Many crimes may go unreported, and thus are not included in federal, state,
and local data. This does not mean that the fraud is not occurring; it simply means
that criminals are not being arrested and prosecuted for various reasons. In the case
of food stamp trafficking, for example, it takes many man-hours to execute an arrest.
Respondents in the present study provided a broader perspective on fraud that is
occurring in welfare system.
Very little data are available concerning Fingerprint Imaging, EBT, and
welfare fraud. Because the present study utilizes a survey involving qualified
respondents, perspectives should determine which system is endorsed by local, state,
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and federal agencies. In December 1994, the General Accounting Office (U.S. GAO,
1995) reported that “the state EBT pilot projects that had been reviewed including
those used to distribute food stamps had not eliminated fraud” (p. 5). The GAO
recommended that testing and study are needed to resolve technological and policy
issues. However, the GAO points out:
Because fraud, other than counterfeiting, persists in EBT pilots around the
country, it is believed that, if feasible, an evaluation should be completed
before fiiO implementation o f the nationwide EBT program is envisioned by
the Federal EBT Task Force in 1999. (U.S. GAO, 1995, p. 9)
By consulting professionals, not only the EBT system but also other alternative
welfare distribution systems are being evaluated.
The next chapter o f the study will explore the methodology used for this
study.
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CHAPTER V
METHODOLOGY
Overview
A discussion o f the methods and procedures utilized in this study will be
presented in this chapter. Given the nature of this study, it was determined that the
best source o f information would be to gather perspectives from a variety of
respondents who are directly involved in combating welfare fraud through the use o f
Electronic Benefits Transfer systems and Fingerprint Imaging systems.
Varying groups o f professionals offer different perspectives on the welfare
fraud problem. Some respondents provide information based on their knowledge and
perceptions o f crimes committed against the welfare system. Others pinpoint
vulnerabilities that may be present during the application and distribution of benefits
for the three systems being considered. Some respondents provide their knowledge
and perceptions about the benefits of each system in combating the welfare fraud
problem.
This study utilized a cross-sectional, nonrandom sample of professionals
connected with state and federal welfare programs. The names o f the professionals
were obtained from the 1996 EBT conferences and public directories that identified
states’ respondents who were employed by government agencies involved with
welfare systems. The survey also included professional contacts of this writer while
employed in the Michigan Family Independence Agency, Office of Inspector General.
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This section will present a discussion o f the methodology and procedures that
were utilized in this study. The following topics are addressed: sample inclusion
criteria, data collection procedures, questionnaire development, pretesting, collection
site, operational definitions of variables, survey instrument, human research subject
protection, sample number, nonresponses, survey questions as related to hypotheses,
reliability, validity, threats to internal validity, structure, statistical tests, delimitations,
and limitations o f the research.
Sample Inclusion Criteria
The target population consists o f professionals who are currently employed in
law enforcement, welfare benefit administration, or EBT administration. As defined
by Kerlinger (1973), a purposive sampling is a nonprobability sample which is
characterized by the use of judgment and a deliberate effort to obtain representative
samples by including presumably typical areas or groups in the sample (p. 129).
The individuals selected for this study are considered experts because o f their
experience with welfare problems and because their input offers practical solutions to
those problems. These same respondents also offer insight into what possible
implications could result from implementing one of the alternatives to the PaperBased system. These individuals bring unique qualifications to this study. Some
examples o f the professional responsibilities represented in this sample are:
(a) responsible for EBT pilot projects in their own state, (b) involved with either the
investigation or arrest of welfare fraud criminals, (c) experienced in the conversion of
the Paper-Based system to an EBT system, (d) responsible for the distribution of
welfare benefits, and (e) experienced in writing policy for the procedures to be used
during the application of welfare benefits for the Paper-Based or EBT systems.
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The sample was restricted to participants employed by government agencies.
Private sector professionals were not consulted, since information concerning crimes
committed in the private sector (mainly the banking industry) during the application
process and/or distribution o f funds is considered confidential and relevant
information is unavailable. For example, according to Newcomb (1993), “Industry
experts say there’s no central tracking system among the ATM networks mainly
because each reported theft is relatively small totaling under $1,000” (p. 2). In the
welfare system, states are responsible for keeping accurate records of crimes
committed against the welfare system.
Respondents selected to participate in this study met the following four
criteria: (1) professional responsibilities include direct involvement with investigation
o f welfare fraud, administration of welfare programs, or EBT systems; (2) employed
by a city, county, state, or federal agency; (3) familiar with the Paper-Based, EBT
systems in either the distribution administration, operations, or welfare crimes that
are committed; and (4) familiar with EBT/pilot projects in their own state or other
states. The next section of this research study provides a step-by-step description of
the data collection procedures that were used.
Data Collection Procedures
The sample members were sent a letter of introduction containing a statement
of confidentiality, a survey, and a return envelope. Each letter (see Appendix B)
explained the purpose o f the survey, structure of the survey, and instructions
necessary to complete the survey. The following are agencies represented in the
research study: United States Secret Service; United States Federal Bureau o f
Investigation; United States Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector General,
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Fraud Unit, in the states of New Mexico, Maryland, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Ohio,
New Jersey, Texas, New York, and Wyoming. A second letter and survey were sent
3 weeks after the first survey was mailed to those participants who had not provided
a response. The letter stated that a survey was mailed out 2 weeks previously and had
not been returned. The letter also stated that a second survey was being forwarded
and its return was requested. Each return envelope received a code; the code was
recorded so a second survey was not sent. For the purpose of this study, nominal and
ordinal level scales were utilized in the survey, along with one open-ended question
to gather the data.
The next section will describe how the questionnaire was developed.
Questionnaire Development
The questionnaire was developed after reviewing key literature, government
reports, and pilot projects dealing with welfare fraud, EBT, and Fingerprint Imaging.
Interviews were also conducted with officials from the Michigan Family
Independence Agency’s Office o f Inspector General and the Michigan EBT Task
Force. First, the most common types of fraud perpetrated were identified (duplicate
assistance fraud, stolen benefits, counterfeiting, and food stamp trafficking). Next,
changes that were considered necessary were made, such as identifying benefits,
technologies to prevent fraud, and policy implications for the alternatives to the
Paper-Based system, namely, Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) and Fingerprint
Imaging, and a hybrid system that combines both EBT and Fingerprint Imaging.
Questions were developed based on difficulties identified through the
evaluation of the Paper-Based and EBT systems. Specifically, questions for the
research instrument attempted to locate where failures in preventing fraud have
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occurred in the welfare system. Adjustments were made that were consistent with the
research objectives. A pretest was conducted prior to the mailing o f the survey to the
sample population. The following section will describe the pretesting o f the survey.
Pretesting
The survey instrument was pretested for clarity, terminology, and structure
among a small group o f 10 welfare fraud and welfare benefit professionals employed
by the Michigan Family Independence Agency. These 10 professionals were excluded
from the larger sample used to gather actual data for the study. Modifications were
made based on the feedback and were balanced with the research project’s goals.
The following section outlines the data collection sites once the survey was
mailed.
Data Collection Site
The data collection site included local, state, and federal agencies of the 50
states. Some examples of the data collection sites are: Montgomery County
Prosecutor’s Office, New York State Department of Social Services, and the United
States Department of Agriculture. These agencies are physically located throughout
the United States. The research instrument was sent by ordinary mail to these data
collection sites.
The respondents were asked to return the survey to the Michigan Family
Independence Agency’s Office of Inspector General at 235 S. Grand Ave., Lansing,
Michigan 48909. The researcher provided a stamped self-addressed envelope.
The relationship of the independent and dependent variables will be explained
in the following section o f the research study.
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Operationalization o f Variables
This research examined and tested the relationship between the independent
and dependent variables. As defined by Babbie (1990), an independent variable is
“presumed to cause or determine the value o f the dependent variable” (p. 372).
Babbie defines the dependent variable as “the variable that is assumed to depend or
be caused by another—called the independent variable” (p. 370).
This research project is contingent upon the selected sample having a basic
understanding o f Fingerprint Imaging, EBT, and EBT with Fingerprint Imaging, as
well as the implications of implementing each system. Each of the systems was
defined in the survey along with other relevant terms. Questions were worded in the
research instrument to examine and measure perceptions of respondents concerning
the perceived impact each system could have on crimes committed in the welfare
system. A sample statement from research instrument is: “The EBT system will not
prevent recipients from applying for benefits which they are already receiving under
an assumed name.” In this statement, the perception o f the EBT system is the
dependent variable; the independent variable would be the perceiver’s characteristics,
including, but not limited to, education, gender, age, organization, and professional
involvement. Each sample participant had the choice of selecting one o f the systems
or o f indicating “undecided,” “don’t know,” or “none.”
Definitions o f the operational variables are provided in the next section o f the
study.
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Operational Definitions o f Variables
The following is a list o f operational definitions pertaining to the dependent
variables (perceptions of Paper-Based system, Electronic Benefit Transfer, and
Fingerprint Imaging).
Perception of the Paper-Based System (Dependent Variable)
The Paper-Based system is the distribution o f welfare benefits by paper
coupon or check to recipients. There are at least 12 federal and state benefit
programs that utilize the Paper-Based system according to the EBT Task Force
(1993, p. 6). Some of the benefit programs are: food stamps; Aid to Families o f
Dependent Children; Social Security Insurance; unemployment; veterans’ benefits;
federal pensions; military pensions; and Women, Infants, and Children program.
Coupons and checks are usually mailed to recipients but sometimes can be picked up
at the local government agency.
Perception of the Electronic Benefits Transfer (Dependent Variable)
EBT provides benefit access to those entitled to social program benefits with
Automated Teller Machines and retail Point of Sale terminals. The recipient inserts
the card into a device that reads the magnetic stripe or, in the case of attended
terminals, presents the card to a clerk who sweeps the card through the stripe reader.
The recipient’s identity is usually verified by his or her Personal Identification
Number, and the terminal communicates with an authorization center to ascertain
that the recipient is eligible for benefits and the card has not been reported lost or
stolen (Wood & Smith, 1991, p. 1).
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Perception o f the EBT With Fingerprint Imaging (Dependent Variable!
Computers are used to scan and digitize fingerprints by automatically creating
a spatial geometry or map o f the unique ridge patterns o f the prints and translating
the spatial relationship into a binary code for the computer’s searching algorithm
(U.S. GAO, 1995, p. 15). The encoded print must match the live print before benefits
can be disbursed.
Survey Instrument
Each participant in the study received a questionnaire containing 38 items
(Appendix C). The first section of the research instrument contained statements
concerning the use of the Paper-Based System with Fingerprint Imaging, EBT, and
EBT with Fingerprint Imaging. Following each of the statements, the respondents
were asked to chose one of the systems that was the best alternative to the PaperBased system, or to indicate “undecided,” “don’t know,” or “none.” Example of
possible responses were: (1) Paper Based with Fingerprint Imaging (PBwFPI), (2)
EBT, (3) EBT with Fingerprint Imaging (EBTwFPI), (4) Undecided, (5) Don’t
Know, and (6) None. In the next section of the survey, respondents were asked to
select from: { } Strongly Agree, { } Agree, { } Undecided, { } Disagree, or
{ } Strongly Disagree. An example of one survey item is: “A form of biometric must
be used in conjunction with EBT in order to prevent fraud. { } Strongly Agree,
{ } Agree, { } Undecided, { } Disagree, { }Strongly Disagree. One open-ended
question addressed policy implications. The last 10 items requested demographic
information. Definitions were provided to assist respondents in answering questions.
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The procedures that were used to keep the names o f sample members
confidential are articulated in the following section.
Human Confidentiality and Subject Protection
The study was submitted to Western Michigan University’s Human Subjects
Institutional Review Board (HSIRB) under the exempt category o f research. The
name o f each participant has remained anonymous to the researcher. The original
survey was mailed out; approximately 3 weeks later a second was mailed to those
who had not returned their surveys. The approval that was requested was based on
the assurance of confidentiality and anonymity.
A review of the desired response rate is provided in the next section.
The Sample Number
Information is reported on the number o f surveys returned and the number of
nonreturns. A 50% or better response rate was expected o f those surveys originally
mailed out. The actual sample o f450 professionals was selected from the purposive
sampling frame. The sample size was based on the recognition that, given the subject,
a larger sample was used as a means to increase the probability o f representatives of
the population and ensure a sufficient number o f responses to meet the assumptions
needed for statistical testing. The number of nonresponses are also indicated in the
research project.
The way each sample question related to the study’s hypotheses is outlined in
the next section.
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Relation o f the Survey Questions to the Dependent Variables
The dependent variables for this study are: perceptions o f Paper-Based
System with Fingerprint Imaging, perceptions o f Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT),
and perceptions o f EBT with Fingerprint Imaging. Each survey question is related to
one o f the three systems.
The reliability o f the study is addressed in the subsequent section.
Reliability
The survey instrument used in this study, if replicated, should yield the same
result each time. This assumption is based on the following: All questions were
relevant to the study, and participants in the study had somewhat similar professional
experience. The research instrument utilizes closed-ended responses; thus,
respondents were provided with standardized answers from which to choose.
The study’s validity is reported next.
Validity
The purpose o f the research instrument was to measure three systems in order
to recommend which system would best prevent welfare fraud. The three systems
were the Paper-Based with Fingerprint Imaging, EBT, and EBT with Fingerprint
Imaging. Data were available for the Paper-Based system with Fingerprint Imaging
and the EBT system as a means to prevent fraud. However, no state has implemented
an EBT system with Fingerprint Imaging; thus, it was not possible to compare the
three systems using other means. Also, by using a variety of professionals, a broader
perspective was gathered concerning the three systems as opposed to collecting
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statistical data from each state. By utilizing professionals, a comparison was made of
the three systems’ strengths and weaknesses. The questions in the research
instrument were based on the prevention o f fraud that has routinely occurred in the
past in the Paper-Based system. All respondents were asked to objectively evaluate
the three systems based on the statements provided and then to select one o f the
systems, or indicate if they strongly agree, agree, are undecided, disagree, or strongly
disagree with the statement provided.
Threats to the internal validity of the study are expressed in ensuing
paragraph.
Threats to Internal Validity
In this research study, possible threats to internal validity were: (a) low
sample return; and (b) biased replies from respondents either in favor or in opposition
to the Paper-Based, Fingerprint Imaging, or EBT systems.
The structure that was used for this study is examined in the following
section.
Structure
Because closed-ended questions were used, respondents were asked to select
an answer from a list that was provided. Closed-ended questions provided a greater
uniformity of responses and were more easily processed. The survey provided an
efficient method of gathering data for the researcher and was far less time-consuming
for the respondents, thus increased the probability o f a higher return ratio.
A discussion of the statistical tests that were used for analyzing the data is
presented next.
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Statistical Tests
Percentages, means, and mediums were applied to the data. The collected
data were at the nominal and ordinal levels. For the nominal and ordinal level data, a
chi-square test was utilized. This primarily tests for bivariate analysis of independence
to determine significant relationships between the variables. This test is used when a
researcher is interested in the number o f responses, objects, or people that fall into
two or more categories. It is also known as a “goodness-of-fit” statistic. Goodnessof-fit relates to whether a significant difference exists between an observed number
and expected number of responses, people, or objects falling in each category
designed by the researcher. The expected number is what the researcher expects by
chance or according to some null hypothesis (Huck, Cormier, & Bonds, 1974, p. 68).
Chi-square analysis was also used for the ordinal level data.
All statistics, viewed collectively, should provide reliable indicators from
which conclusions may be drawn
The study’s limitations are outlined in the following section.
Limitations
Limitations o f the study include the following:
1. The purpose of this study is descriptive, not explanatory.
2. Many o f the respondents in this study were involved with EBT and
Fingerprint Imaging. Their continued employment may be contingent on the success
of either EBT or Fingerprint Imaging systems. Therefore, an objective response
concerning the failure to prevent fraud may not be provided, even with assurances
that responses will be kept confidential.
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3. No aggregate data were available for all three models (Paper-Based with
Fingerprint Imaging, EBT, and EBT with Fingerprint Imaging) to confirm or dismiss
the results o f this study.
4. Few respondents possessed expertise in all three areas o f the research
(Paper-Based with Fingerprint Imaging, EBT, and EBT with Fingerprint Imaging). A
respondent may have had knowledge o f the EBT system but may not have been
considered an expert in Fingerprint Imaging. To overcome this limitation,
descriptions o f all three methods to prevent fraud were provided to the respondents.
5. The structuring o f responses to the research instrument might have
overlooked important answers.
Policy Implications
To obtain potential policy implications for the research, an open-ended
question was presented to the sample. The purpose of this open-ended question was
to gather data on implementing a new welfare system. Policy implications will be
reviewed and discussed in the next chapter, along with the social and demographic
characteristics associated with the implications.
A description o f the sample, data collection procedures, questionnaire
development, pretesting, the human research protection, reliability, validity, statistical
tests, and limitations of the study have been provided in this chapter. A discussion of
the data analysis and findings will be presented in Chapter VI.
Summary o f Chapter V
In summary, a survey consisting o f 38 items was mailed to approximately 450
professionals. The names of the respondents were chosen from public directories
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such as the United Council o f Welfare Fraud Directory. The items that were chosen
for the survey instrument came from the literature. The survey was pretested and the
necessary changes were made. The confidentiality o f the respondents will be
protected. The necessary steps have been outlined in this chapter so the study can be
replicated. The main statistical tests for this study are percentages and chi-square.
The following section will address the data analysis utilized for this study.
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CHAPTER VI
DATA ANALYSIS/RESEARCH FINDINGS
Introduction
In this section, the results o f the study will be presented and analyzed. The
social and demographic characteristics o f the sample will be described, and the results
of testing the hypotheses will be discussed.
Perceptions o f professionals regarding the following will be analyzed: ways to
prevent specific forms of fraud, namely, duplicate assistance fraud, counterfeiting,
stolen benefits, and food stamp trafficking; prevention o f all fraud; benefits of fraud
prevention; and specific technologies that will and will not prevent fraud. In addition,
potential policy implications will be examined for each o f the alternatives to the
Paper-Based welfare system.
In all, 267 surveys were completed out of the original 450 surveys mailed out.
Twenty-six were returned and marked “returned to sender.” The response rate was
59.3%. From the first mailing, 212 surveys were returned, and 55 surveys were
returned from the second mailing. The research instrument contained 27 statements
which produced nominal level data, followed by 10 statements that produced ordinal
level data. For the purpose of gathering data regarding potential policy implications,
one open-ended question was provided in the survey.
The following statistical tests were used to analyze the quantitative data:
percentages, means, medians, and chi-square for the nominal and ordinal level data.

84
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First, I will describe the population using the 10 social and demographic
characteristics which were used as independent variables for this study.
Results
Sample Characteristics
As Table 2 demonstrates, 37% (n = 101) were law enforcement respondents,
46% (n = 123), were welfare benefit administrators, and 16% (n —42) were EBT
administrators. Forty-two percent of the respondents were employed by city and
county governments (n = 112 ). Fifty-eight percent were employed by state and
federal governments (n = 155). This is not surprising since most EBT and Fingerprint
Imaging programs are administered primarily by state and federal agencies. One
practitioner listed his or her profession as “other.”
Table 2 shows that more respondents were employed by an agency that was
directly involved with EBT or Fingerprint Imaging, 69% (n — 184). O f those
respondents who were not employed by an agency that was directly involved with
EBT or Fingerprint Imaging, 34% (n= 91) indicated familiarity with such systems in
other states. There were more respondents with a college degree, 70% (n = 187), and
more male respondents, 55% (n = 147). The percentages were almost equal, with the
exception of law enforcement. It was expected that law enforcement respondents
were going to be predominantly male. This is not surprising since law enforcement
continues to be a profession overrepresented by men, and social work is a profession
more often pursued by women. There were substantially more Caucasians, 91%
(n = 243). This was unexpected and no explanation is offered as to why a higher
percentage of minorities was not represented in the sample. All (N= 267) but one of
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Table 2
Demographics by Profession (N= 267)
Law
Enforcement
(n = 101)
(37%)

Welfare Benefit
Admin.
(n = 123)
(46%)

(n —42)
(16%)

(N = 267)
(99%)

Employed by:
City/County
State/Federal

44%
56%

51%
49%

12%
88%

42%
58%

Employers’ Involvement:
Yes
No
Don’t know

67%
31%
1.2%

67%
31%
0.8%

79%
21%
—

69%
29%
2%

Employers’ Not
Involved/Familiar with
Yes
No
Don’t know

36%
21%
0.3%

36%
26%
—

29%
28%
0.2%

34%
28%
0.1%

Education
No college degree
College degree

40%
60%

29%
86%

0.7%
92%

30%
70%

Gender
Male
Female

65%
33%

48%
52%

59%
41%

55%
45%

Race/Ethnicity:
Caucasian
African American
Hispanic American

87%
8%
3%

94%
0.4%
2%

92%
0.7%
—

91%
6%
0.2%

Employment:
Full-time
Part-time

100%
0%

99%
1%

100%
0%

99%
1%

EBT

Total

A dm in

the respondents were employed full-time. The median years of experience for all
respondents was 10. The mean age for all respondents was 48.6.
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Summary o f Sample Characteristics
As Table 2 indicates, more o f the respondents were employed by a state or
federal agency. More of the respondents’ employers were directly involved with an
EBT or Fingerprint Imaging system. This is consistent with information provided in
the literature that indicates that 38 states have either pilot or statewide EBT or
Fingerprint programs. Of those who did not work for an employer directly involved
with EBT or Fingerprint Imaging, a majority had knowledge o f systems in other
states. Most o f the respondents had a college degree, 70%. This was expected since
many professional positions in welfare benefit administration and EBT administration
require a college degree. Law enforcement and welfare benefit administrators had
substantially more professional experience than EBT administrators. This is not
surprising since EBT is a relatively new process of distributing welfare benefits. The
median years of experience for the respondents was 10. The mean age was 48.6. This
may be explained by the fact that many o f the respondents could have begun their
careers at entry level positions and gradually progressed to administrative positions in
law enforcement and welfare benefit administration.
The following section o f the study will analyze the data in relationship to the
study’s hypotheses. Because there were so few part-time and non-Caucasian
respondents, these groups were not considered separately in the data analysis.
Data Presentation for Hypothesis Testing
Data Analysis for Research Hypothesis I
Research Hypothesis I: There is a relationship based on social and
demographic characteristics between professionals and their selection of an
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alternative to the Paper-Based system for preventing specific forms o f welfare fraud:
duplicate assistance fraud, counterfeiting, stolen benefits, and food stamp trafficking.
In order to examine the first research hypothesis, respondents were assigned
to groups based on their social and demographic characteristics and systems that
might reasonably be expected to have an impact on preventing the four most common
forms of fraud (duplicate assistance fraud, counterfeiting, benefits being stolen, and
food stamp trafficking). Individuals who chose a particular system more than 50% o f
the time (six or more selections in their responses to the 12 relevant questions) were
considered to have selected that system. Individuals who did not choose a particular
system more than 50% o f the time were assigned to a “no selection” group.
Questions were grouped based on subject matter. Twelve of the initial 15 questions
(Section 1 of the research instrument) addressed the prevention o f welfare fraud.
Questions 6, 7, and 9 were excluded from this section of the data analysis, and were
utilized in a section where the questions were more appropriate. The 12 questions
addressed the prevention of the four most common forms of fraud. The statistical
significance is observed at the conventional .05.
Table 3 examines the relationship based on social and demographic
characteristics between a profession and the selection of an alternative to the PaperBased system for preventing fraud, namely, duplicate assistance fraud, counterfeiting,
stolen benefits, and food stamp trafficking. The chi-square results are displayed in
Table 3. One of the respondents listed profession as “other” and was not considered.
Respondents did not select the Paper-Based with Fingerprint Imaging or EBT
systems the minimum number of times to be considered for the chi-square tests. This
implies that respondents employed in law enforcement, welfare benefit, and EBT
administration did not believe these systems were the best alternatives in terms of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

89
Table 3
Profession and the Prevention o f the Most Common Forms of Fraud (N = 266)
Law
Enforcement
(#» = 101)

Welfare Benefit
Admin.
(#1=123)

EBT Admin,
(/i = 42)

No Selection

17%

25%

63%

EBT w Fingerprint
Imaging

83%

75%

35%

Note, x2 = 28.941, d f= 2 ,p < .05.
preventing the four most common forms of fraud. There was a statistically significant
difference between the respondents based on their profession and selection o f the
EBT with Fingerprint Imaging and the selection o f no alternative (p < .05). The
findings suggest a relationship between the characteristic profession and selection o f
a particular system.
Eighty-three percent (n —84) o f law enforcement respondents selected the
EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system. Seventy-five percent (#i - 92) of welfare
benefit administrators selected the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system. The
percentages for the EBT administrators were dissimilar when compared with the
other groups o f professionals. Sixty-three percent (#i = 27) of EBT administrators
made no selection regarding fraud prevention, and 37% (#i = 15) selected the EBT
with Fingerprint Imaging.
There were obvious differences between the groups. Law enforcement
respondents had the strongest belief (83%) that to prevent duplicate assistance fraud,
counterfeiting, stealing of benefits, and food stamp trafficking, government agencies
must implement a welfare policy that utilizes both EBT and Fingerprint Imaging. One
reason law enforcement may have chosen the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

90
is the long history this profession has had in relying on the use of fingerprints. In
addition, law enforcement may believe that combining EBT with Fingerprint Imaging
could provide conclusive evidence that the recipient actually received the benefits.
Although, welfare benefit administrators had a lower percentage of responses
compared to law enforcement, their responses still indicate that welfare systems are
in need o f added security. Perhaps they are aware that billions of dollars are at risk.
EBT administrators do not share this same premise. These respondents are
responsible for the administration o f the EBT system, thus may be less likely to
believe the system is vulnerable to fraud. It could also be that EBT administrators are
not willing to accept that fraud could continue under the EBT system without some
form o f biometric measurement such as Fingerprint Imaging. Lastly, EBT
administrators may be less likely to endorse the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system
or the Paper-Based with Fingerprint Imaging system because the EBT system was
highly promoted by the federal government as well as the commercial financial
industry as an improvement over the more traditional Paper-Based welfare system.
Based on the results shown in Table 3, Research Hypothesis I was accepted.
The findings that appear in Table 3 indicate a significant relationship. Law
enforcement respondents had the highest percentage of selecting the EBT with
Fingerprint Imaging to prevent the four most common forms o f welfare fraud,
followed by welfare benefit administrators. EBT administrators had the highest
percentage for no selection.
The next section of the study presents the data analysis to determine if a
relationship exists between employer type and selection o f an alternative to the
Paper-Based system for the purpose o f preventing fraud.
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Categories where there were insufficient responses to conduct a valid test
were deleted. This resulted in eliminating the Paper-Based system with Fingerprint
Imaging and EBT. There were statistically significant differences {p < .05) based on
which government agency they were employed by and their selection o f an alternative
system.
As Table 4 indicates, 80% (n = 86) o f city and county practitioners selected
the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system for Research Hypothesis I to prevent the
more common forms of welfare fraud. Sixty-six percent (n = 90) of the state and
federal respondents selected the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system for the
prevention o f duplicate assistance fraud, counterfeiting, benefits being stolen, and
food stamp trafficking. The results o f the chi-square test show statistically significant
differences (p < .05) between the groups of respondents. A much higher percent of
city and county respondents selected the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system than
did state and federal respondents.
Table 4
Employer and the Prevention of the Most Common Forms of Fraud ( N - 245)
City/County
(n = 108)

State/Federal
(»= 137)

No Selection

20%

34%

EBT w Fingerprint Imaging

80%

66%

Note, x = 5.797, d f = \ , p < .05.
City and county professionals may have a stronger belief than state and
federal professionals that there is a need to combine EBT with Fingerprint Imaging in
order to prevent fraud. More city and county professionals may strongly believe the
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federal government should provide the funding for an EBT with Fingerprint Imaging
system. This belief may be based the fact the federal government is mandating an
EBT system be implemented, even though the system has not be proven to prevent
fraud.
Based on the chi-square test results shown in Table 4, Research Hypothesis I
was accepted. There is relationship based on social and demographic characteristics
between professionals and selection o f an alternative to the Paper-Based system to
prevent the more common forms o f fraud. A higher percentage of city and county
respondents selected the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system than other
professionals.
Table 5 presents the chi-square test results to determine if a relationship exists
between education and selection o f an alternative to the Paper-Based welfare system
to prevent fraud.
Tables
Education and the Prevention of the Most Common Forms of Fraud (N= 245)
Noncollege Graduate
(n = 76)

College Graduate
(n = 169)

No Selection

18%

33%

EBT w Fingerprint Imaging

82%

67%

Note, x = 5.169, d f = ^ P < 05.
There were insufficient responses for the Paper-Based or EBT systems to
conduct a valid test for questions related to Research Hypothesis I. This implies that
both noncollege and college graduates believed that the Paper-Based with Finger
Print Imaging or EBT systems would not be the best alternative to prevent the four
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most common forms o f fraud. This resulted in eliminating the Paper-Based system
with Fingerprint Imaging and the EBT system. There was a statistically significant
difference between respondents based on their education and the selection of an
alternative to the Paper-Based System for the purpose of preventing specific forms of
fraud (p < .05). Table 5 indicates that 82% (n = 62) of respondents who did not have
a college degree selected the EBT system with Fingerprint Imaging 50% or more of
the time. Sixty-seven percent (it = 113) o f the respondents who did have a college
degree selected the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging for preventing specific forms of
fraud of fraud.
Noncollege graduates were more likely to choose the EBT with Fingerprint
Imaging system than college graduates. For college graduates, a greater number o f
respondents made no selection for preventing the four major forms o f fraud when
compared to noncollege graduates. One possible explanation for these results are the
education requirements for professions. Law enforcement respondents in this study
had the highest percent o f noncollege graduates when compared to the other
professions. Many law enforcement positions do not require a college degree. As
noted earlier, law enforcement has had a long history of using fingerprints.
Fingerprints have been used by law enforcement for almost 100 years to identify
criminals, both upon arrest and after comparison o f crime scene fingerprints with
already established criminal fingerprint files (U.S. GAO, 1995, p. 2). Another
possible explanation for these results may be that many college graduates are
administrators who have a broader understanding o f how fraud occurs. These
respondents may be administrators who foresee policy implications for the EBT with
Fingerprint Imaging system and thus were less likely to select that system than
noncollege graduates.
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Based on the results demonstrated in Table 5, Research Hypothesis I was
accepted. There is a relationship based on social and demographic characteristics
between respondents and selection of an alternative to the Paper-Based system for
the prevention o f the most common forms of fraud. Those respondents without a
college degree had a higher percentage for selecting EBT with Fingerprint Imaging
system.
Summary o f Data Analysis for Research Hypothesis I
Research Hypothesis I was accepted based on the results shown in Tables
3-5. There were not enough selections of the Paper-Based with Fingerprint Imaging
system and EBT to apply the chi-square test. An alternative had to be selected by at
least five respondents within the same social or demographic category to be
considered for the chi-square test. The respondents who selected “undecided,” “don’t
know,” or “none” were categorized as making no selection. Those results were
compared to the respondents who selected the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system
for the chi-square analysis.
Of those respondents who selected the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging, law
enforcement respondents, city/county employees, and noncollege graduates
designated it more often than other respondents within the same social and
demographic category. Results of the chi-square tests indicate that the following
variables were not statistically significant when comparisons were made within the
same social and demographic category: gender, age, experience, respondents whose
employer was directly involved with either EBT or Fingerprint Imaging, and
respondents whose employer was not directly involved with either EBT or
Fingerprint Imaging. Since these social and demographic characteristics were judged
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not to be significantly different, it appears that these variables did not influence the
selection of an alternative system.
The next section of the study examines the data regarding changes necessary
to prevent all fraud in the welfare system.
Data Analysis for Research Hypothesis II
Research Hypothesis II: There is a relationship based on social and
demographic characteristics between the professionals and agreement that the
alternatives will not prevent all forms of fraud.
This section o f the study will examine the second research hypothesis to
determine if there is a relationship based on social and demographic characteristics
between professionals and agreement that no one alternative will provide all the
necessary changes to prevent fraud. Questions were grouped based on the selection
of an alternative that provided changes which would result in a more secure system in
comparison to the more traditional Paper-Based welfare system. The questions from
the research instrument that were utilized for this section were: 16-20, 22, and 24.
Questions 19, 21, and 23 were not used in this section but were utilized in another
section.
Table 6 examines whether there is a relationship between the characteristic
profession and determination that none of the alternatives offers enough changes to
prevent fraud. One respondent listed profession as “other,” and thus was not
considered for analysis purposes. The chi-square results are displayed in Table 6.
Categories where there were insufficient responses to conduct a valid test were
eliminated. This resulted in the elimination o f the Paper-Based with Fingerprint
Imaging and the EBT system.
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Table 6
Profession and Prevention of All Fraud (AT= 266)
Law
Enforcement
(#» = 101)

Welfare Benefit
Admin.
(n = 123)

EBT Admin.
(" = 42)

No Selection

64%

60%

88%

EBT w Fingerprint
Imaging

36%

40%

12%

Afcfe. x2 = 10.031, df= 2 ,p < .05.
There was a statistically significant difference between the variable
“profession” and agreement by the respondents that none o f the alternatives would
prevent all forms o f fraud.
Sixty-four percent (n = 65) of law enforcement respondents, 60% (n - 74) of
the welfare benefit administrators, and 88% (n = 37) o f EBT administrators failed to
select any of the three alternatives. There were statistically significant differences
between the groups. Research Hypothesis II was accepted. There is a relationship
based on social and demographic characteristics between respondents and agreement
that no one alternative will prevent all forms of fraud.
A higher percentage of EBT administrators, than of any other profession, did
not select any of the alternatives. The findings suggest that EBT administrators have
the strongest belief that more changes are needed in the welfare system, besides EBT
and Fingerprint Imaging, to effectively prevent fraud. There are several possible
explanations for the results shown in Table 6. EBT administrators may be less willing
to pay for all of the changes that are necessary to prevent fraud. These respondents
may contend they can only prevent fraud at a reasonable cost. The investment in
preventing fraud cannot be greater than the potential savings. These respondents may
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also be taking the position that technology will provide only some o f the answers;
fraud will continue no matter which alternative is selected. The respondents may have
made no selection due to the failings o f the EBT system. Many states invested
millions of dollars in the EBT programs after it was promoted as a cure for all fraud
problems. It was discovered after reviewing pilot projects that fraud was still
occurring. EBT administrators may not want relive that situation; instead, they may
be likely to take a “wait and see approach” until more EBT and EBT with Fingerprint
Imaging pilot systems are reviewed. Even though law enforcement respondents
submitted a smaller percentage of responses than EBT administrators, this group may
think that if states chose an EBT or EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system, which will
utilize the commercial infrastructure (ATMs and Point of Sale machines), the same
types of fraud that have occurred in the banking industry will occur. “Commercial
credit card industry reports fraudulent applicants have increased 33% in the past two
years” (U.S. GAO, 1995, p. 1).
Table 7 reviews the chi-square results to determine if there is a relationship
between employer and agreement that no one alternative offers enough changes to
prevent fraud. Categories where there were insufficient responses to conduct a valid
test were excluded. Thus, Paper-Based with Fingerprint Imaging and the EBT were
eliminated. Table 7 shows that 53% (n —57) o f city and county respondents did not
select a system. Seventy-six percent (n = 104) o f the state and federal respondents
did not select an alternative to the Paper-Based system.
There was a statistically significant difference between the respondents based
on employer and selection of an alternative welfare system that would provide the
necessary changes to prevent fraud (p < .05).
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Table 7
Employer and Prevention of All Fraud (N = 245)
City/County
(n= 108)

State/Federal
(n = 137)

No Selection

53%

76%

EBT w Fingerprint Imaging

47%

24%

Note, x = 5.797, ctf= 1,p < .05.
Based on the stated results, one can state that 53% of city and county and
76% o f the state and federal respondents do not believe that any o f the three
alternatives provide the necessary changes to the welfare system that would result in
the prevention o f fraud. This presumption may be the result of not having enough
time to thoroughly review and change the alternatives that are available. The message
was: “Gore to agencies: ‘Deliver benefits on line by 1999’” (Minaham, 1994, p. 6).
These deadlines may be unrealistic. It is possible that not enough time has been
devoted thus far to developing the appropriate computer hardware and software to
effectively prevent fraud.
The chi-square test results shown in Table 7 suggest there is more of an
agreement between respondents employed by state and federal respondents that none
of the alternatives provide the necessary changes to prevent fraud. Thus, Research
Hypothesis II is accepted. There is a relationship between respondents based on
employment type and agreement that none o f the alternatives will provide enough
change to prevent all fraud.
Table 8 will examine the data to determine if there is a relationship between
professionals and agreement there is no alternative that would provide the necessary
changes to prevent fraud.
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Table 8
Education and Prevention o f All Fraud (N = 255)
Noncollege Graduate
(n = 77)

College Graduate
(n = 178)

No Selection

53%

72%

EBT w Fingerprint Imaging

47%

28%

Note, x = 8.376, d f = l , P < 05.
For the chi-square analysis, categories where there were insufficient responses
to conduct a valid test were eliminated. This resulted in deleting the Paper-Based
system with Fingerprint Imaging and EBT alternatives. The minimum number of
selections per social or demographic characteristic was five in order to be considered
for the chi-square test. A statistically significant difference existed between the
respondents based on education and determining changes necessary to prevent fraud
(p < .05). As Table 8 indicates, 53% (w = 41) o f noncollege graduates and 71% (n —
126) o f college graduates did not select any o f the three alternatives that were
presented.
Of the respondents who were noncollege graduates, a smaller percentage
made no selection when compared to college graduates. Based on these results, one
can infer that respondents with more education believe that none of the alternatives
offers the changes that are necessary to prevent all fraud in the welfare system. The
findings further suggest that those respondents with more education did not select the
more technical and sophisticated EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system, over the less
elaborate Paper-Based with Fingerprint Imaging system, for providing the necessary
changes to prevent fraud.
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There could be a number o f reasons for this. Educated respondents may not
be convinced that EBT with Fingerprint Imaging can prevent fraud until there are
available data to review. More extensive pilot testing would provide a means for
determining the reliability and accuracy of the equipment through an actual practical
application and serve to identify other possible problems, for example, in the case of
individuals who illegally gain access to welfare recipients’ accounts. However, data
will not be available untfl a pilot EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system is
implemented by one o f the states or within a few counties in a state. One o f the
factors the respondents would have to consider is not only the reduction in fraud but
also whether the fraud that does occur can be detected. Those respondents without a
college degree may be relying too much on fingerprinting to prevent many o f the
crimes that are occurring in the welfare system.
The results shown in Table 8 indicate Research Hypothesis II was accepted.
More respondents with a college degree, in comparison to those without a college
degree, were convinced that none o f the alternatives would provide enough changes
to prevent all fraud.
Table 9 o f the study will review the chi-square test results to determine a
relationship between experience and agreement between respondents that none of the
alternatives provide enough changes to prevent all fraud in the welfare system.
As a result o f the chi-square analysis, categories where there were insufficient
responses to conduct a valid test were eliminated. The minimum number o f selections
for an alternative had to be five per social or demographic category to be considered
for the chi-square test. This resulted in eliminating the Paper-Based system with
Fingerprint Imaging and EBT alternatives. There was a statistically significant
difference between respondents based on their years of professional experience and
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Table 9
Experience and Prevention o f All Fraud (N - 256)
< 10 Years
(/»=135)

> 10 Years
(n = 121)

No Selection

73%

58%

EBT w Fingerprint Imaging

27%

42%

Note, x2 «6.817, d f = h P < 05.
their selection of an alternative that would provide changes that are necessary to
prevent fraud in the welfare system (p < .05). Table 9 indicates that 73% (r> = 99) of
the respondents who had 10 or less years o f experience made no selection. Fifty-eight
percent (n = 70) o f the respondents who had 10 or more years o f experience made no
selection of the three alternatives that would provide the necessary changes to
prevent fraud.
A higher percentage of respondents with 10 or less years o f experience than
those who had 10 or more years of experience made no selection. Respondents with
more experience may have concerns that an alternative system may not produce as
much revenue. An alternative system may not be able to recoup as much money as
the Paper-Based system, which would result in less revenue being provided to the
state by the federal government. States are paid by the federal government when an
individual is ordered by the court to pay restitution for moneys fraudulently received.
Without proof that a person actually has received benefits (for example, canceled
checks), agencies will be severely disadvantaged in preventing fraud. According to
the Michigan Family Independence Agency (1994), “In 1994 S24.5 million in
restitution was ordered” (p. 2). Another risk the older respondents may have
perceived is the sharing o f fingerprints with other agencies. The issue o f who would
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have access to fingerprint records is controversial and has yet to be settled by the
courts.
Those respondents with less experience may feel overwhelmed by their
current workload. Thus, they may have concerns that none o f the alternatives will
prevent fraud, and fraud may actually increase. Part of the appeal of an alternative
welfare process would be the reduction in fraud. Unfortunately, a concern many o f
these respondents may have is if a chosen alternative would provide an increase o f
fraud, there may not be enough available resources to handle the investigation
workload.
Based on the results shown in Table 9, Research Hypothesis II was accepted.
There is a relationship based on social and demographic characteristics between
professionals and agreement that none o f the alternatives will prevent all fraud. There
was a higher percent of respondents with 10 or less years of experience than those
with 10 or more years of experience who made no selection for any of the available
alternatives providing changes that would prevent fraud.
There was not enough selection of the Paper-Based with Fingerprint Imaging
or EBT systems to apply the chi-square test. Each one o f the alternatives would need
to have been selected by a minimum of five respondents for each social or
demographic category. The respondents who selected “undecided,” “don’t know,” or
“none” were categorized as making no selection. Those results were compared to the
respondents who selected the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system for the chisquare analysis.
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Summary of Data Analysis for Research Hypothesis II
Based on the results o f Tables 6-9, Research Hypothesis II was accepted.
There is a relationship based on social and demographic characteristics between
professionals and agreement that none of the alternatives will prevent all fraud. These
tables indicate a much higher percentage for no selection than for any o f the
alternatives that would provide the necessary changes to prevent fraud. The EBT
administrators had the highest percent of respondents who believed that none of the
alternatives would provide enough changes to prevent all fraud compared to law
enforcement and welfare benefit administrators. State and federal respondents had a
higher percent for no selection than city and county respondents. College graduates
had a higher percent than noncollege graduates for not selecting an alternative
welfare system that would provide the necessary changes to prevent fraud.
One can conclude that more changes are needed in the welfare system beyond
the implementation of EBT and Fingerprint Imaging to prevent all forms of fraud in
the welfare system. The chi-square test indicates that the following variables were not
statistically significantly different from each other for Hypothesis II: gender, age,
respondents whose employer was directly involved with either EBT or Fingerprint
Imaging, and respondents whose employer was not directly involved with either EBT
or Fingerprint Imaging.
Data Analysis for Research Hypothesis III
Research Hypothesis III: There is a relationship based on social and
demographic characteristics between professionals and selection o f an alternative to
the Paper-Based welfare system that would produce fraud prevention benefits.
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This section o f the study will examine the third research hypothesis, namely,
that there is a relationship based on social and demographic between professionals
and selection o f an alternative to the Paper-Based welfare system that would produce
fraud prevention benefits. If an alternative was not selected the minimum number of
times, it was not considered for the analysis. This resulted in the elimination o f the
Paper-Based with Fingerprint Imaging and EBT systems. The measure of 50% was
chosen to indicate a selection for a welfare system from the three alternatives that
were provided. Individuals who did not choose a particular system more than 50% of
the time were assigned to the no selection group.
Questions were grouped on the basis of selecting an alternative to the PaperBased system that would produce fraud prevention benefits, such as reducing
undercover investigations or eliminating the need for surveillance cameras.
Table 10 examines if there is a relationship between profession and selection
of an alternative that would provide benefits as a result o f fraud prevention. The chisquare results are displayed in Table 10.
Table 10
Employer and Fraud Prevention Benefits (N = 245)
City/County
(« = 108)

State/Federal
(/i = 137)

No Selection

29%

52%

EBT w Fingerprint Imaging

71%

48%

Note, x = 9.040, df= 1,p < .05.
The results demonstrated in Table 10 indicate that 29% (n = 66) o f city and
county respondents did not select any of one of the three alternatives 50% or more of
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the time. Seventy-one percent (n = 77) selected the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging
system 50% or more o f the time. Statistically significant differences existed between
the respondents based on employer and selection o f an alternative that would provide
welfare fraud prevention benefits ip < .05). Based on the chi-square test results
presented in Table 10, Research Hypothesis III was accepted for city and county
respondents. A relationship exists between professionals based on social and
demographic characteristics and selection o f an alternative to the Paper-Based
welfare system that would produce fraud prevention benefits.
These results indicate that city and county respondents believe that the EBT
with Fingerprint Imaging system would provide more benefits than the other
alternatives. This may be explained by the fact that many of these respondents have
been directly involved with Paper-Based with Fingerprint Imaging and EBT systems.
They may feel these systems have failed to produce the benefits as claimed. For
example, there may still be expensive labor-intensive investigations involving
surveillance cameras and other equipment under the EBT and Paper-Based with
Fingerprint Imaging systems.
The state and federal respondents do not believe any one o f the three systems
is a better alternative to the Paper-Based welfare system in producing fraud
prevention benefits. These respondents may be fearful that no additional benefits will
result from any o f the alternatives. The position o f the respondents could be that
surveillance cameras, undercover investigations, and many man-hours would still be
required if any o f the alternatives were selected. For example, the EBT system would
indicate an electronic transaction had occurred. The system would show the time,
amount, and location o f the transaction and the EBT card that was used. However,
without eyewitness testimony or a photograph, there is no concrete evidence it was
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the recipient who accessed the benefits. These elements o f a fraud investigation all
represent administrative costs.
Summary of Data Analysis for Research Hypothesis III
There were not enough selections of the Paper-Based with Fingerprint
Imaging and EBT to apply the chi-square test. Research Hypothesis m was accepted
for city and county practitioners. State and federal respondents did not select any one
of the three alternatives. One explanation for these results is city and county
respondents believe EBT with Fingerprint Imaging may reduce welfare fraud
investigations. Fewer investigations represent a reduction in administrative costs.
These respondents may also assume that surveillance cameras may not be needed
because positive identification can be provided with the EBT with Fingering Imaging
system but not with any o f the other alternatives.
The following variables were judged not to be significantly different from
each other for testing data related to Research Hypothesis III: profession, education,
gender, age, experience, respondents whose employer was directly involved with
either EBT or Fingerprint Imaging, and respondents whose employer was not directly
involved with either EBT or Fingerprint Imaging. It could thus not be determined if
these variables affected the selection of an alterative system.
The following section of the study will review the results o f data for testing
Research Hypothesis IV.
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Data Analysis fhr R in a r c h Hypothesis IV

Research Hypothesis IV: There is a relationship based on social and
demographic characteristics between practitioners and agreement on specific
technologies to prevent fraud for each of the alternatives.
Respondents had to choose among “strongly agree,” “agree,” “undecided,”
“disagree,” and “strongly disagree.” Data were collapsed into “strongly agree/agree,”
“undecided,” and “strongly disagree/disagree” for analyzing questions 27 through 37:
Questions 27, 30, and 36—EBT cards and magnetic stripes; Questions 28, 29, 34,
and 32—EBT with Fingerprint Imaging; Questions 31, 33, and 35—Paper-Based
with Fingerprint Imaging.
Test results will be presented for questions where there was a significant
difference in responses from respondents based on social and demographic variables
and the questions presented in Section 4.
Respondents had to choose from “strongly agree” (1), “agree” (2),
“undecided” (3), “disagree” (4), and “strongly disagree” (5). A minimum o f five
selections had to be made for each social or demographic characteristic category to
be considered. The following five tables will show those social and demographic
characteristics that were found to be statistically significant different (p < .05).
Table 11 shows the results o f responses to the question, “Magnetic stripes
imprinted on EBT cards will prevent fraud.” Forty-four percent (n —61) o f those
respondents 40 years and younger strongly agreed or agreed that magnetic stripes
imprinted on EBT cards will prevent counterfeiting. Forty-three percent o f those
respondents 40 years and older strongly agreed or agreed with the statement. There
was a statistically significant difference between the groups (p < .05). Based on the
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results shown in Table 11, Research Hypothesis IV was accepted. There is a
relationship based on social and demographic characteristics between professionals
and identification of technologies that will prevent fraud.
Table 11
Age and Magnetic Stripes Preventing Counterfeiting (N —266)
Response

<40 Years
(n =139)

> 40 Years
(n =127)

Agree

44%

43%

Undecided

16%

28%

Disagree

40%

30%

Note, x = 2.497, df= 2, p < .05.
Younger respondents may be more knowledgeable about the credit card
industry due to more frequent use of electronic financing. They may realize that a
criminal would need a valid Personal Identification Number (PIN) in order to activate
a counterfeit EBT card. Without a valid PIN, the counterfeited card would be
useless. This may explain their responses to EBT cards being counterfeited.
Respondents who were 40 years and older may have been victims or heard stories in
their line of work of someone stealing a Personal Identification Number and
producing a counterfeit card. According to the U.S. General Accounting Office
(1995), “Commercial Credit Card counterfeiting has increased dramatically in the
past few years. Most equipment needed to counterfeit cards is easily purchased on
the open market” (p. 15).
The next section o f the study will explore responses from respondents
regarding the accuracy o f fingerprints.
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Table 12 shows the results of Question 31, “A fingerprint is the most accurate
means available to identify an individual.” Statistically significant differences existed
between the respondents based on the variable “employer” and responses to Question
31 regarding magnetic stripes and counterfeiting (p < .05). Seventy-eight percent
(n = 87) o f city and county respondents and 72% (n — 111) o f state and federal
respondents strongly agreed or agreed that a fingerprint is the most accurate means
to identify an individual. Based on the results shown in Table 12, Research
Hypothesis IV was accepted. There is a relationship based on social and demographic
characteristics between practitioners and identification o f specific technologies that
would prevent fraud.
Table 12
Employer and Fingerprinting to Identify an Individual Employer (N —266)
City/County
(n= 112)

State/Federal
(n =154)

Agree

78%

72%

Undecided

18%

14%

4%

14%

Response

Disagree
Note. % = 6.378, df= 2, p < .05.

Overwhelmingly, respondents employed by city and county strongly agreed or
agreed that fingerprinting is the most accurate means to identify an individual.
Seventy-eight percent (n = 87) o f the city and county respondents believed that a
fingerprint is the most accurate means to identify an individual. In comparison to city
and county respondents, a slightly lower percentage, 72%, of state and federal
respondents believed the fingerprint is the most accurate means to identify an
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individual. A higher percentage o f city and county respondents than state and federal
respondents believed that the fingerprint is the most accurate means to identify an
individual.
Many of the respondents employed in law enforcement are employed by city
and county agencies. Law enforcement relies on the use o f fingerprints for
identification. For example, the FBI has about 72 million individual criminal and civil
fingerprint records, according to the U.S. General Accounting Office (1995, p. 2).
Most EBT administrators are state and federal employees and may be less likely to
endorse the use of fingerprints as a means of identifying an individual due to the
added administrative costs that would be incurred.
This section of the study will examine to see if there is a relationship between
respondents surveyed and the belief that fingerprinting is the most accurate means of
identification. The responses are based on profession.
As Table 13 demonstrates, 76% (w = 77) of law enforcement, 79% (n = 97)
o f welfare benefit administrators, and 57% (n - 24) of EBT administrators strongly
agreed or agreed that a fingerprint is the most accurate means available to identify an
individual. EBT administrators had the highest percentage of respondents who were
undecided and strongly disagreed or disagreed. Statistically significant differences
existed between the respondents based on the variable “profession” and responses to
Question 31, “A fingerprint is the most accurate means available to identify an
individual” (p < .05). Based on the results shown in Table 13, Research Hypothesis
IV was accepted. There is a relationship based on social and demographic
characteristics between professionals and identification of specific technologies that
would prevent fraud.
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Table 13
Profession and Fingerprinting to Identify an Individual (Y = 266)
Response

Law
Enforcement
(w = 101)

Welfare Benefit
Admin.
(n = 123)

EBT Admin.
(/* = 42)

Agree

76%

79%

57%

Undecided

16%

10%

31%

8%

11%

12%

Disagree

Note. % = 10.923, df= 2,p < .05.
The results of Table 13 are consistent with the other results presented in this
chapter. Welfare benefit administrators may have had the highest number o f
respondents with 79% (n = 97) strongly agree and agree responses due to the
success that fingerprint imaging systems have had in deterring duplicate assistance
fraud. Major cities in this country, such as New York and Los Angeles, have
implemented an automated fingerprint identification system with their Paper-Based
welfare system as means to identify individuals applying for benefits twice, once
under their own name and again under an assumed name.
Los Angeles County Welfare has utilized fingerprint biometric in the
application phase of their General Relief and Aid to Families with Dependent
Children entitlement programs by use o f the AFIS system, reports the United
States Secret Service. The Automated Fingerprint Imaging Record
Management (AFIRM) has been extremely successful and cost efficient in
detecting individuals whom attempt to file multiple applications using more
than one identity. (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1995, p. 1)
Law enforcement respondents were again strong supporters o f the use of
fingerprinting to identify individuals with a slightly lower percentage, 76% (n = 77),
than welfare benefit administrators. Their responses indicate that without a biometric
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measurement, such as a fingerprint, it may be difficult to prove conclusively that the
person applying or accessing welfare benefits is entitled to receive them.
As with other results in this study, the findings shown in Table 13 suggest that
EBT administrators are less supportive o f fingerprinting or fingerprint technology
than other respondents, 57% (n = 23). Their perspective could indicate a lack o f
desire to change the EBT systems to include fingerprint technology. Implementing
fingerprint technology into an EBT system would delay meeting mandated deadlines
by the executive administration and increase administrative costs.
Table 14 presents the chi-square test results to determine if a relationship
exists between the employer and responses regarding the need to combine EBT with
Fingerprint Imaging. Eighty-six percent in = 96) of city and county respondents and
61% (n = 94) of state and federal respondents strongly agreed or agreed with the
statement that it was necessary to combine EBT with Fingerprint Imaging. There
were statistically significant differences ip < .05) between the respondents based on
this variable. Based on the results shown in Table 14, Research Hypothesis IV was
accepted. There is a relationship based on social and demographic characteristics
between professionals and agreement on technologies to prevent fraud.
Table 14
Employer and EBT With Fingerprint Imaging to Prevent Fraud {N = 266)
Response

City/County
(n = 112)

State/Federal
in = 154)

86%

61%

Undecided

7%

18%

Disagree

7%

21%

Agree

Note, x = 20.277, df= 2 ,p < .05.
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City and state respondents may have more concerns than state and federal
respondents that the use of the PIN has not been able to prevent fraud in the EBT
system. This may explain the differences. Most of the investigations o f fraud in the
EBT programs have been completed by city and county respondents. This may also
explain why they feel there is a need to combine both EBT and Fingerprint Imaging
to better prevent fraud. State and federal respondents are responsible for the
administration ofEBT programs and thus are not as involved with the investigation
of fraud. By not being directly involved with fraud investigations, they have not
witnessed the crimes that have been committed.
The next section of the study will analyze the data to determine if a
relationship exists between the variable “education” and the need to combine EBT
with Fingerprint Imaging to prevent fraud in the welfare system.
Table 15 shows the results for Question 32, “It is necessary to combine EBT
with Fingerprint Imaging to prevent fraud” for the variable “profession.” As Table 15
indicates, 86% (n = 87) of law enforcement and 73% (n — 80) o f welfare benefit
administrators believe that it is necessary to combine EBT with Fingerprint Imaging
to prevent fraud. Statistically significant differences exist between the respondents
based on the variable “profession” and responses to Question 32 (p < .05). Research
Hypothesis V was accepted. There is a relationship based on social and demographic
characteristics between professionals and agreement on specific technologies to
prevent fraud in the welfare system.
Law enforcement may have had a higher percentage of strongly agree and
agree responses due to their reliance on fingerprinting. The responses in Table 15
indicate that some forms of fraud may be prevented if it can be physically proven that
the individual is not an imposter and that the recipient actually received the benefits.
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Table IS
Profession and EBT With Fingerprint Imaging to Prevent Fraud {N= 266)
Law
Enforcement
(/»= 101)

Welfare Benefit
Admin.
(#r=123)

EBT Admin.
(#t = 42)

86%

73%

29%

Undecided

9%

11%

31%

Disagree

5%

15%

40%

Response

Agree

Note, x = 49.701, d f= 4 ,p < .05.
A potential explanation for welfare benefit administrators not being as supportive as
law enforcement regarding the need to implement fingerprinting with EBT could be
the constitutional rights of recipients. EBT administrators appear less convinced that
it is necessary to combine EBT with Fingerprint Imaging to prevent fraud in the
welfare system. EBT systems have taken years to develop and implement in many
states; any changes would cause further delay in foil implementation statewide.
Summary of Data Analysis for Research Hypothesis IV
Because o f the data displayed in Tables 11-15, Research Hypothesis IV was
accepted. There is a relationship based on social and demographic characteristics
between professionals based on social and demographic characteristics and
agreement on technologies that will prevent fraud. Younger respondents (under 40
years), more than older respondents (over 40 years), believed the use o f a Personal
Identification Number would prevent counterfeiting Respondents employed by city
and county, more than state and federal respondents, strongly agreed or agreed that
fingerprinting is the most accurate means to identify an individual. Welfare benefit
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administrators, when compared to other professions, had the highest support of
strongly agree and agree responses regarding fingerprinting being the most accurate
means to identify an individual. More city and county respondents than state and
federal respondents felt it was necessary to combine EBT with Fingerprint Imaging.
The following section o f the study will analyze the data for identifying
technologies that will not prevent fraud in the welfare system.
Data Analysis for Research Hypothesis V
Hypothesis V: There is a relationship based on social and demographic
characteristics between professionals and agreement on specific technologies that will
not prevent fraud in the welfare system.
Respondents had to choose among “strongly agree,” “agree,” “undecided,”
“disagree,” and “strongly disagree ” Data were collapsed into “strongly agree/agree,”
“undecided,” and “strongly disagree/disagree” for analyzing questions 27 through 37:
Questions 27, 30, and 36—EBT cards and magnetic stripes; Questions 28, 29, 34,
and 32—EBT with Fingerprint Imaging; Questions 31, 33, and 35—Paper-Based
with Fingerprint Imaging.
Test results are presented for questions where there was a significant
difference in responses from respondents based on social and demographic variables
and the questions presented in Section 4 of the research instrument.
The next section o f the study will present the chi-square results for
determining a relationship between the “profession” and the Paper-Based with
Fingerprint Imaging allowing only the authorized recipient access to benefits.
Table 16 shows the results for Question 33, “Implementing Fingerprint
Imaging with the Paper-Based System will allow only the authorized recipient to
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access benefits.” Statistically significant differences existed between the respondents
based on the variable “profession” and responses to Question 33 (p < .05).
Table 16
Profession and the Paper-Based System With Fingerprint Imaging
Preventing Unauthorized Access (N —266)
Law
Enforcement
(w= 101)

Welfare Benefit
Admin.
(n =123)

EBT Admin.
(n = 42)

Agree

37%

32%

14%

Undecided

24%

29%

19%

Disagree

39%

39%

67%

Response

Note, x = 12.434, d f= A ,p< .05.
Thirty-nine percent (n = 40) of law enforcement respondents and 39% (n =
41) of welfare benefit administrators strongly disagreed or disagreed that the PaperBased system with Fingerprint Imaging would allow only the authorized recipient to
access benefits, while 67% (n —28) o f the EBT administrators strongly disagreed or
disagreed with this statement. Based on these results, Research Hypothesis V was
accepted. There is a relationship based on social and demographic characteristics
between professionals and agreement on specific technologies that would not prevent
fraud in the welfare system.
EBT professionals had the highest percentage of respondents who strongly
disagreed or disagreed that only authorized individuals could access benefits under
the Paper-Based with Fingerprint Imaging system. EBT administrators may have
taken this position to justify the switch from the Paper- Based systems to the EBT
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system in 38 states. EBT administrators may be convinced it was necessary to switch
from the paper system to an electronic system.
A smaller percentage o f law enforcement respondents than EBT
administrators strongly disagreed or disagreed that adding Fingerprint Imaging would
allow only authorized recipients access to welfare benefits. The responses from law
enforcement respondents may be due to historically relying on fingerprinting.
O f the welfare benefit administrators, the highest percentage strongly
disagreed or disagreed that an unauthorized individual would be denied access to
benefits if the Fingerprint Imaging was incorporated with the Paper-Based welfare
system. As with law enforcement, this group o f respondents had a much lower
percentage o f strongly disagree or disagree responses when compared to EBT
administrators. The position taken by welfare benefit administrators may represent a
conflict. Many Paper-Based with Fingerprint Imaging systems have prevented
duplicate assistance fraud (when an individual applies for benefits twice) but it has
not prevented the other three most common forms o f fraud (counterfeiting, stolen
benefits, and food stamp trafficking).
The next section of the study will present the chi-square results for examining
a relationship between the variable “employer” and the Paper-Based system with
Fingerprint Imaging providing data on each welfare transaction.
As Table 17 indicates, 43% (n = 48) of city and county respondents strongly
agreed or agreed that the Paper-Based system with Fingerprint Imaging would
provide data on each welfare transaction. Fifty-one percent (n = 79) of state and
federal respondents strongly disagreed or disagreed that combining Paper-Based with
Fingerprint Imaging would provide data on each welfare transaction. Statistically
significant differences existed between the groups (p < .05). Based on the results
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shown in Table 17, Research Hypothesis V was accepted. There is a relationship
based on social and demographic characteristics between state and federal
professionals and agreement on technologies that would not prevent fraud.
Table 17
Employer and Paper-Based System With Fingerprint Imaging
Providing Real Time Data (N —266)
Response

City/County
(/i = 112)

State/Federal
(/»= 154)

Agree

43%

27%

Undecided

29%

23%

Disagree

28%

51%

Note. % = 1.128, d f = 2 , p < .05.
The responses from these respondents indicate that city and county
professionals may feel a stronger bond to the Paper-Based with Fingerprint Imaging
system than do state and federal respondents. This may be explained by the fact that
many cities and counties, such as Los Angeles and New York, have initiated PaperBased with Fingerprint Imaging Systems. Most EBT systems in this country are
administered by state and federal respondents. This may explain why they do not
support the concept o f upgrading the Paper-Based welfare system by installing
Fingerprint Imaging.
The next section o f the study will present the chi-square results for
determining a relationship between the variable “profession” and responses to
Question 35, “Adding fingerprinting to the Paper-Based system will provide data on
each welfare transaction.”
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Table 18 indicates that the highest percentage of law enforcement
respondents, 42% (n —42), and EBT administrators, 71% (n = 87), strongly
disagreed or disagreed that the Paper-Based system with Fingerprint Imaging
provided data on each welfare transaction. It is surprising that only 30% (n = 37)
strongly disagreed or disagreed with the statement. Statistically significant differences
existed between the groups (p < .05). Because o f the results shown in Table 18,
Research Hypothesis V was accepted. There is a relationship based on social and
demographic characteristics between professionals and agreement on technologies
that will not prevent fraud.
Table 18
Profession and the Paper-Based System With Fingerprint Imaging
Providing Real Time Data (N - 266)
Law
Enforcement
(» = 101)

Welfare Benefit
Admin.
(« = 123)

EBT Admin.
(n = 42)

Agree

38%

39%

7%

Undecided

21%

31%

21%

Disagree

42%

30%

71%

Response

Note, x = 25.980, df= 4 , p < .05.
As Table 18 indicates, the highest percent of respondents who strongly
disagreed or disagreed with this statement were EBT administrators. One feature of
the EBT systems is its ability to track each welfare transaction: the date, time,
amount, and location. This was one o f the main marketing points made by state and
federal respondents when they were lobbying to replace the Paper-Based system with
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the EBT system. “EBT provides an audit trail that links individual purchases to
specific retailers, whereas coupons provide no such linkage” (Robinson, 1994, p. 8).
The results shown in Table 18 for welfare benefit administrators are
surprising, because the Paper-Based system with Fingerprint Imaging cannot track
each welfare transaction. States that have implemented a Paper-Based with
Fingerprint Imaging system only attempt to match fingerprints at the beginning o f the
application process, when an individual applies for benefits. This is done to verify that
the applicant is not already receiving benefits under an assumed name.
The responses o f law enforcement respondents indicate that it is necessary to
track welfare fraud in order to help prevent it. This claim could be based on the
assumption that individuals will be less likely to commit fraud if they feel they can be
prosecuted and found guilty of the crime.
The next section of the study will present the chi-square results for
determining a relationship between the variable “employer” and responses asking
whether a Personal Identification Number would positively prove who accessed
benefits.
Table 19 displays the results of responses from respondents employed by a
city, county, state, or federal agency when asked about the PIN identifying welfare
recipients. As Table 19 indicates, 83% (n = 93) of city and county respondents and
92 % (n= 142) of state and federal respondents are not confident that a PIN will
positively prove who accessed welfare benefits. Statistically significant differences
existed between the groups (p < .05). Research Hypothesis V was accepted based on
the results shown in Table 19. There is a relationship based on social and
demographic characteristics between professionals and agreement on technologies
that would not prevent fraud.
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Table 19
Employer and PIN Indicating Who Accessed Benefits (N —266)
Response

City/County
(n = 112)

State/Federal
(n = 154)

Agree

6%

5%

Undecided

11%

3%

Disagree

83%

92%

Note. % = 6.321, df= 2,p< .05.
These outcomes were not unexpected since Personal Identification Numbers
have not prevented crimes in the commercial credit card industry. The U.S. Secret
Service reports that “commercial credit card Industry reports fraudulent applications
have increased 33% in the past two years” (U.S. GAO, 1995, p. 3). State and federal
respondents may have had such a high percentage because welfare agencies know
who the welfare recipient is but not necessarily who received the benefits under the
EBT system. This is the same situation respondents faced with the Paper-Based
system. There was no direct linkage between the recipient and use of the benefits.
The use o f the Personal Identification Numbers has failed to prevent fraud in both the
credit card industry and EBT pilot projects. These respondents may be concerned
that once an individual has knowledge of a PEN and possession o f a debit or credit
card, they have access to the account.
The next section o f the study will present the chi-square results for
determining a relationship between the variable “age” and responses regarding
Personal Identification Number positively proving who accessed benefits.
As Table 20 indicates, 68% (n = 26) o f the respondents who were 40 years
and younger, and 91% (n = 207) of the respondents who were 40 years and older, do
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not think that the use of a PIN will positively prove who accessed welfare benefits.
Statistically significant differences existed between the respondents (p < .05), and
Research Hypothesis V was accepted. There is a relationship based on social and
demographic characteristics between respondents and agreement on technologies that
would not prevent fraud.
Table 20
Age and PIN Number and Positive Identification (N = 266)
Response

< 40 Years
(/i = 38)

> 40 Years
(n = 228)

Agree

18%

3%

Undecided

13%

5%

Disagree

68%

91%

Note, x2 = 17.947, df= 2, p < .05.
It was somewhat surprising that there was a higher percentage of respondents
who were 40 years and older, compared to those 40 and younger, who did not think
a PIN would positively identify an individual accessing benefits. These results may
indicate that older respondents have less confidence in the EBT system in terms o f
preventing fraud. Many of these respondents may have worked for many years with
the Paper-Based welfare system and thus feel more comfortable with that process.
The next section of the study will present the chi-square results for
determining a relationship between the variable “employer” and responses to the
Paper-Based system with Fingerprint Imaging providing positive identification.
Table 21 shows 51% (n —79) o f state and federal respondents strongly
disagreed or disagreed that the Paper-Based with Fingerprint Imaging system will
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positively prove who accessed the welfare benefits. Only 34% (n = 38) of the city and
county respondents strongly disagreed or disagreed. Statistically significant
differences existed between the groups (p < .05). Research Hypothesis V was
accepted for state and federal professionals. There is a relationship based on social
and demographic characteristics between professionals and agreement on
technologies that would not prevent fraud.
Table 21
Employer and the Paper-Based System With Fingerprint Imaging
Providing Positive Identification (N = 266)
Response

City/County
(n = 112)

State/Federal
(n = 154)

Agree

34%

32%

Undecided

32%

17%

Disagree

34%

51%

Note. % = 11.014, df= 2, p < .05.
The results shown in Table 21 indicate that state and federal respondents
believe that combining Fingerprint Imaging with the more traditional Paper-Based
system will not prove who accessed welfare benefits. State and federal respondents
may have taken this position because so many states have done away with PaperBased systems and have already adopted an EBT systems. City and county
respondents may have had a smaller percentage of strongly disagree or disagree
responses because of a level of comfort they feel with the Paper-Based system.
The following section o f the study will discuss potential polity implications
for alternatives to the Paper-Based welfare system.
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Summary o f Data Analysis for Research Hypothesis V
Because o f the data displayed in Tables 16-21, Research Hypothesis V was
accepted. There is a relationship based on social and demographic characteristics
between professionals and agreement on technologies that will not prevent fraud.
EBT respondents had the highest percentage o f respondents who strongly disagreed
or disagreed that only authorized individuals could access benefits under the Paper*
Based with Fingerprint Imaging system. More state and federal respondents than city
and county respondents felt that adding Fingerprint Imaging would not provide data
on each welfare transaction. More EBT administrators than any other profession felt
that adding Fingerprint Imaging would not provide data on each welfare transaction.
More state and federal respondents felt that the use o f the PIN would not positively
prove who accessed welfare benefits. There was a higher percentage of respondents
who were 40 years and older, compared to those 40 and younger, who did not think
a PIN would positively identify an individual accessing benefits. State and federal
respondents believe that combining a Fingerprint Imaging with the more traditional
Paper-Based system will not prove who accessed the welfare benefits more than city
and county respondents.
The following section of the study will discuss potential policy implications
for alternatives to the Paper-Based welfare system.
Policy Implications
One o f the main purposes of this study is not only to gather data for selecting
the most effective alternative to the Paper-Based welfare system, but also to examine
possible policy implications for implementing such a system. To accomplish this task,
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the following open-ended statement was included in the research instrument: “In my
opinion, I perceive the best alternative to the Paper-Based system to be (Please circle
one): Paper-Based with Fingerprint Imaging, EBT, EBT with Fingerprint Imaging.
The policy implications with selecting this system are:_____________________
Of the returned surveys (N = 267), 210 responded to the open-ended
question. However, many of them veered away from addressing policy implications
and instead listed benefits of the system that would best prevent fraud. Of the 267
responses, 20% of the respondents chose not to answer the question, and another
11% listed benefits instead of policy implications. Table 22 shows the social and
demographic characteristics of respondents who provided benefits as a result of
selecting the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system.
As this table indicates, 59% (n - 17) o f the respondents were employed by a
city or county agency. All, 100% (n = 29), either worked for an employer who was
directly involved with EBT or Fingerprint Imaging, or had knowledge of such
systems. Sixty percent of the respondents (n — 17) were college graduates. Fifty-five
percent were female (/» = 16), and 93% (n —27) were Caucasian. The mean age for
respondents who provided benefits was 44.7 years, and the median years of
experience was 14 years.
When asked to provide policy implications, many of the respondents instead
provided benefits o f the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system. The following will
summarize the benefits for the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system as viewed by
the respondents based on profession.
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Table 22
Demographics and Benefits for the EBT With Fingerprint Imaging System (Ar= 29)
Law

Total

(n —15)

Welfare Benefit
Admin.
(n=13)

EBT
Admin.
(n=l)

(Ar= 29)

Employed by:
City/County
State/Federal

60%
40%

46%
54%

0%
100%

59%
41%

Employers’ Involvement:
Yes
No

53%
47%

31%
69%

100%
0%

41%
59%

Employers’ Not
Involved/Familiar with
Yes
No

47%
53%

69%
31%

0%
0%

59%
41%

Education
No college degree
College degree

40%
60%

46%
54%

0%
100%

41%
59%

Gender
Male
Female

60%
40%

23%
77%

100%
0%

45%
55%

Race/Ethnicity:
Caucasian
Non-Caucasian

85%
15%

100%
0%

100%
0%

93%
7%

Benefits Provided bv Respondents Regarding the EBT With Fingerprint
Imaging System

Law Enforcement
Positive Identification. “The EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system is the only
system that would provide positive identification of recipients.” “This system would
deter fraud from occurring in the welfare system.” “The EBT with Fingerprint
Imaging system is the only alternative that would provide positive identification of
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the individual receiving the welfare benefits because fingerprints cannot be
duplicated.”
Welfare Benefit Administrators
Accountability. “Improved control over benefit delivery.” “This system
would prevent anyone other than the authorized recipient from receiving the benefits
and would also prevent duplicate assistance fraud.”
EBT Administrators
Real Time Information. “The system would provide real time data on welfare
transactions. There would be more control at each stage of the welfare process.”
The next section of the study will review the alternatives that were selected
for Question 38 and the policy implications associated with the respective systems.
Each respondent was asked to select an alternative from the three that were
provided: Paper-Based with Fingerprint Imaging, EBT, and EBT with Fingerprint
Imaging. O f those who responded to Question 38, 197 chose the EBT with
Fingerprint Imaging system and provided policy implications; 12 chose the EBT and
provided policy implications; and 4 chose the Paper-Based system with Fingerprint
Imaging but did not provide any policy implications. Fifty-four of the respondents did
not select an alternative to the Paper-Based System or provide any policy
implications.
The following section of the study will analyze the results of the policy
implications that were provided. First, the responses are indicated from the
respondents who chose the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging, then EBT, and finally the
Paper-Based system with Fingerprint Imaging. There were similarities and differences
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in responses between the respondents when it came to providing policy implications
for alternatives to the Paper-Based welfare system. The answers were grouped, based
on the profession o f the respondent.
E B I With Fingerprint Imaging System

Definition o f the EBT With Fingerprint Imaging System
During benefit enrollment, live scan fingerprint capture allows for a
comparison to be made between the live scan and prints recorded on the database.
Welfare benefits are disbursed at either an ATM or Point of Sale machine. The
system allows for self-verification by using a fingerprint reader to compare a live
scanned fingerprint with the same printed on the EBT card.
Overwhelmingly, the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system was selected by
those respondents who provided policy implications. This section of the study is a
review of those policy implications. Seventy of the respondents (n - 70) chose the
EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system. Table 23 indicates the backgrounds of the
respondents.
Table 24 shows the frequency of policy implications as cited by the
respondents who chose the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system. Many of the
respondents provided more than one policy implication on their survey. For example,
one respondent may have listed access to benefits, costs, and privacy issues as
possible policy implications. These policy implications are categorized by the
respondent’s profession.
Seventy of the respondents who provided policy implications also chose the
EBT system with Fingerprint Imaging. The three most frequently cited implications
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Table 23
Demographics and Policy Implications for the EBT With Fingerprint Imaging System
Law
Enforcement
(/i *27)

Welfare Benefit
Admin.
(n * 33)

EBT
Admin.
(n * 10)

(Y -70)

Employed by:
City/County
State/Federal

33%
67%

52%
48%

100%

37%
63%

Employers’ Involvement:
Yes
No

74%
26%

70%
30%

80%
20%

73%
27%

Employers’ Not
Involved/Familiar with
Yes
No

26%
74%

30%
70%

20%
80%

73%
27%

Education
No college degree
College degree

26%
74%

24%
76%

100%

21%
79%

Gender
Male
Female

55%
44%

48%
52%

80%
20%

56%
44%

Race/Ethnicity:
Caucasian
Non-Caucasian

88%
10%

94%
6%

100%
0%

93%
7%

Total

Table 24
EBT With Fingerprint Imaging and Frequencies of Policy Implications
Cost

Access

Privacy

Policy

Legislation

Training

Accuracy

Benefit
Sites

32

25

25

13

7

4

2

1

were administrative costs, access by individuals other than the authorized recipient,
and privacy issues regarding fingerprinting welfare recipients. This section o f the
study will examine whether these policy implications are consistent between
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respondents with similar and differing social and demographic characteristics. Trends
and patterns are also identified between the respondents who furnished potential
policy implications for alternatives to the Paper-Based Welfare System.
Based on these results, Hypothesis VI was accepted. There is a relationship
between social and demographic characteristics and policy implications for
alternatives to the Paper-Based welfare system for the purposes of preventing fraud.
The following section o f the study will discuss those implications for the EBT
system with Fingerprint Imaging, beginning with law enforcement respondents.
I jiw Enforcem ent Respondents

The responses from law enforcement respondents to the policy implication
question indicate that EBT with Fingerprint Imaging is considered the best alternative
to the Paper-Based welfare system for preventing fraud. All of the law enforcement
respondents (100%, n - 27), were employed full-time by a county or state
government agency; 16 of the respondents (S9%, n = 27), had a bachelor’s or
graduate degree; IS (56%) were male and 12 (44%) were female (n - 27); and 20
(74%) of the respondents’ employers were directly involved with either an EBT or
Fingerprint Imaging system. Seven (26%, n = 27) worked for employers who were
not directly involved but were familiar with systems in other states. O f those
respondents, 24 (90%) were Caucasian, 2 (7%) were African American, and 1 (4%)
was Hispanic American (n = 27). The median years of experience was 12.4 years, and
the mean age was 49 years.
Accessibility. According to law enforcement respondents, application for and
accessibility o f benefits to homebound recipients (elderly or physically challenged)
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was a concern that would impede the implementation o f this system. Because the
EBT with Fingerprint Imaging requires an exact fingerprint match, law enforcement
respondents indicated home health aides would be unable to access benefits for the
recipients.
Administrative Costs. Law enforcement respondents also raised concerns
that the costs to train recipients and caseworkers in Fingerprint Imaging would be
prohibitive. There would also be costs for Fingerprint Imaging devices at POS/ATM
machines, for EBT cards, and for contracting services. These respondents also
identified such costs as service charges and maintenance fees. The respondents
indicated these expenses could impede the implementation o f the EBT with
Fingerprint Imaging system.
Constitutional Rights of Welfare Recipients. This group expressed concerns
that fingerprinting recipients would be intrusive, demeaning, and judgmental. They
felt that the process of fingerprinting recipients should not criminalize the right to
receive welfare benefits. This group also indicated that fingerprinting should not
invade a person’s privacy. In addition, it was also believed that legislation and policy
would have to be developed and implemented to protect biometric data from other
agencies. One practitioner pointed out that social service agencies would not be able
to exchange database records of fingerprints with law enforcement agencies.
Database records can be used only for identification purposes and not for arrests and
prosecutions.
In summary, the law enforcement respondents who responded to the policy
implication question regarded application, accessibility, costs, intrusive methods
regarding privacy issues, and policy changes as important implications when
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implementing an EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system. Based on these responses,
there appears to be a relationship between respondents’ perceptions o f potential
policy implications (administrative costs, access to benefits, and privacy issues) and
their selection of an alternative to the Paper-Based welfare system for the purposes o f
preventing fraud.
The following section o f the study will review the opinions of welfare benefit
administrators on potential policy implications.
Welfare Benefit Administration Respondents
The responses from welfare benefit administrators indicate that EBT with
Fingerprint Imaging is the system chosen by these respondents to deal with welfare
fraud. O f the welfare benefit administrators who responded to the policy implication
question, all (100%, n = 33) were employed fiill-time by a county or state agency.
Twenty-three (70%, n = 33) of these respondents’ employers were directly involved
with either EBT or Fingerprint Imaging. Ten o f the respondents (30%, n = 33) were
not employed by an agency that was directly involved with EBT or Fingerprint
Imaging, but they were familiar with such systems in other states. Twenty-five of the
welfare benefit administrators (76%, n = 33) had a college degree or graduate
degree. Sixteen (48%) were male and 17 (52%) were female (n = 33). Thirty-one
(94%) were Caucasian, 1 (3%) respondent was African American, and 1 (3%) was
Hispanic (n —33). The welfare benefit administrators who responded to the policy
implication question averaged 12.7 years of experience (n = 33). The median age for
welfare benefit administrators who provided policy implications was 48.5.
The following is a summary of concerns by welfare benefit administrators
regarding potential policy implications for the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system.
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Administrative Costs. Most often, welfare benefit administrators questioned
the investment in terms o f administrative costs and funding for sophisticated
equipment at ATM/POS machines, especially in rural areas. One welfare
administrator believed that without federal funding, the required EBT system would
be considered an unfunded mandate placed upon the states by the federal
government.
Constitutional Rights o f Welfare Recipients. Many o f these same respondents
perceived that fingerprinting applicants for benefits could be seen as a possible
violation o f federal rules o f eligibility and could be considered an invasion o f privacy.
Currently, most states require applicants to provide other forms of identification,
such as a birth certificate, driver’s license, voter registration, or some other form o f
documentation. Many administrators believed privacy issues raised by fingerprinting
welfare recipients would have to be settled by the courts. As with law enforcement
respondents, welfare benefit administrators concluded that fingerprinting is often
associated with criminal processing. A group of respondents believed fingerprinting
individuals would discourage citizens from applying for welfare benefits. The
administrators raised issues about how the information would be shared with other
public agencies such as law enforcement, health agencies, and the Internal Revenue
Service.
Legislation. A number of welfare benefit administrators argued that
legislation would have to be passed, requiring an exact fingerprint match before the
disbursement o f welfare benefits. These welfare professionals pointed out that
currently many states have passed laws for the use o f fingerprints for the purpose o f
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identification. However, no state has passed legislation that would require positive
identification before benefits can be distributed.
Accessibility to Welfare Benefits. There was consistency between the welfare
benefit professionals who are responsible for the disbursement o f welfare benefits
regarding issues o f accessibility to benefits. One of the main themes expressed by
these respondents was that only authorized recipients would be able to access
benefits, unless every member of a household was fingerprinted. These administrators
expressed similar concerns regarding the disabled or mentally handicapped who have
home health aides shop for them. The aides would be unable to access benefits from
the EBT system with Fingerprint Imaging, because the system requires an exact
match between the encoded print on the EBT card and the fingerprint.
One administrator expressed concern with the accuracy o f Fingerprint
Imaging, especially for the disabled recipients. This administrator mentioned
recipients who were missing fingers or hands, which could prevent citizens from
receiving welfare benefits to which they are entitled. Apprehension was expressed
about delays pertaining to the efficiency o f processing applicants expediently while
utilizing the fingerprint imaging process. They expressed concerns about delays in
processing benefits to welfare recipients as a result of the fingerprinting process.
Each recipient will have to be fingerprinted and then database searches have to be
completed.
Welfare benefit administration respondents who responded to the policy
implication question all chose the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging option (/i = 33).
Their concerns were: violation of federal rules, a “big brother” controversy,
fingerprinting associated with criminal processing, proposed legislation allowing only
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the client to use the system, and the accuracy of fingerprinting and efficiency of
operations.
The following section of the study will review responses from EBT
administrators to policy implications for the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging.
EBT Administration Respondents
The responses to the question regarding policy implications from EBT
administrators indicated that EBT with Fingerprint Imaging is considered the best
alternative to the Paper-Based welfare system regarding fraud issues. O f those who
responded to the policy implication statement, nine were state employees, one was
from a county, and one was a federal employee; all were employed full-time (n = 10).
Eight o f the respondents’ employers were directly involved with either EBT or
Fingerprint Imaging (n —10). Two respondents’ employers were not directly
involved with EBT or the Fingerprint Imaging system, but these individuals indicated
they were familiar with such systems in other states (n = 10). Seven of the
respondents had a college degree (/i = 10). Eight o f the respondents were male; all
were Caucasian (n = 10). The mean years of experience for this group was 8.4. The
median age was 47.5 years.
Administrative Costs. As with the other groups of respondents,
administrative costs were a great concern, especially in smaller jurisdictions. In fact,
six EBT administrators saw this as a potential policy implication. The system was
described as an expensive form of technology that may never pay for itself. There
would be high administrative costs for the state, and expenses will bar retailers
because the current commercial infrastructure has no fingerprint readers at Point of
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Sale machines. There were concerns that cost to retailers might be passed on to
recipients, who would be charged for financial transactions, such as ATM charges.
This group also maintained that no one but the client can use this system, and that it
would exclude family members who are also eligible for benefits, unless the states
issued multiple cards to each household. As one EBT administrator stated, “If
multiple cards are not issued per household, then the authorized recipient would have
to sign an agreement for sole use o f the card and benefits, which may not be legally
possible.” The potential to violate the right to privacy as a result of fingerprinting
welfare recipients would be present.
Constitutional Rights of Welfare Recipients. One EBT practitioner was
concerned with the civil liberties implications and the reaction o f the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU). Some EBT administrators were apprehensive about the
misuse of client data. For example, who would have access to the data and with
whom would the data be shared? There was also the “Big Brother is Watching”
concern (government monitoring citizens). EBT administrators worried about the
accuracy of Fingerprint Imaging. Some EBT administrators expressed concerns that
clients might be denied benefits because there was not a direct match between the
encoded print and the fingerprint.
In summary, all EBT administration respondents chose the EBT with
Fingerprint Imaging (n = 10). Some o f the policy implications provided by this group
included: costs, the fact no one but the client can use this system, the potential to
violate the right to privacy as a result of fingerprinting welfare recipients, misuse o f
client data, the advent of “big brother,” and the danger of inaccuracy. There does
appear to be a relationship between respondents’ perceptions o f potential policy
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implications and their selection o f an alternative to the Paper-Based welfare system
for the purposes o f preventing fraud.
Summary o f the EBT With Fingerprint Imaging System’s Policy Implications
There appear to be three major policy issues among the respondents
concerning the implementation o f EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system:
administrative costs, access to benefits by authorized representatives (children and
home health aides), and privacy issues regarding fingerprinting. These implications
were identified by 48 of the 70 respondents who selected EBT with Fingerprint
Imaging and provided policy implications.
The responses are consistent across the demographic variables. Of those who
identified one o f the three implications, 18 were law enforcement respondents, 31
welfare benefit administrators, and 10 were EBT administrators. Forty-five of the
respondents were employed by a county or state agency, and three by a federal
agency. Forty-one of the respondents had college degrees. Twenty-six were male and
22 were female; 47 were Caucasian; and all but one was a full-time employee. Thirtythree o f the 48 worked for an employer who was directly involved with either EBT
or Fingerprint Imaging.
The following section of the study will look at the responses concerning the
policy implications of implementing an EBT system.
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EBT System
Definition o f the EBT System
Welfare recipients are issued a plastic card with magnetic tape and a personal
identification number. They access benefits at an Automated Teller Machine or a
Point o f Sale machine.
Three respondents chose the EBT system as the best alternative to the PaperBased system. One respondent was employed as a welfare benefit administrator, and
the other two were EBT administrators. All three were full-time state employees.
One respondent’s employer was directly involved with EBT or Fingerprint Imaging.
The other two respondents’ employers were not directly involved with EBT or
Fingerprint Imaging, but both were familiar with such systems in other states. All
three were college graduates and two were males. The median years of experience
for this group was 15.2 and the median age was 47.3.
One EBT administrator listed client impact and cost as potential policy
implications. The welfare administrator listed as a danger authorized representatives
not being able to access benefits. In addition, this practitioner indicated as a policy
implication that some smaller retailers would not be able to afford EBT and Point of
Sale machines.
The policy implications listed for EBT were very consistent with the
implications provided for EBT with Fingerprint Imaging, namely, administrative costs
and access to benefits by authorized recipients.
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Summary of the EBT System’s Policy Implications
The implications for implementing an EBT system would appear to be similar
to those for the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging. The main concerns are access by
authorized representatives and administrative costs, especially to smaller retailers.
One policy implication that was anticipated for the EBT system but not EBT with
Fingerprint Imaging is that it would not prevent fraud. There does not appear to be a
relationship between respondents and a selection for an alternative to the PaperBased system for the purposes o f preventing fraud.
Paper-Based System With Fingerprint Imaging
The respondents who selected the Paper-Based with Fingerprint Imaging
system for Question 38 did not provide any potential policy implications.
Summary o f Potential Policy Implications
Overwhelmingly, the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system was the one
selected when respondents provided policy implications (194 EBT with Fingerprint
Imaging, 18 EBT, and 4 Paper-Based with Fingerprint Imaging, N = 267). However,
of those 216 who selected the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system, only 74 of the
respondents provided policy implications. There appear to be great concerns among
respondents about the administrative costs involved in implementing an EBT system
with Fingerprint Imaging. Administrative costs were frequently the single most cited
policy implication identified by the respondents. The second most frequently cited
policy implication was the capacity of family members and authorized recipients to
access benefits.
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Many o f the respondents raised the issue that authorized recipients and entire
families would have to be fingerprinted if states implement an EBT with Fingerprint
Imaging system. The third most frequently cited implication listed by respondents
was the possible violation o f rights of welfare recipients required to be fingerprinted.
A number o f respondents felt fingerprinting welfare recipients might constitute a civil
rights violation. Respondents also felt legislation needs to be passed before an EBT
with Fingerprint Imaging system could be implemented. There were similarities
between the policy implications provided for the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging
system and the EBT system. Administrative costs were most cited, followed by
access by authorized representatives (someone other than the authorized recipient
who may access benefits). No policy implications were provided for the Paper-Based
system with Fingerprint Imaging.
Summary of Data Analysis Chapter
The results of the chi-square test results indicate that the EBT with
Fingerprint Imaging was selected by law enforcement and welfare administration
respondents more often than the Paper-Based with Fingerprint Imaging and the EBT
system for preventing the four most common forms of fraud (duplicate assistance
fraud, counterfeiting, stolen benefits, and food stamp trafficking). There could be a
number o f reasons for this.
Law enforcement has had a long history o f relying on fingerprints for
identification purposes, both in criminal and civil procedures. Combining EBT with a
Fingerprint Imaging system also provides positive identification of who accessed the
benefits.
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Many welfare benefit administrators have witnessed first-hand fraud still
occurring in EBT programs. With the implementation o f EBT with Fingerprint
Imaging, welfare benefit administrators are offered more assurances that benefits will
be used for their rightful purpose.
EBT with Fingerprint Imaging would offer welfare benefit administrators
positive identification o f welfare recipients at the two critical points of the welfare
process: at the beginning when an individual applies for benefits, and at the end when
the individual accesses benefits. EBT administrators did not select any o f the
alternatives for preventing the four most common forms o f fraud. One reason for this
could be that these administrators do not want the added administrative costs and
delays when implementing a Fingerprint Imaging system with their current EBT
systems.
Noncollege graduates had a higher percentage for selection of the EBT with
Fingerprint Imaging than college graduates for the prevention of the four most
common forms o f fraud. This may be explained by the fact that more law
enforcement respondents than any other professionals in the study were noncollege
graduates. This profession also has had a history o f relying on fingerprinting as a
means of identification. The probability is that the majority o f noncollege graduates
were law enforcement respondents.
None of the respondents selected any o f the alternatives that would provide
the necessary changes to prevent all fraud in the welfare system. Not much data are
available concerning the EBT system’s ability to prevent fraud for respondents to
review. There are no data available for the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging systems,
because no state has implemented such a system. Respondents may be reluctant to
present their opinions concerning necessary changes to prevent all fraud until they
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have more information available to them. However, they appear to be confident the
EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system would prevent the four most common forms of
fraud.
Respondents who were employed by either a city or county agency were the
only respondents who selected an alternative that would produce fraud prevention
benefits. Most welfare fraud investigations are conducted at the local level by city and
county respondents. Most o f these respondents selected the EBT with Fingerprint
Imaging system. Their responses may indicate frustration with the EBT and PaperBased with Fingerprint Imaging systems not providing effective security measures.
For example, the EBT system does not provide a means to positively prove who
accessed the welfare benefits, and the Paper-Based with Fingerprint Imaging system
was designed to prevent duplicate assistance but is not a preventive measure for other
forms of fraud.
The majority o f city, county, and welfare benefit administrators had the
highest percentages indicating they felt that a fingerprint is the most accurate means
to identify an individual. These results were not surprising since fingerprints have
long been used to identify individuals. It is surprising that city and county
respondents had a higher response rate on this point than state and federal
respondents. Many of these respondents may be directly involved at the local level
with Paper-Based with Fingerprint Imaging systems, so they have a greater
knowledge of fingerprint systems.
City and county administrators and law enforcement professionals had the
most responses concerning the necessity to combine EBT with Fingerprint Imaging
to prevent fraud. There are a number of explanations why these respondents may
have taken this position. Reviews have indicated that EBT pilot projects have failed
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to prevent fraud. Many of the city and county respondents may have been involved
with these pilot projects. Law enforcement respondents may be drawn to an
alternative that offers positive identification because o f their reliance on
fingerprinting. EBT administrators did not select any o f the alternatives for
preventing the four most common forms of fraud from the choices that were
provided. These administrators may feel changes are not necessary in the EBT
system, or they may be unwilling to fund the changes that are necessary. Respondents
employed by state and federal as well as EBT administrators did not think that adding
Fingerprint Imaging to the Paper-Based system would provide data on each welfare
transaction. These responses from the EBT administrators were expected, since this
is one strong advantage the EBT system has over the Paper-Based with Fingerprint
Imaging system. Responses from state and federal respondents were also not
surprising, since most EBT systems have been administered by state and federal
agencies.
State and federal respondents and those over 40 years o f age were most
opposed to the concept that the use o f a Personal Identification Number (PIN) would
positively prove who accessed the welfare benefits. The responses from the state and
federal respondents were surprising since they are the professionals responsible for
the EBT programs. Their responses may indicate knowledge or actual experience
with crimes committed in the commercial credit card industry. PINs have long been
used in the commercial credit card industry with little success in preventing crimes
from occurring. These respondents may assume that the use o f a PIN does not
positively prove who accessed an account. All that is proven with the use of a PIN is
that someone had knowledge of the PIN and possession o f the credit or debit card. It
does not place the recipient or an unauthorized third party at the location where the
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benefits were accessed. According to the General Accounting Office, “Investigations
have revealed that the PIN is often sold along with the EBT card to trafficking
brokers” (U.S. GAO, 1995, p. 1). This may be one o f the advantages EBT with
Fingerprint Imaging has over the EBT system. No one but the authorized recipient
can use the benefit card with the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system. With the
EBT system, anyone with access to the card and knowledge o f the PIN can access
the benefits.
The results o f the open-ended statement were supportive o f the findings from
the closed-ended responses for Hypotheses I, IE, IV, and V in that almost all o f the
respondents who provided policy implications selected the EBT with Fingerprint
Imaging system as the appropriate alternative to the Paper-Based system.
The responses to the open questions (selection o f the EBT with Fingerprint
Imaging system) do not support the findings for Research Hypothesis II, that no one
alternative will provide enough changes to prevent all fraud in the welfare system.
The results o f the study reveal that a number of policy implications are involved in
implementing any o f the three alternatives to the Paper-Based system. The major
policy implications with the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging are administrative costs,
the right to fingerprint recipients, and access to benefits by someone other than the
authorized recipient. The major policy implications for the EBT system were
administrative costs and inability to prevent fraud. None o f the respondents provided
policy implications for the Paper-Based with Fingerprint Imaging system.
The next chapter o f this study includes a summary, conclusions, and
recommendations o f the study.
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CHAPTER VH
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Introduction
The purpose of this study was to gather perspectives of respondents who are
directly involved with welfare fraud. They were asked whether they preferred the
Paper-Based system, another alternative that would prevent fraud, or none o f the
alternatives. Respondents were selected from public welfare directories. A series of
questions were posed for these respondents on the Paper-Based system with
Fingerprint Imaging, Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT), and Electronic Benefits
Transfer with Fingerprint Imaging. The respondents were grouped according to their
social and demographic characteristics and their selection of an alternative that
would: (a) prevent the four most common forms o f fraud—duplicate assistance fraud,
counterfeiting, stolen benefits, and food stamp trafficking; (b) provide the necessary
changes to prevent all forms o f fraud; (c) pinpoint technologies o f the three
alternatives in terms o f preventing fraud; (d) pinpoint technologies o f the three
alternatives in terms of not preventing fraud; (e) distinguish which alternative would
produce the most fraud prevention benefits; and (f) identify policy implications for
each alternative.
The next section will provide a description o f the respondents who were
sampled.

145
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Description o f the Respondents
This section will present a summary of the respondents' characteristics in this
study. The characteristics examined in this study were: profession, employer,
employer’s involvement with welfare systems, gender, education, years of
professional experience, and age. Surveys were mailed to 4S0 respondents who were
directly involved with welfare fraud. O f those 450,267 returned the requested survey
(59.3%). Of those respondents who returned the survey, 38% were law enforcement
professionals, 46% were welfare benefit administrators, and 16% were EBT
administrators. All o f the respondents were employed by a public entity: 1% were
employed by a city, 49% by a county, 48% by a state, and 2% by a federal agency.
Ninety-nine percent were employed full-time and 1% part-time. Of the respondents,
69% worked for an employer who was directly involved with either EBT or
Fingerprint Imaging system; 31% worked for an employer who was not directly
involved with an EBT or Fingerprint Imaging System but was familiar with such
systems in other states. Sixty-three percent of the respondents had a college or
graduate degree. The others had some college or a high school diploma. Fifty-seven
percent were male, and 43% were female. Ninety-eight percent were Caucasian, and
2% were African American or Hispanic. The median years o f experience was 10. The
mean age for the respondents was 47.9 years.
The respondents had to meet the following criteria to be considered for the
study: employment in law enforcement, welfare benefit administration, or EBT;
employment by a public entity; and possession of at least a high school diploma. The
respondents had to have some knowledge of the EBT or Fingerprint Imaging systems
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(knowledge coming from either direct involvement or knowledge o f other state
programs).
Summary
The social and demographic characteristics served as the independent
variables. The dependent variables were perceptions of the three alternative systems
regarding fraud prevention issues and policy implications for implementing the
alternatives. The conceptual framework relates the respondents’ characteristics,
namely, profession, employer, employer’s involvement with a system, education,
gender, ethnicity, experience, and age to their selection o f an alternative that would
prevent welfare fraud. The respondents were categorized on the basis o f their social
and demographic characteristics to see if their backgrounds led them to view the
policy alternatives differently.
Profession

The practitioners’ “profession” was found to influence their perceptions
towards the selection o f an alternative welfare fraud system for preventing duplicate
assistance fraud, counterfeiting, stolen benefits, and food stamp trafficking. The
differences were statistically significant (p < .OS).
More respondents in law enforcement than in any other profession selected
the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system for preventing the four most common
forms o f welfare fraud. Law enforcement professionals have long relied on
fingerprinting for identification purposes. Many of the respondents who participated
in this study may be directly involved in fingerprinting individuals. These respondents
may also be involved with the investigation of welfare fraud in the Paper-Based
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system. Their perceptions could potentially be shaped by seeing first-hand the ease
with which fraud can occur in the Paper-Based system. Because o f this, these
respondents seemed less likely to choose an alternative that involves paper benefits.
In addition, they are more likely to choose an alternative that utilizes fingerprint
identification. Fewer welfare benefit administrators than law enforcement respondents
selected the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system for preventing duplicate assistance
fraud, counterfeiting, stolen benefits, and food stamp trafficking. However, 75% o f
these respondents did select the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging as an alternative that
would prevent the four most common forms of fraud. The selection o f this system is
probably the result o f two desired objectives. First, the selection of the EBT with
Fingerprint Imaging may be due to the savings in administrative costs the system
offers from not processing paper benefits. An EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system
would eliminate the need to print, ship, distribute, and destroy paper welfare benefits.
This perspective indicates that while EBT with Fingerprint Imaging may reduce
fraud, its greater pay-off may occur in the reduction of administrative costs due to
not processing paper coupons. Second, by selecting the EBT with Fingerprint
Imaging system, these respondents may be convinced that positive identification is
necessary when an individual applies for welfare benefits. This perception would be
consistent with the findings of the United States General Accounting Office (1993):
“EBT alone does not effectively deter fraud in the delivery of benefits. Thus, an EBT
program without the enhanced security of biometric verification raises a genuine
concern about the potential for increased program costs and losses” (p. 7). Sixtythree percent of the EBT administrators did not select any of the alternatives. One
possible explanation why these respondents did not select the EBT with Fingerprint
Imaging system is the potential for high administrative costs of purchasing computer
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hardware and software that would be needed to implement Fingerprint Imaging with
the EBT system. These respondents may not be willing to admit that fraud does exist
in the EBT system and that changes are necessary, especially after the system was so
heavily promoted by the federal government and private industry in terms o f fraud
prevention. The fact that these administrators did not select the EBT (a system for
which they are responsible) is consistent with the position taken by Deputy Director
of the United States Department of Agriculture, Craig Beauchamp: “EBT and use of
the Personal Identification Number certainly gives us a great tool to identify the
stores and recipients who are trafficking. It will not, however, put an end to it”
(Wood & Smith, 1991, p. 12).
Based on the characteristic profession (law enforcement, welfare benefit
administrators, and EBT administrators), none of the respondents chose an
alternative that would provide the necessary changes or produce fraud prevention
benefits. EBT administrators had the highest percentage of respondents who did not
choose an alternative. These responses may be because the approach has not been
determined (Is EBT or Fingerprint Imaging going to be implemented first, Fingerprint
Imaging, or both at the same time?), total costs have not be established, and no
prototype has been reviewed. Although fewer law enforcement and welfare benefit
administrators opted for “no selection,” there were still a number o f respondents who
did not select an alternative. This is surprising since these respondents had enough
knowledge of the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging alternative to believe the system is
capable of preventing the four most common forms of fraud. This indicates that the
full potential o f the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system is not yet known.
One’s profession also influenced the perceptions of respondents when
identifying technologies that would help prevent fraud, namely, that fingerprinting is
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the most accurate means to identify the individual, and the need to combine EBT
with Fingerprint Imaging to prevent fraud (p < .05). Professionals in law enforcement
were more in favor of using fingerprinting and combining EBT with Fingerprint
Imaging than any other profession. Their perspective could be driven by wanting to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual not only committed fraud but
received assistance (duplicate assistance fraud, food stamp trafficking).
Fewer welfare benefit administrators than law enforcement respondents
strongly agreed or agreed that fingerprinting is the most accurate means to identify an
individual. However, almost two thirds strongly agreed or agreed that fingerprinting
is the most accurate means to identify an individual and that combining EBT with
Fingerprint Imaging was necessary to prevent fraud. The position taken by these
respondents may come from the desire to use Fingerprint Imaging to ensure that
benefits have been received by the rightful individuals, once the benefits are sent out
by the social service agency.
A little more than 50% o f the EBT administrators believed that fingerprinting
was the most accurate means available to identify an individual. More EBT
administrators were undecided or strongly disagreed or disagreed that EBT should be
combined with Fingerprinting to prevent fraud. The EBT administrators’ perspective
may be driven by the fact there is no hard evidence that EBT with Fingerprint
Imaging prevents fraud. EBT administrators may also argue that there has never been
concrete evidence to indicate exactly how much fraud is occurring. Thus, it would be
difficult to justify the added administrative costs that would result from adding
Fingerprint Imaging to an established EBT system to prevent fraud.
There were statistically significant differences between the respondents based
on their profession when it came to identifying technologies that would not prevent
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fraud (p < .05). More EBT administrators than any profession indicated “strongly
disagree” for the concept that a Paper-Based welfare system combined with
Fingerprint Imaging would allow only the authorized recipient to access benefits or
provide data on each transaction. Almost two thirds of EBT administrators felt this
way. Their responses may be based on the belief that the Paper-Based system must be
done away with and replaced with newer technology such as an EBT system.
Employer
There is a relationship between the employer and the practitioner’s
perceptions about the selection of an alternative welfare system for preventing
duplicate assistance fraud, counterfeiting, stolen benefits, and food stamp trafficking.
The differences were statistically significant (p < .05). A higher percentage o f city
and county respondents than state and federal respondents selected this system. The
perspectives of these respondents is consistent with the recommendations o f the U.S.
General Accounting Office (1995): “A fingerprint secured card could not be used by
anyone other than the authorized recipient of the entitled benefits” (p. 6).
State and federal respondents are often far removed from what actually
occurs during the application, processing, and disbursement of welfare benefits. City
and county respondents are many times on the “front lines” in the welfare systems.
State and federal respondents may operate more in theory, while city and county
respondents are more involved in program implementation. This may explain the
differences in their perspectives regarding the selection of an alternative to the PaperBased welfare system for preventing fraud. City and county respondents may be
somewhat frustrated with the EBT and Paper-Based with Fingerprint Imaging
systems in terms of what was supposed to work in theory, but did not in reality.
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Significant differences existed between the respondents, based on their
employer, in selecting an alternative or no alternative that would provide the
necessary changes to prevent fraud (p < .05). More state and federal respondents
thought that none of the alternatives would provide the necessary changes to prevent
fraud. This perspective reflects the viewpoint that some changes in the welfare system
may take a bite out of fraud but never totally eliminate it. Their responses suggest
that even if states choose to implement an EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system,
some forms o f fraud are still going to occur, or new forms o f fraud are going to be
committed.
The respondents’ employer also appeared to influence respondents in
identifying specific technologies o f each alternative (p < .05). A higher percentage of
city and county respondents than state and federal respondents either strongly agreed
or agreed that fingerprinting is the most accurate means to identify an individual and
that it is necessary to combine EBT with Fingerprint Imaging. Many of the city and
county respondents are directly involved with EBT systems. Their belief that EBT
must be combined with Fingerprint Imaging indicates a lack of confidence in the EBT
systems. This view is significant because many of these respondents are involved in
this system, with 38 states now having some form o f an EBT system.
Statistically significant differences existed between respondents based on their
employer and identification of technologies that will not prevent fraud (p < .05).
Many more state and federal respondents strongly disagreed or disagreed that the
Paper-Based with Fingerprint Imaging systems would provide data on each welfare
transaction and positively prove who accessed the welfare benefits. These results
reflect the differences in perspectives on the Paper-Based system. More state and
federal respondents were strongly opposed to any form o f paper benefits being
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utilized by welfare agencies. City and county respondents’ responses reflected more
confidence in the Paper-Based system than those o f their counterparts employed by
state and federal agencies. More state and federal respondents did, however,
recognize some short-comings in the EBT system. Over 90% strongly disagreed or
disagreed that the use of a Personal Identification Number (needed with the EBT
system) would positively prove who accessed welfare benefits. A slightly lower
percentage (83%) o f city and county respondents felt the same. State and federal
respondents may realize that the EBT system is needed to save administrative costs,
but that the potential for fraud will still be present.
Education
There is a relationship between the respondents’ education and their
perceptions on the selection of an alternative welfare system for preventing duplicate
assistance fraud, counterfeiting, stolen benefits, and food stamp trafficking. The
differences were statistically significant (p < .05). More noncollege than college
graduates selected the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging as an alternative to the PaperBased welfare system for preventing the four most common forms of fraud, namely,
duplicate assistance fraud, counterfeiting, benefits being stolen, and food stamp
trafficking. Many o f the noncollege graduates could be respondents who work on the
front lines in the investigation o f fraud, processing o f clients, and distribution o f
benefits. Their perspective may be based on observing the failure o f the Paper-Based
with Fingerprint Imaging and the EBT systems to prevent fraud, as well as the firm
belief that a more stringent system is needed. For example, eligibility workers may
have suspicions that someone is applying twice for benefits with the EBT system but
have no method to prove it, while welfare fraud investigators may have witnessed an
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increase in food stamp trafficking with the Paper-Based with Fingerprint Imaging
system.
Education also influenced respondents in their selection o f an alternative that
would provide the necessary changes to prevent fraud. The differences were
statistically significant (p<. 05). A higher percentage o f college graduates than
noncollege graduates perceived that none o f the alternatives to the Paper-Based
system would provide the necessary changes to prevent fraud. This may suggest that
college graduates are more likely to be administrators who, because o f their
education and experience, have a more complete understanding o f the complexity of
fraud issues facing the welfare system. However, over half of the noncollege
graduates also believed that none of the alternatives provide enough change to
prevent fraud.
Experience
The respondents’ experience was found to influence their perceptions towards
the selection o f an alternative welfare system for providing the necessary changes to
prevent fraud (p < .05). There was a stronger preference for no selection by
respondents with 10 or less years of experience than those with 10 or more years of
experience. Younger respondents may be more knowledgeable about the limits of
technology in preventing fraud. This perception is consistent with the findings of
Glickman et al. (1994): “It appears that selling of benefits for cash under the EBT
system is much more difficult than under the Paper-Based system, although it is still
possible” (p. 139).
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Age
Age was found to influence perceptions in identifying technologies that would
not prevent fraud (p < .05). Many more respondents over the age of 40 years
strongly disagreed or disagreed that the use of a Personal Identification Number (a
requirement with the EBT system) would positively prove who accessed the welfare
benefits. Younger respondents may have more knowledge and experience with
electronic financing (the use of credit cards) than older respondents. Older
respondents may be more fearful than their younger colleagues of crimes that have
occurred in the credit card industry.
Statistical differences were not found in the case of the following social and
demographic variables (p > .05): employer’s involvement with either EBT or
Fingerprint Imaging, gender, and ethnicity.
Policy Implications
Some o f the respondents provided benefits for the EBT with Fingerprint
Imaging system when asked to supply policy implications for the alternative o f their
choice. The major benefits the respondents provided were: positive identification by
law enforcement respondents, improved control for delivering benefits by welfare
benefit admonition respondents, and having real time data available by EBT
administration respondents. When asked to choose a policy alternative to the PaperBased welfare system and indicate the resulting policy implications, 74 respondents
provided a response. Seventy of the 74 choose the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging
system. Three critical policy implications were identified by the respondents in
implementing the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system. Although there were some

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

156
differences between the respondents, these policy implications appeared to transcend
all social and demographic variables. The three policy implications most frequently
identified by respondents were: access to benefits by authorized representatives such
as home health aides and members o f the immediate family, administrative costs, and
the right to fingerprint welfare recipients. Four respondents selected the EBT system
and pinpointed that administrative costs, access to benefits by authorized
representatives, and the system’s inability to prevent fraud were potential policy
implications. None o f the respondents set forth potential policy implications for the
Paper-Based with Fingerprint Imaging system.
Summary of Findings
Data were collected and analyzed for the three policy alternatives to the
Paper-Based system, namely, the Paper-Based system with Fingerprint Imaging,
EBT, and EBT with Fingerprint Imaging. They were examined with particular
reference to fraud that has commonly occurred in the Paper-Based welfare system.
The information regarding the alternative systems was gathered from a survey that
utilized nominal and ordinal level data. The data with respect to policy implications
were obtained from one open-ended statement that requested the respondents to
indicate their selection o f an alternative to the Paper-Based system and their estimate
as to policy implications o f implementing that system.
Summary for the Prevention of the Four Most Common Forms of Welfare Fraud
There were not enough selections o f the Paper-Based with Fingerprint
Imaging and EBT to apply the chi-square test. The respondents who selected
“undecided,” “don’t know,” or “none” were categorized as making no selection.
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Those results were compared to the respondents who selected the EBT with
Fingerprint Imaging system through a chi-square analysis. The highest percentage of
law enforcement, city, county, and noncollege graduates selected the EBT with
Fingerprint Imaging system. For the purposes of Section 1, welfare fraud was defined
as duplicate assistance fraud, counterfeiting, stolen benefits, and food stamp
trafficking.
Summary of Findings for Preventing All Fraud
There were not enough selections o f the Paper-Based with Fingerprint
Imaging and EBT to apply the chi-square test. The respondents who selected
“undecided,” “don’t know,” or “none” were categorized as making no selection.
Those results were compared to the respondents who selected the EBT with
Fingerprint Imaging system for the chi-square analysis. Only experience was found to
be statistically different. These experienced respondents opted for no selection rather
than select any of the alternatives.
A higher percentage of respondents with 10 years or less experience than
those with 10 or more years of experience selected no preference. Based on these
results, it would appear that most of the respondents do not believe any o f the
alternatives would provide all the changes that are necessary to prevent fraud.
Summary of Findings for Benefits Produced as a Result of Preventing Fraud
There were not enough selections of the Paper-Based with Fingerprint
Imaging and EBT policy alternatives to apply the chi-square test. The respondents
who selected “undecided,” “don’t know,” or “none” were categorized as making no
selection. Those results were compared to the respondents who selected the EBT
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with Fingerprint Imaging system by doing a chi-square analysis. City and county
respondents selected the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system 50% o f the time for
questions concerning administrative savings, effectiveness o f preventing fraud, and
benefits produced as a result of preventing fraud. State and federal respondents did
not select any one o f the three alternatives.
The following section o f the study will review the findings for o f study,
regarding the technologies for Paper-Based with Fingerprint Imaging, EBT, and EBT
with Fingerprint Imaging system.
Summary o f Findings Regarding Technologies o f the Three Alternatives
for Preventing Fraud
The highest percentage of respondents, who were employed in law
enforcement and employed by a city or county agency, strongly agreed or agreed that
fingerprinting is the most accurate means to identify an individual, and that combining
EBT with Fingerprint Imaging is necessary to prevent fraud in the welfare system.
The differences between the groups were statistically significantly (p < .05). The
findings for Section 4 also indicate that respondents did identify technologies that
would not prevent fraud. EBT administrators, and state and federal respondents had
the highest percentage o f those who opposed the use of any form of the Paper-Based
welfare system being combined with Fingerprint Imaging. These results demonstrate
that combining the paper benefit process with Fingerprint Imaging would not prevent
fraud.
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Summary of Findings Regarding Technologies o f the Three Alternatives
That Will N ot Prevent Fraud

EBT administrators had the highest percentage o f responses for “strongly
disagree” or “disagree” that the Paper-Based with Fingerprint Imaging would allow
only authorized recipients to access benefits. State and federal professionals as well
as EBT administrators had the highest response rate indicating that this same system
would provide real time data. State and federal respondents and those over 40 years
o f age strongly disagreed or disagreed more often than any o f the other professionals
regarding the use of the PIN providing positive identification. The differences were
statistically significant (p < .05).
Summary o f Findings for Policy Implications
Respondents were asked to select an alternative and provide policy
implications. They chose the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system (n = 194),
followed by the EBT system (n = 18), and, finally, Paper-Based with Fingerprint
Imaging (n = 4). O f those 216 who selected the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging
system, only 74 o f the respondents provided policy implications. Those providing
such policy implications were most concerned about the administrative costs involved
in implementing an EBT system with Fingerprint Imaging. The second most frequent
policy implication was the issue of access to benefits by family members and
authorized recipients (home health aides). Many of the respondents raised the issue
that authorized recipients as well as family members would have to be fingerprinted if
states implemented an EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system.
The third most frequently cited implication was the rights o f welfare
recipients, who would be fingerprinted. A number of respondents felt fingerprinting
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welfare recipients might be a civil rights violation. Respondents also felt legislation
would need to be passed to fingerprint welfare recipients before an EBT with
Fingerprint Imaging system could be implemented. There were similarities between
the policy implications provided for the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system and the
EBT system. Here, too, administrative costs were cited most frequently, followed by
access by authorized representatives (someone other than the authorized recipient
who may access benefits). No policy implications were provided for the Paper-Based
system with Fingerprint Imaging.
Unexpected Findings
Although many of the findings were expected (that one system may be
selected over the others), some of the findings were unexpected.
Unexpected Findings for Preventing Common Forms of Fraud
The EBT system with Fingerprint Imaging was selected as the best alternative
to the Paper-Based system by law enforcement and welfare benefits administration
respondents. It was not, however, selected by EBT administrators in terms o f
preventing duplicate assistance fraud, counterfeiting, benefits being stolen, and food
stamp trafficking. EBT administrators were the only professionals who did not
choose the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system, nor did these respondents select
the EBT system. This was surprising, since all EBT administrators are employed by
states which have EBT, and these respondents are responsible for the administration
of these systems.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

161
Unexpected Findings Regarding the Prevention o f All Fraud
The majority o f the respondents indicated that none of the three alternative
systems would provide all the necessary changes to prevent fraud in the welfare
system, even though they preferred the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system. These
results are surprising, since one would assume that a system which prevents the four
common forms of fraud would also provide the necessary changes to prevent all
forms o f fraud. This could mean that the alternatives might prevent common forms o f
fraud but could also create opportunities for new forms of fraud (debit card fraud,
card passing, and electronic fraud). There could also be fears that the fraud created
by these new systems may go undetected.
Unexpected Findings for Alternatives That Provide Welfare Fraud Benefits
Only city and county respondents selected an alternative to the Paper-Based
system for providing welfare fraud prevention benefits. It was anticipated that one of
the systems would be selected based on its ability to eliminate the need for
surveillance cameras and undercover investigations by providing positive
identification. However, only respondents employed by city or county agencies
selected the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging as a system that would provide welfare
fraud benefits such as lowering administrative costs and reducing the number of
investigations. The literature promotes the EBT system as a very desirable alternative
based on its ability reduce administrative costs.
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Unexpected Findings for Technologies That Would Prevent Fraud
Only two technologies were identified by respondents that would help prevent
fraud. The majority of the respondents (with the exception o f EBT administrators)
strongly agreed or agreed that fingerprinting was the most accurate means to identify
an individual and that it is necessary to combine EBT with Fingerprint Imaging to
prevent fraud. This was surprising because much o f the literature argues that the use
o f the EBT card with a Personal Identification Number would prevent fraud in the
welfare system. However, this belief was not shared by the respondents.
Unexpected Findings for Technologies That Would Not Prevent Fraud
The results of identifying technologies unlikely to prevent fraud were not
unexpected. The Paper-Based welfare system with Fingerprint Imaging was identified
by more respondents than any other alternative. That system would not deny access
to unauthorized individuals or provide data concerning each transaction. The use of
the Personal Identification Number was also identified by respondents as a nuance
that would not provide positive identification. The results of testing concerning
potential policy implications were expected.
Much of the literature endorsed the EBT system as a means to prevent the
types o f fraud that have occurred in the Paper-Based system. However, the data
collected and analyzed for this study identify that this system was not selected as the
best alternative for preventing fraud. The following section outlines the conclusions
o f this study on the system that was selected by the respondents.
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Conclusions
Conclusions Related to Alternatives to the Paper-Based System
Prevention o f F rau d

R eg a rd in g

Based on the responses from respondents, one can conclude there is a need
for using encoded fingerprints for identification purposes when attempting to prevent
duplicate assistance fraud, counterfeiting, stolen benefits, and food stamp trafficking.
It would appear that EBT with Fingerprint Imaging requires positive identification at
two critical stages in the welfare process: first, when an individual applies for welfare
benefits; and second, when the benefits are accessed. None of the other alternatives
requires positive identification at these two critical stages. This may help explain why
so many respondents selected the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system for
preventing the four most common forms o f fraud.
By selecting this alternative, respondents are indicating their lack o f support
and confidence in the Paper-Based with Fingerprint Imaging and EBT systems. By
selecting the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging option, law enforcement officials are
indicating that some form of biometric measurement is needed at the points of
application and disbursement in order to prevent any illegal transaction from going
forward. This is critical under EBT, particularly to ensure that benefits are transacted
and received by the rightful beneficiary. However, it can also be concluded that EBT
administrators do not believe that any of the alternatives offer the mechanisms needed
to prevent duplicate assistance fraud, counterfeiting, stolen benefits, and food stamp
trafficking. It would appear that EBT is not a fraud control panacea, but rather more
of an improved efficiency service delivery system. It can be further concluded that
EBT administration respondents have the strongest belief that fraud will continue no

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

164
matter what system is chosen, and that there may be higher priorities in the welfare
system than the prevention of fraud (savings gained by not processing paper
benefits).
Respondents generally do endorse the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging as a
means to prevent duplicate assistance fraud, counterfeiting, benefits being stolen, and
food stamp trafficking. Law enforcement professionals, city and county respondents,
and noncollege graduates are the strongest supporters of the EBT with Fingerprint
Imaging system.
When respondents were asked to identify an alternative that would prevent
the four most common forms of fraud, the majority selected the EBT with Fingerprint
Imaging system. However, when asked to select an alternative that would provide the
necessary changes to prevent fraud, the majority of the respondents made no
selection. The respondents felt that none of these alternatives would provide enough
changes to significantly prevent fraud. Many respondents may think EBT or EBT
with Fingerprint Imaging cannot be limited by state boundaries. It can be concluded
that without a nationwide system EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system, an individual
could receive welfare benefits in two different states at the same time: in one state
under his or her own name, and in another state under an assumed name. Also, the
EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system may be susceptible to other forms o f fraud and
manipulation other than duplicate assistance fraud, counterfeiting, benefits being
stolen, and food stamp trafficking. Some forms of fraud that could possibly occur
under the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system are: recipient purchases o f nonfood
items, recipients claiming illegal dependents, and recipients working and receiving
welfare benefits at the same time.
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One o f the primary reasons many states want to prevent fraud is to reduce
administrative costs. In terms of preventing fraud, administrative costs could be
reduced by eliminating surveillance cameras and undercover investigations. Based on
the views o f these respondents, one can conclude that none of the alternatives will
greatly reduce administrative costs in terms of fraud prevention.
O f the policy technologies offered by these alternatives, it can be concluded
that it is helpful to combine EBT with Fingerprint Imaging to prevent fraud. It can be
further concluded that these respondents viewed the technologies offered by the
other alternatives, such as Paper-Based with Fingerprint Imaging and Personal
Identification Number, as not offering much of a deterrence to fraud prevention.
The respondents identified a number of policy implications that may prevent
the implementation o f an EBT with Fingerprint Imaging System. The most frequently
cited ones were: high administrative costs to install computer hardware and software,
limited access to authorized representatives, and the constitutional rights o f welfare
recipients not to be fingerprinted.
Table 25 indicates the statistical significant differences between the
respondents for social and demographic characteristics. This table indicates the
highest responses for each group of respondents in relationship to the hypotheses.
Sum m aiy-of Conclusions

The major conclusion drawn from this study then is that the respondents
indicate that EBT with Fingerprint Imaging is the best alternative to the Paper-Based
welfare system for preventing duplicate assistance fraud, counterfeiting, the theft of
welfare benefits, and food stamp trafficking. One can also conclude that
fingerprinting is the most accurate means available to identify an individual and that it
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Table 25
Quantat Results for the Highest Responses
Hypothesis

Social or Demographic Group
With Highest Response

Statistically
Significant
Difference

Common forms prevented by
EBT with Fingerprint
Imaging system

City, county, noncollege
graduates, law enforcement

Yes

Prevention o f all fraud (No
selection)

EBT administrators, state,
federal, college graduates, less
than 10 years of experience

Yes

Produce fraud prevention
benefits

State and federal

Yes

Magnetic stripes

40 years or older

Yes

Fingerprint is the most
accurate means to identify
an individual

City, county, welfare benefit
administrators

Yes

It is necessary to combine
both EBT and Fingerprint
Imaging

City, county, law enforcement

Yes

Paper-Based with
Fingerprint Imaging

State and federal

Yes

EBT with Personal
Identification Number

State, federal, and professionals
older than 40 years

Yes

Technologies that will
prevent fraud

Technologies that will not
prevent fraud

must be combined with EBT to help prevent fraud. Even when EBT and Fingerprint
Imaging are combined to prevent fraud, however, these technologies may not be
enough to prevent all forms of fraud. The EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system may
still be vulnerable to other forms o f fraud besides duplicate assistance fraud,
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counterfeiting, stolen benefits, and food stamp trafficking. In the event states choose
to implement EBT with Fingerprint Imaging, there will be high administrative costs
as well as other issues relating to access to benefits and the constitutional rights of
individuals to be fingerprinted.
Recommendations
Implications for Public Policy
The implications for public policy that can be inferred from these respondents’
responses encompass issues pertaining to the distribution of any government benefits
to the appropriate recipients. The findings of this research can be applied to Social
Security benefits, veterans benefits, railroad retirement, and Medicare, to name a few.
It has been recommended that to make EBT most cost-effective, the card would have
to provide several benefits. For example, the EBT card will be used for child support,
Medicaid, and Women, Infants and Children (WIC) programs. An individual will be
able to receive benefits from all of these programs using the same EBT card. If any
one of these federal and state programs is susceptible to fraud, then millions of
dollars are at risk.
Once public policy respondents have decided upon an alternative, the
potential of the system to prevent fraud must at that point be determined. Before
millions of dollars are invested in alternative systems, it must be determined whether
these systems are capable of preventing fraud, or simply change fraud from one form
to another.
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The benefits of fraud prevention must be compared to the cost of
implementing a particular policy. Any agency planning such a change must consider *
whether these savings outweigh the administrative costs.
States that choose to change their welfare benefit distribution systems must
also consider the constitutional rights of recipients before investing taxpayers dollars.
If the courts determine that the means o f identifying an individual are intrusive and
thus unconstitutional, the alternative system would have to be abandoned.
Recommendations for Future Research
The results of this study suggest the need for continued investigation of issues
relating to government benefit systems and fraud. In addition, the results of this study
support the need to consider major changes in welfare systems in this country.
Several implications for future research can be drawn from this study.
1. Future research should continue to focus on identifying the several forms
of vulnerability in welfare system, specifically, where fraud can occur in the system
and what can be done to prevent it. One example is preventing recipients from
receiving welfare benefits while they are employed.
2. Additional research needs to be completed that examines positive
identification of applicants and recipients during the application and disbursement of
benefits. Alternatives such as retina scanning and voice identification should be
compared to other identification methods to find the best system in terms of
efficiency, effectiveness, and cost.
3. A longitudinal study should be instituted to monitor welfare fraud referrals,
fraud complaints, fraud investigations, and fraud convictions stemming from all three
alternatives to judge which system would best prevent crimes in the welfare system.
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4. A study should be completed that compares aggregate data from the states
that have implemented the Paper-Based with Fingerprint Imaging, EBT, and EBT
with Fingerprint Imaging systems to gather data for research purposes.
5. Focus groups should be formed to evaluate these three systems and other
alternatives that might emerge from such discussions. These groups should include
professionals from law enforcement, welfare benefit administration, and EBT
administration in states that have all three systems.
Closing Comments
Public agencies across this country have recognized that welfare assistance is
an appropriate undertaking of government on behalf of persons less fortunate. In fret,
the courts have made it a legal requirement. In Goldberg v. Kelly, the United States
Supreme Court (1970) stated that “welfare benefits are a matter of statutory
entitlement for persons to receive them” (n.p.). Welfare, by meeting the basic
demands o f subsistence, can help bring within the reach o f the poor the same
opportunities that are available to others to participate meaningfully in the life o f the
community (United States Supreme Court, 1970). And this is why the proper use of
welfare benefits is so vitally important.
The purpose o f this study was to review three alternatives to the Paper-Based
Welfare system for the purposes of preventing fraud. Based on the results, one can
infer that combining EBT with Fingerprint Imaging, more than any alternative
currently available, may help prevent the four most common forms of fraud and
provide some fraud prevention benefits. This conclusion is based on premise that
some form o f biometric must be used with an EBT system to combat fraud.
However, the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging will not prevent all fraud. The

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

170
implementation o f the EBT with Fingerprint Imaging system may involve high
administrative costs, prompt constitutional challenges to fingerprinting, and prevent
welfare recipients with physical challenges from accessing benefits.
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To:

Peter Kobnk, Principal Investigator
Timothy Cole, Student Investigator a
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HSIRB Project Number 98-02-13

This letter will serve as confirmation that your research project entitled
“Practitioner's Pciccptives of Changes in the Paper-Based System for Preventing
Welfare Crimes” has been approved under the exempt category o f review by the
Human Subjects Institutional Review Board. The conditions and duration o f this
approval are specified in the Policies of Western Michigan University. You may
now begin to implement the research as described in the application.
Please note that you may only conduct this research exactly in the form it was
approved. You must seek specific board approval for any changes in this project.
You must also seek reapproval if the project extends beyond the terminatiau date
noted below. In addition if there are any unanticipated advene reactions or
unanticipated events associated with the conduct o f this research, you should
immediately suspend the project and contact the Chair of die HSIRB for
consultation.
The Board wishes you success in the pursuit of your research goals.
Approval Termination:

4 May 1998
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Dear Participant:
A study is being conducted under the sponsorship of the Michigan Family
Independence Agency, Office of Inspector General, and Western Michigan University.
The purpose o f this study is to examine the best possible system to distribute benefits..
Soon you will be mailed a survey. You will be asked to complete the survey and return it
by:__________________ . Michigan is one of many states in the process o f developing
an Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) pilot project. Because not enough attention has
been given in the prevention o f fraud your response is o f the utmost importance.
The responses remain confidential. No one will know how you responded to the
statements.
The questions utilize likert scale. You will simply have to indicate if you,
Strongly Agree {SA}, Agree {A}, are Undecided {U}, Disagree {D}, or Strongly
Disagree {SD} with the statement provided. The survey will take approximately 10
minutes to complete. I am the principal investigator and will be your contact person if
you have any questions. The study also constitutes my doctoral dissertation in Western
Michigan University's Doctoral Program in Public Administration.
Should you have any questions, please feel free to contact me at (517) 335-3902
week days from 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM .

Sincerely

Timothy J. Cole
Michigan Family Independence Agency
Office o f Inspector General
235 S. Grand
Lansing Michigan 48909
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Welfare Fraud Survey
Michigan Family Independcace Agency, Office o f Inspector General
Selection of an alternative to the Paper-Based System.
Based on your perceptions, please circle the response that indicates your choice. Definitions are provided.
DEFINITIONS
Electronic Benefits T roaster (EBT): Recipients are issued a plastic card with magnetic tape on the back and a personal identification
number. They access benefits at an automotive teller machine or retailer by using a point o f sale terminal connected to a central data base. If
the transaction is approved, the account transfers the benefit amount.
Duplicate Assistance Fraud: A welAre recipient applies for benefits twice: once under then- own name and again under an assumed name,
while providing false identification.
Paper Based taith Fingerprint Imaging System: Welfare benefits are distributed by coupon or check. Benefits are normally mailed to the
recipient's last known address. During the application process the applicant's live fingerprint is compared to those that have been recorded on
the social service's computer data base.
EBT with Fingerprin t Imaging System: During benefit enrollment, live scan fingerprint capture allows fora comparison to be made
between the live scan and prints recorded on the dan base. Welfare benefits are disbursed at either an ATM or Point of Sale machine. This
system allows for self verification by using a fingerprint reader to compare a live scanned fingerprint with the same print encoded on the EBT
card.
Stolen Benefits: Welfare benefits are taken without consent by an unauthorized third party.
Counterfeiting o f Benefits: Coupons, checks and benefit cards are fraudulently replicated and then passed on to unknowing store owners or
sold on the street.
Food Stamp Traflicking: The illegal sale and purchase o f food stamp coupons.
Section I. Fraud Prevention
I. Paper- Based with Fingerprint Imaging (PBw/FP!) 2. Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) 3. EBT with Fingerprint Imaging
(EBTw/FPI) 4. Undecided 5. Don’t Know 6. None
PBw/FPI

EBT

EBTw/FPI

Undecided Don’t Know None
6
5

2

3

5

6

Prevent the counterfeiting o f welfare benefits.

2

3

5

6

4.

Prevent food stamp trafficking.

2

3

5

6

5.

Prevent postal theft o f wel Are benefits.

2

3

5

6

6.

Prevent the trading o f benefits for illegal goods
and services.

2

3

S

6

7.

Reduce undercover investigations.

2

3

5

6

6
6

1.

Prevent duplicate assistance fraud.

2

2.

Prevent unauthorized persons from using stolen benefits.

3.

8.

Will prevent retailers from unauthorized use o f PIN.

2

3

5

9.

Increase recipient’s safety by reducing the threat of attack for
welfare benefits.

2

3

5

10. Prevent the use o f EBT cards purchased illegally.
OVER

I
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1!. Prevent recipients from claiming they did not
receive their benefits.

PBw/FPI
1

EBT
2

EBTw/FPI
3

Undecided Don’t Kaow
4
5

None
6

12. Will prevent counterfeited benefits from being used.

1

2

3

4

S

6

13. Will assist caseworkers with a large caseload to
by identify an individual already receiving welfare benefits.

1

2

3

4

5

6

14. Will reduce the amount o f fraud in the welfare system.

1

2

3

4

5

6

15. Is the best alternative to the Paper-Based system to
prevent welfare fraud.

1

2

3

4

S

6

Section 2. Changes ia th e W elfare System . Based on y ear perceptions, please circle the response that indicates your selection as the best
changes to welfare systems to prevent fraud.
PBW /FPI
EBT EBTW/FPI Undecided Don’t Know None
16. Provide the best positive identification o f recipients.
3
*
5
6
17. Makes stolen benefits useless.

2

3

5

6

18. Will guarantee benefits are delivered from the Social
Service Agency to the recipient.

2

3

5

6

19. Will prove the recipient actually received the benefits.

2

3

5

6

20. Would allow only the authorized recipient to access benefits.

2

3

5

6

21. Will not require eye witness testimony for investigative
purposes.

2

3

5

6

22. Provide benefits that are impossible to duplicate.

2

3

5

6

23. Will not increase the amount o f time recipients have to
wait to receive benefits.

2

3

5

6

24. Recipients will not be mailed benefits.

2

3

5

6

25. Will make it possible to trece each transaction.

2

3

5

6

26. Will eliminate the need for surveillance cameras.

2

3

5

6

Section 3. Features o f Alternative Systems Based on your perceptions, please circle the response that best describes how you feel about
the statement.
I. Strongly Agree {SA} 2- Agree {A} 3. Undecided {U} 4. Disagree {D} 5. Strongly Disagree {SD}
27. Magnetic stripes imprinted on EBT cards will prevent
counterfeiting.

{SA»
I

{A}
2

{U}
3

ID*
4

{SD}
5

28. EBT cards with an encoded fingerprint cannot be duplicated.
29. Benefits cannot be accessed unless there is an exact match between
the live fingerprint and the fingerprint image on the EBT card.
30. The use of a Personal Identification Number will prevent
anyone except the authorized recipient front using the EBT card.
OVER
2
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31. A fingerprint is the most accurate mans available to identify an
individual.

(SA) (A>
1 2

{UJ
3

{D|
4

1 2

3

4

5

32. Ii is necessary to combine EBT and Fingerprint Imaging to prevent
fraud.

<SD|
5

33. Implementing Fingerprint Imaging with the Paper-Based system
will allow only the authorized recipient to access benefits.

1

2

3

4

5

34. The EBT with Fingerprint Imaging will allow oniy die authorized
recipient to access benefits.

1

2

3

4

5

35.

Adding fingerprinting to the Paper-Based system will provide
dan on each welfare traniwrion

1

2

3

4

5

36.

The use o f a PIN number will positively prove who accessed
the wel Are benefits.

1

2

3

4

5

3

4

5

37. The Paper-Based system used with Fingerprint Imaging will
positively prove who accessed the welAte benefits.

1 2

Section 4. Policy Im plieatloas involved with the sebctiea o f an alterative to the Paper-Bascd system.
38. In ray opinion, I perceive the best alternative to the Paper-Based system to be (Please circle one) Paper-Based
with F in g e r p r in t Imaging, EBT, EBT with Fingerprint Imaging. The policy implications with selecting this

system are:

2 ._______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

PLEASE CHECK ONE RESPONSE TO EACH QUESTION.
A.

Professionally. I am directly involved in: I. Law Enforcement
2. Welfare Benefit Administration._____
3. EBT Administration._____ 4 . Other (specify)______________

B.

I am presently employed by: I. City_2. County

C.

I am employed 1. Full time

D.

My employer is directly involved with an EBT or Fingerprint System: I.Yes

E.

My employer is not directly involved with an EBT or Fingerp rint System but I am familiar with such systems in other states.
I. Yes
2. No
3. Don’t Know

F.

My highest level o f education is: I. Less than High School
2. High School Grarhmr
4. College Graduate
S. Some Graduate School
6. Graduate Degree_____

2-Pan Time

G.

I am: I.Mate

H.

lam (.C aucasian

I.

I have been employed in my current position for

J.

My age at my last birthday was_____ yean.

3. State
3. Retired

4.Federal_____ 5. Other (specify)_____________
4. Other
2. No

3. Don't Know

3. Some College

2- Female
2. African American______ 3.Hispanic____ 4. Other______
years.

THANK YOU FOR RESPONDING TO TH IS QUESTIONNAIRE
3
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FOOD STAMP TRAFFICKING UNDER EBT

PROOFS

U/C sells
to store

Recipients sells
to store

Testifies to
transaction

Scenerio #1

Scenerio 112

Scenerio 03

Recipients observed to
walk in ABC store and
walk out without bag

Recipients observed to
walk in ABC store with
out bag but leaves with
bag

Recipients use
EBT card to obtain
cash rather than to
purchase food

EBT record of
transaction and
amounts

I

(note)
This case will
be easier to
prosecute
under EBT

T

T

No witness
Video tape by surveillance
crew outsie of store.

No video

Match time with EBT record
of transaction & amount.

EBT printout of
card debited but
no proof of food
not being sold

Photograph of recipients
taken from surviellance
may be matched with photo
in case file
Proof of fraud against store
and recipients

No way to identify
the user of the EBT
card
May be proof of fraud,
depending on if recipient
carried large bag, if the
amount debited compares
to size of bag

Fraud may exist but
cannot be proven
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